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ABSTRACT 
The question of what policy options Sudan can choose to emerge from 
its current economic crisis of persistent inflation, unsustainable 
external and internal imbalances, and negative growth in real output is 
addressed in this study. An empirical general equilibrium model is 
constructed, validated and used to research the nature, causes and 
possible remedies for the economic problems of Sudan. The model is based 
on the multi-sector Walrasian equilibrium structure. Keynsian 
macro-features recognizing short-run adjustment dynamics, sticky prices 
and an endogenous monetary mechanism are also incorporated. The model 
allows for less than perfect flexibility in some markets such as the 
foreign exchange and domestic capital markets due to price rigidities. 
Partial adjustment in some agricultural sectors where supply lags exist 
are also modelled. The economy is disaggregated into 16 sectors. 
Detailed supply and demand specifications are given for each sector in 
the model. The general price level together with other nominal and real 
flows are endogenously determined in this model. 
Econometric methods are used to estimate the model parameters. This 
provided superior statistical basis for model predictions over 
calibration. A jacobian algorithm (GAMS/MINOS) is employed to solve the 
model for equilibrium in the product market. Validation and policy 
analysis are conducted using dynamic simulation. The model showed 
powerful performance in recovering the historical path of the economy. 
Policy experiments indicated that the economy is non-responsive to 
movements in nominal interest rates as the domestic credit market is 
highly controlled. Removal of the institutional rigidities in the 
domestic capital market is therefore necessary for effective monetary 
control and efficient allocation of capital resources in Sudan. 
Simulation results also provided further empirical support to the 
argument that expansionary fiscal and monetary policies have worked 
against stabilization and economic recovery in Sudan. The thesis 
objecting to removal of indirect taxation for budgetary reasons is 
challenged by the tax policy experiment results. The results of the six 
policy experiments suggested that for positive growth and improved 
performance of the Sudan economy, monetary control and minimal indirect 
taxation are required to support exchange rate adjustments. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Preamble 
Various efforts have recently been made by Sudan in coordination 
with donor organizations and governments to overcome the severe internal 
and external imbalances facing the economy. The economic recovery 
programs of the late seventies and early eighties failed to achieve their 
intended objectives and in some instances led to perverse results. After 
almost a decade of economic adjustments and policy reforms, mainly in the 
direction of the IMF/World Bank prescriptions, Sudan continues to suffer 
from persistant inflation, unsustainable balance of payments deficits, 
and negative growth in real output. 
While the need for fiscal improvements and monetary control was well 
recognized by donor initiated stabilization programs, special emphasis 
was placed on liberalizing the foreign trade and payments regimes of 
Sudan. Several devaluations and removals of various foreign exchange and 
trade controls were undertaken. However, devaluation and partial 
liberalization were introduced in the presence of a number of other 
distortions in the economy. Although Sudan's experience is yet to be 
adequately evaluated, the presence of unfavorable macro-economic 
environments has been considered one major factor behind the failure of 
trade liberalization in many countries (Sjaastad, 1983; Mussa, 1986; 
Fischer, 1986; and Corbo and de Melo, 1987). 
On the other hand simultaneous introduction of stabilization 
measures along with structural adjustment programs has been blamed for 
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the unsatisfactory results of liberalization in some developing countries 
(Krueger, 1984 and Fischer, 1986). It has been argued that the two 
programs may contain conflicting objectives or use instruments that 
generate offsetting effects. Whereas the short term macro reforms of 
stabilization may be contractionary, structural adjustment packages aim 
at expanding the productive capacity and promoting allocative efficiency 
and growth (Cline, 1983 and Krueger, 1984). Moreover, elimination of 
price controls and indirect taxes with liberalization may conflict with 
stabilization efforts particularly in developing countries where these 
are the main anti-inflationary measures and sources of fiscal revenues 
(Mussa, 1986 and Fischer, 1986). -Another, fundamentally different view 
of the third world economic crisis is provided by the structuralists 
critique of orthodox stabilization policies. Structuralists argue that 
tight monetary restraints and devaluation are inflationary and 
inconsistent with the structural nature of developing countries' economic 
problems which, on the contrary, call for expansionary policies and 
increased investment (Taylor, 1981 and Ahluwalia and Lysy 1981). 
The sequencing and speed at which liberalization is introduced has 
also been considered an important factor in its success (Krueger, 1984; 
McKinnon, 1982; Frenkel, 1982; and Edwards, 1984). It is therefore 
essential for an adequate evaluation of Sudan's economic experience and 
for conducting useful policy analysis, to incorporate the complex 
structural interactions outlined above in an integrated analytical 
framework. This is an objective towards which the present study intends 
to contribute. 
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A wide range of analytical models have been employed in conducting 
the empirical search for the second best economic strategy in distorted 
economies. The social costs of economic distortions have been analyzed 
in isolated markets as well as with economy wide models. While partial 
equilibrium analyses do not capture the intermarket effects, multi-
sector Walrasian models disregard short term adjustments and adjustment 
costs and suppress the nominal sectors of the economy. On the other 
hand, the monetary mechanism and short run dynamics are explicitly 
modelled in the usually demand driven macro-econometric models (Robinson 
and Roland-Hoist, 1987a, 1987b). Limited information, however, is 
obtained from aggregated macro models on sectoral adjustments and micro-
based responses in disaggregated markets. 
Hybrid models that incorporate Walrasian supply structures into 
Keynesian macro models have also been developed to endogenize supply and 
demand simultaneously, recognize the role of the financial sectors and 
generate sectoral responses (Dungan, 1980 and Feltenstein, 1984). These 
models are, however, equilibrium models and do not provide for the 
endogeneity of money, an important phenomenon in developing countries. 
Two tasks are, therefore, intended for the present research. First, 
the study aims at identifying the gaps in existing methods and approaches 
of policy analysis in developing countries. A model that attempts to 
overcome the deficiencies of current methods will be developed. 
Important structural rigidities and adjustment dynamics will be 
recognized in a reasonably disaggregated general equilibrium model with 
endogenous money. Explicit modelling of the macro sectors'together with 
4 
the real spheres of the economy will allow for comprehensive 
representation of various tax structures as well as other fiscal, 
monetary and commercial policy instruments. 
The second task is empirical. Parameters of the model will be 
measured econometrically to verify the important thesis of structural 
rigidities and inelastic short run responses to policy changes that 
questions the efficacy of monetarists' stabilization policies in semi-
industrialized countries. The model will then be used to analyze the 
economy wide impacts of sector-specific as well as macro-economic 
policies in Sudan. The net effects of alternative fiscal, monetary, 
pricing, and foreign trade and payments regimes will be evaluated with 
the model, with the aim of delineating the appropriate course of actions 
for economic recovery in Sudan. 
Organization of the Study 
The study consists of seven chapters. Chapter one defines the 
research problem and motives of the study. The structural features and 
performance of Sudan economy and the debate over the current economic 
crisis are summarized in Chapter two. Chapter three reviews current 
methods of economic policy analysis in developing countries and defines 
specific objectives and methods of the study. A general equilibrium 
model for the Sudan economy is developed in Chapter four. Chapter five 
discusses alternative estimation procedures and presents estimates of the 
parameters of the model. Policy simulations and validation of the 
5 
model are performed in Chapter six. Chapter seven summarizes the 
findings and derives policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER POLICY REFORMS 
IN SUDAN 
The nature and origins of the present economic crisis in Sudan are 
analyzed in this chapter. Structural features and performance of the 
economy under various policies over the last two decades are summarized 
in part one. Part two reviews the available relevant literature and 
presents different views about the soundness of devaluation and 
liberalization policies in Sudan. The structure of economic incentives 
and internal terms of trade between economic sectors are discussed in 
part three. Part four summarizes the discussion in this chapter and 
defines the contribution of the present study. 
Structure and Performance 
Sectoral structure 
Contributions of the major economic sectors of Sudan to domestic 
production, value of exports and employment are given in Table 2.1. 
According to Table 2.1, agriculture is the biggest employer and foreign 
exchange earner for the country. A significant share of GDP (37%) is 
also generated in the farming sector. This clearly indicates the 
importance of agriculture to the Sudan economy. Moreover, agriculture 
provides a vital backward linkage to industrial development in Sudan 
since manufacturing is mainly agro-based. The fact that only 20% of the 
total arable land in the country is currently utilized points out the 
potential of Sudanese agriculture for economic growth (Ali, 1984a). 
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Table 2.1 also reflects upon the sectoral growth pattern and inter­
industry flow of resources in the Sudan. The share of agriculture in the 
labor force went down, whereas, the other sectors continued to use more 
labor over the same period. Given the rate of growth in total supply of 
labor, a declining share may not necessarily imply reduced employment, it 
nevertheless, indicates that larger proportions of the additional labor are 
being absorbed by the steadily growing services sector. The growing share 
of the services sector in GDP (57%) is relatively high compared to 31% and 
40% in low and upper- middle income countries respectively (World Bank, 
1983). This imbalance may reflect the long term effects of a sectorally 
biased economic policy (such as an overvalued exchange rate) that distorts 
Table 2.1. Distribution of GDP, value of exports and labor force 
by economic sector in the Sudan, 1970-1983 (percentages)® 
Agriculture Manufacturing^ Services^ 
70/71 77/78 82/83 70/71 77/78 82/83 70/71 77/78 82/83 
Share in GDP(%) 
Contribution to 
Value of 
Exports (%) 
Distribution of 
Labor Force (%) 
38.6 36.5 34.4 
88.6 94.7 90.1 
69.8 68.5 64.8 
9.1 7.5 7.9 
11.4 5.3 9.9 
3.3 4.46 4.5 
52.3 56.0 57.7 
26.9 27.04 30.7 
^Ministry of Finance, "Economic Survey," and Bank of Sudan, "Annual 
Report," various issues. 
^Includes mining. 
^Consists of trade, construction, transport and other services. 
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the structure of incentives to producers of traded goods and leads to 
reallocation of resources away from tradables into home goods sectors. 
Internal balance 
The rapidly mounting deficits of the public sector shown in Table 
2.2 (row 5) indicates the serious internal imbalance facing the Sudan 
economy. The heavy reliance on indirect taxation to generate revenue for 
the government and the use of deficit financing and external borrowing to 
close the internal resource gap are two basic features of Table 2.2. 
These are common to most developing economies where the institutional 
difficulties associated with direct taxation and the absence of efficient 
capital markets limit governments' abilities to use alternative measures 
(income taxes and borrowing from the public) to mobilize other domestic 
financial resources and curb private consumption. Whereas indirect 
taxation distorted market prices during the period covered in the table, 
significant pressures were placed on domestic inflation by deficit 
financing and external borrowing. The short and long term effects of 
these policies on economic incentives, the real exchange rate and 
resource allocation were certainly substantial as the wrong signals were 
communicated to economic agents through distorted relative prices. 
On the other hand, alternative instruments of monetary control other 
than borrowing from the non-bank public, were inefficiently utilized. 
Table 2.3 shows that negative real rates of interest were maintained over 
the same period. The lack of positive real interest rates coupled with 
the absence of efficient markets for financial assets (bonds) and low 
Table 2.2. Internal balance and the financial performance of the public sector in the Sudan 
(1971-1986)® 
71/72 73/74 75/76 77/78 79/80 80/81 82/83 85/86 
1) Cent. Govmt. Revenue (Ls mil.) 163.7 209.5 332.0 451.6 691.8 760.9 1469.0 1790.4 
Indirect Tax. {% of revenue) 63.4 67.5 74.5 68.1 68.9 66.4 61.1 68.2 
2) Cent. Govmt. Tot. Spend (Ls mil) 201.2 231.4 416.3 595.4 808.0 909.5 2130.7 3747.3 
oDevelop. Expend. (% tot. exp.) 14.8 28.1 37.2 36.4 28.4 24.5 22.9 10.1 
3) Central Govmt. Balance (1-2) -37.5 -21.9 -84.3 -143.8 -116.2 -148.6 -661.7 -1956.9 
4) Other Pub. Entities Pos. (net) -2.1 -50.3 -46.0 4.5 -34.4 -131.5 -92.2 -69.6 
5) Overall Position, Pub. Sec. (3&4) -39.6 -72.2 -130.3 -139.3 -150.6 -280.1 -753.9 -2026.5 
6) Financing-Overall Def. (Ls mil) 39.6 72.2 130.3 139.3 150.6 280.1 753.9 2026.5 
o/w Central Bank Financing (%) 80.8 58.0 82.7 96.8 60.7 75.3 24.3 59.9 
Foreign Borrowing {%) 9.2 33.8 17.3 3.2 39.3 24.7 75.7 40.1 
Sales, Govmt. Securities (%) 10.0 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
®Bank of Sudan, "Annual Report," various issues. 
Table. 2.3. GDP, total spending and the inflationary pressures of the current resource gap in 
Sudan 1974-1985 (Ls million)^ 
74/75 75/76 77/78 79/80 80/81 81/82 83/84 85/86 
1) GDP (Y) 1510.8 1848.0 2882.7 4122.6 5431.7 7246.1 11493.0 14920.0 
2) Consumption (C) 1418.2 1604.8 2700.2 3837.1 5256.0 7384.2 10787.0 14090.0 
o/w Private (%) 85.4 85.7 87.8 83.4 83.3 87.1 84.8 85.9 
3) Gross dom. savings (S=l-2) 92.6 243.2 182.5 285.4 175.7 -138.1 706.0 830.0 
4) Gross domestic investment (I) 265.1 427.5 413.7 735.0 899.0 1161.0 1792.0 2114.0 
5) Resource gap (3-4)=Exp-Imp^ -172.5 -184.3 -231.2 -449.6 -723.3 -1299.1 -1086.0 -1284.0 
6) Gross domestic spending (C+I) 
as a % of GDP (Y) 111.4 110.0 108.2 110.9 113.3 117.9 118.8 111.3 
7) Rate of inflation 22 1.6 18 30 25 25 32 46 
8) Nominal rate of interest 
(average deposits) 
7.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 13.0 15.0 
®Bank of Sudan, "Annual Report," various issues and World Bank, 1983. 
^Equivalent to the trade balance in the balance of payments (BOP) and represents a net inflow of 
capital (external borrowing). 
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income taxation discouraged private savings and stimulated consumption 
and excess demand (Table 2.3). 
The government rather chose to impose quantitative restrictions in 
order to allocate credit and manage aggregate demand. Private borrowing, 
however, was reported to expand from Ls206 million in 1975 to Ls 2716.0 
million in 1980 (Table 2.4). Most of this borrowing is believed to have 
been invested in directly unproductive activities such as speculative 
hoarding of goods and holdings of foreign currencies (Ali and Hussein, 
1986). Increased private investment in residential construction is one 
more example of the unproductive use of scarce capital resources (World 
Bank, 1983). The flow of capital resources into the steadily expanding 
services sector represents another feature of the sectoral growth 
imbalance of the Sudanese economy. 
Due to the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies of Sudan, money 
supply rose from Ls 309.5 million in 1975 to Ls 7265 million in 1986—a 
2347% increase (Table 2.4). This increase in turn led to excessive 
domestic inflation. Taken together, the above mentioned fiscal and 
monetary practices were among the main forces behind the failure of the 
IMF initiated stabilization programs of the late seventies in the Sudan. 
Also, real GDP shows very low to negative rates of growth for most of the 
last decade (column 9, Table 2.4). 
External balance 
Another important feature of the economic crisis in the Sudan is the 
steadily growing balance of payments deficit (Table 2.5). While 
Table 2.4. Factors affecting money supply (Ls millions), 1975 - 1986® 
75 77 79 81 82 83 84 85 86 
1) Net foreign assets 
2) Net claims on 
public sector 
3) Net claims on 
private sector 
4) Other 
5) Money supply (M2) 
6) % age change in M2 
7) % age change in CPI 
(inflation) 
8) % age change in GDP 
9) % age change in 
real GDP (8-7) 
-172.4 
338.2 
206.6 
-62.9 
309.5 
-208.3 
610.8 
287.6 
-158.3 
531.8 
39.8 
23.0 
24.6 
1.6 
-286.0 
930.3 
483.9 
-191.7 
937.2 
29.2 
32.0 
12.9 
-19.1 
-871.2 
1340.5 
807.5 
292.8 
1569.6 
27.4 
24.0 
23.4 
-0.6 
-1121.3 
1214.2 
1173.1 
895.1 
2161.1 
37.7 
26.0 
38.2 
-12.2 
-2218.5 
1659.6 
1422.0 
1964.0 
2827.1 
30.8 
31.0 
32.6 
1.6 
-2220.4 
3315.1 
1665.8 
501.0 
3261.5 
15.4 
32.0 
18.7 
-13.3 
-2367.0 
5883.0 
1843.0 
-86.0 
5273.0 
61.7 
45.4 
29.8 
-15.6 
-2797.0 
7166.0 
2716.0 
180.0 
7265.0 
37.8 
29.0 
34.1 
5.1 
®Bank of Sudan, "Annual Report" and Ministry of Finance, "Economic Survey," various 
issues. 
Table 2.5. Sudan's balance of payments (U.S.$ million), 1972-1986® 
Exports Imports 
Trade 
Bal ance 
Net Factor 
Income 
Private 
Transfers 
Current 
Bal ance 
External^ 
Terms of Trade 
Developing 1 
Countries 
Terms of Trade 
1972/73 434.2 428.7 5.5 -26.4 9.5 -11.4 .87 .97 
73/74 479.6 618.6 -139.0 -26.2 24.4 -140.8 .95 1.1 
74/75 526.7 1022.1 -495.4 -43.1 66.1 -472.4 .79 1.0 
75/76 639.3 1169.2 -529.3 -51.2 150.7 -429.8 .56 .95 
76/77 708.9 1134.0 -425.1 -51.0 172.0 -304.1 .58 .99 
77/78 691.1 1360.0 -663.9 -51.1 221.0 -494.0 .68 1.13 
78/79 699.4 1321.3 -621.8 -69.0 240.0 -450.8 .83 1.05 
79/80 798.4 1563.5 -765.1 -58.8 209.0 -614.9 .78 1.03 
80/81 698.9 1850.4 -1151.5 -70.0 305.0 -916.5 .57 .99 . 
81/82 704.2 2165.7 -1461.5 -157.0 350.0 -1268.5 .42 .90 
82/83 839.0 2042.5 -1203.5 -142.0 430.0 -915.5 .48 .90 
83/84 848.0 1649.0 -801.0 -458.0 395.0 -864.0 .83 .91 
84/85 734.0 1500.0 -766.0 -478.0 430.0 -814.0 .90 .87 
85/86 695.0 1336.0 -641.0 -559.0 350.0 -850.0 .66 .93 
^World Bank (1983, 1987), Bank of Sudan, "Annual Report," various issues. 
^Ratio of exports to imports price index constructed by author for Sudan (see Appendix A). 
^The IPS ratio of exports to imports price index for non-oil exporting developing countries. 
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continuous deterioration in the terms at which Sudan trades with the rest 
of the world, particularly in the late seventies and the eighties (Table 
2.5) was one strong factor. Besides unfavorable external economic condi­
tions, several internal factors contributed significantly to the severe 
trade imbalance. In addition to the negative impacts of the expansive 
fiscal and monetary policies discussed in the previous section, an 
adverse foreign trade and payments regime was adopted by Sudan as well. 
The basic properties of the exchange rate and commercial policies of the 
country are described in the next section. It is important to note 
though, that a massive investment program undertaken by the government in 
the seventies was financed by large external borrowing. The failure of 
those projects to pay back when foreign debt payments fell due in the 
late seventies led to the clearly unsustainable imbalance of the eighties. 
The foreign trade and payments regimes of Sudan 
Three distinct periods are considered to represent the evolution of 
Sudan's foreign exchange and trade regimes. These include two phases of 
high government control and intervention (before 1978 and after 1984) 
with a liberalization era in-between (1978-1984). 
Pre-liberalization period (prior to 1978) Since before indepen­
dence in 1956 and until the seventies, Sudan exercised full exchange 
control under a system of fixed exchange rates. All capital and current 
international transactions were carried at the fixed nominal rate of Ls 
0.35 per U.S.$ until 1972. No private dealings in foreign exchange were 
allowed and all export proceeds were to be surrendered to the Bank of 
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Sudan at the official rate. A strict import system was also maintained 
over the same period where the Central Bank provided the foreign exchange 
at a specified rate. 
An exchange tax/subsidy system for non-cotton exports, imports, and 
remittances of Sudanese nationals working abroad (SNWA) was introduced in 
the early seventies (Table 2.6). As is common to almost all developing 
economies, multiple exchange rates are used to promote exports, encourage 
private transfers, and provide protection to domestic industries. Such 
protectionist strategies of economic development are founded in the 
import substitution—export promotion doctrines of industrial growth. New 
import systems were also introduced to mobilize additional foreign 
exchange resources, namely the Town-barter (TB) and the Nil-value (NV) 
systems. Under the TB system exporters of marginal products (other than 
cotton and gum arabic) were allowed to usé 50% of their foreign exchange 
revenues to finance imports and surrender the other half to the Central 
Bank at the official exchange rate. The TB has been considered an 
export-promotion system. Additional imports, to be financed from the 
savings of SNWA, were also allowed via NV licensing. Importers could 
obtain the necessary foreign exchange from non-bank sources under the NV 
system, e.g., they were allowed to buy foreign exchange from SNWA. 
Apart from a limited success in attracting private transfers to 
official banking channels, the above described payments and trade regimes 
failed to improve the balance of payments position. It has been argued 
that the overvalued exchange rate, inflationary internal imbalances and 
protectionism distorted the structure of incentives in Sudan in favor of 
Table 2.6. Exchange rate and foreign trade policies in Sudan since 1970^^ 
OR 
ERi 
(NG-NC) 
ERg 
(GVTIMP) 
ER3 
(CN-INP) RR Trade and Payment Regimes 
1970/71 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 Strict import against payment system 
All foreign exch. proceeds from exports 
are to be surrendered to the Bank of 
Sudan. All transactions at the OR. 
1972 .35 (.40) .35 .35 .35 Exch. tax/subsidy (ETS) introduced to all 
exports except cotton and gum arabic 
July '73 .35 .40 .35 .35 (.40) Premium rate for remittances of SNWA (RR) 
Jan. '74 .35 .40 .35 .35 (.56) RR adjusted, nil value system for 
imports introduced 
May '75 .35 (.40) .35 .35 .56 Gum arabic exports moved to ETS rate (ER^) 
June '78 (.40) (.50) (.40) (.40) .56 1st devaluation, ER, adjusted 
March '79 .40 .50 .40 .40 (.67) RR adjusted 
July '79 .40 .50 .40 (.50) .67 ETS extended to cotton (CN-INP) 
Sept. '79 (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) 2nd devaluation, more liberalized trade 
(nil-value system abolished), unification 
of exch. rates (all ETS and RR removed). 
a parallel rate of Ls .8 for selected 
exports and imports 
Sept. '80 .50 (.80) .50 .50 .50 All exports and imports except CN-INP & 
GVTIMP at parallel rate 
June '81 .50 .80 .50 (.80) .50 CN-INP moved to parallel market rate (PR) 
July '81 .50 .80 .50 .80 .50 Exch. dealers (ED) licensed and black 
market legalized 
Nov. '81 (.90) (.90) (.90) (.90) (.90) 3rd devaluation (OR & PR unified), all 
trade except l/4th of NC exports at PR, 
the rest at free market rate (FR). 
1982 (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) 4th devaluation. 
Fb/Mar '83 1.3 (1.61) 1.3 (1.61) 1.3 Commercial banks (CB) licensed to deal 
at FR 25% of exports at FR. 
May '83 1.3 1.61 1.3 1.61 1.3 Licenses for ED & CB revoked, then rein­
stated for CB in May & ED in June 1983. 
Oct. '84 1.3 (2.4) 1.3 1.61 1.3 Exports of NG-NC at FR and 50% of export 
revenues (100% for sesame) to be trans­
ferred to Central Bank. 
Feb. '85 (2.5) (2.5) (2.5) (2.5) (3.0) 5th devaluation, stringent import licens­
ing & currency control (39 import items 
banned, licenses of ED revoked), RR to be 
operated by CB (crawling rate). 
1986 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 (4.10) CB committee to allocate foreign exch. by 
priority list. Imports ban list extended 
to more than 100 items. 
1987 (4.5) (4.5) (4.5) (4.5) (4.5) 6th devaluation, more liberal import 
system (similar to the nil value). 
®World Bank (1983), Elbadawi (1987), Ministry of Finance, "Economic Survey, 86/87." 
^OR is the official exchange rate; ER^ is the exchange tax/subsidy adjusted rate (ETSAR) 
for non-government imports and non-cotton exports (NG-NC); ER2 is the ETSAR for government imports 
(GVTIMP), which consists of petroleum, wheat, and sugar mainly; ER3 is the cotton exports and 
imported inputs rate (CN-INP) and RR is the premium rate for SNWA remittances. Exchange rates are 
measured as units of local currency (Sudanese Pounds, Ls) per a US$. 
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home goods and.import competing sectors and against exportables. This 
fact led to a steady deterioration in the external balance (IMF, 1977). 
The illegal foreign exchange market grew bigger attracting larger shares 
of the savings of SNWA as the premium on their official remittances was 
much lower than the black market rate, despite its frequent adjustments. 
The high demand for the private transfer funds was mainly a derived 
demand for foreign exchange to finance the NV import licenses. 
Accordingly, an IMF initiated stabilization strategy was adopted by the 
Sudan government in the late seventies, inspite of wide professional and 
political objections. While a review of the conflicting views in this 
regard will wait for the next section, the basic characteristics of the 
IMF inspired foreign trade and payments regime is discussed here. 
Liberalization era (1978-1984) Gradual liberalization of trade, 
removal of exchange controls and movement towards a unified exchange rate 
were the main objectives of the IMF program. Several steps were taken by 
the government in this direction between 1978 and 1984 (Table 2.6). Four 
devaluations of the Sudanese pound took place during this period, often 
referred to as the liberalization era (1978-1984). In 1979 all the 
exchange tax/subsidy schemes and nil-value system of imports were 
abolished. Instead only two exchange rates were established: an 
official (Ls .50/US$) and a parallel (Ls .80/US$) rate for selected 
exports and imports. In 1980, all non-cotton exports (NO and all 
non-government imports (NG) except pharmaceuticals were moved to the 
parallel market. Later cotton joined other exports at the parallel rate. 
These adjustments were meant to give foreign exchange its scarce value 
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and align domestic with world border prices. The policies were expected 
to improve the structure of incentives to producers of exportables and 
manage the excess demand for imports. 
Further steps were taken by the government to remove exchange 
controls. The black market for foreign exchange was legalized and 
licenses were issued to private exchange dealers in 1981. Commercial 
banks were also licensed in 1983 to deal at the free market rate. 
Exports and imports were again gradually shifted to the free market. The 
purpose of the mentioned liberalization policies was to eliminate the 
black market for foreign exchange, unify exchange rates and improve 
external balance. Due to other economic distortions, however, the wedge 
between the free and official exchange rates continued to grow bigger and 
the balance of payments position worsened. The parallel market assumed 
the functions of the old NV system in converting the excess demand for 
imports into an excess demand for SNWA savings leading to larger premiums 
in the free market. The parallel market continued to finance the 
steadily growing current account deficit. 
Post Liberalization Period (1984-1987) In response to the 
failure of the liberalization policies to promote exports, discourage 
imports, and eliminate disequilibria in the balance of payments and 
foreign exchange markets, the government decided to exert more control on 
the system. Private dealing in foreign exchange was again prevented and 
licenses revoked in 1985. Other stringent import licensing and currency 
controls were imposed. More than 39 import items were banned in 1985 and 
higher tariffs were used to ration imports. Administrative restrictions 
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were extended to more than 100 import items in 1986. While tight import 
controls reduced imports in 1985 and 1986, black market rates stayed 
higher by more than 20% over the premium rate on remittances of Ls 4.10/$. 
Consequently, the share of the official banking channels in total private 
transfers continued to decline from an estimated annual average of 20% 
between 1981-1984, to less than 15% in 1986/87 (Elbadawi and Hussein, 
1988). A new nil-value system was introduced in 1986, which reestablished 
once again, the current account link to the black market for foreign 
exchange. 
The Devaluation Controversy in the Sudan 
As documented by Ali (1984b), an undated IMF memorandum, believed to 
have been written in early 1977, began the devaluation debate in the 
Sudan. The IMF memo provided the basis and directives for what was known 
later as the stabilization program. The document argued that Sudan 
experienced an inflation rate higher than its main trading partners in 
the mid-seventies, causing the fixed nominal exchange rate to appreciate 
in real terms. Coupled with expansionary fiscal and monetary policies and 
other structural rigidities, overvaluation of the Sudanese pound was 
believed to be the main cause of the external and internal imbalances 
facing the Sudan economy. Accordingly, the memo recommended a 44% 
reduction in the official exchange rate to become Ls .5/US$. The proposed 
devaluation was believed to be adequate to realign domestic prices with 
their international equivalents, restore the profitability of export 
production, and promote better utilization of the country's comparative 
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advantage, particularly in agriculture. It was argued by the IMF memo 
that, the stabilization program would have a positive impact on the trade 
balance and negligible effects on domestic prices and government budget 
if the suggested devaluation was supported with several policy adjust­
ments such as fiscal and monetary controls, liberalization of foreign 
trade, and removal of institutional rigidities in the irrigated 
agricultural sector. 
In spite of large disagreement with the IMF analysis by many Sudanese 
professionals and political institutions, the government adopted the 
stabilization program in 1978. After that successive policy adjustments 
were introduced to implement the IMF recommendations to liberalize Sudan's 
foreign trade and payment regimes, as described in the previous section. 
The major disagreement with the IMF package was on its devaluation 
component. Ali (1984b) documented several criticisms advanced by El 
Hassan (1977) against the devaluation proposal. The counter devaluation 
argument emphasized the importance of export/import elasticities of 
supply and demand in determining the net impact of an exchange rate 
adjustment on the balance of payments. It was pointed out that for a 
devaluation to have desirable effects on the trade balance it is 
necessary that exports and imports be price responsive (El Hassan, 1977). 
The IMF did not attempt to investigate this requirement. 
Some empirical evidence on the inelasticity of demand for exports 
and imports of consumer goods is provided by the findings of Marzouk 
(1975). Imports of raw materials and capital goods, on the other hand, 
were believed by some authors to be inelastic as quantitative restrictions 
22 
had already reduced imports to essentials. Moreover, the supply of 
exportables, which are highly dominated by agricultural products, was 
expected to be non-responsive to price incentives in the short run due to 
several structural rigidities particularly in the irrigated sector. 
Accordingly, these authors concluded that the results of an exchange rate 
depreciation would at least be ambiguous, if not adverse on the economy. 
The anti-devaluation view also suggested that Sudan suffered from an 
economic management crisis, not a structural imbalance and admitted to 
the need for fiscal and monetary improvements rather than a devaluation 
for a remedy (Ali, 1984b). 
A study of the cost structure and competitiveness of Sudan's major 
export crops was another source of support to the IMF devaluation 
proposal. El Nashashibi (1980) calculated competitiveness indices for 
the six major export crops of the Sudan using the domestic resource cost 
(DRC) criterion. The average shadow price of foreign exchange obtained 
from the DRC indices of El Nashashibi suggested a depreciation of the 
Sudanese pound would restore the profitability of Sudanese exports. 
Nashashibi's framework and results have been questioned on several 
grounds by Hussein (1984b) and Ali (1984c). Hussein (1984b) argued that 
devaluation could lead to a deterioration in the profitability and net 
foreign exchange earnings of domestic resources in their current uses. 
He concluded this based on the low elasticity of supply and high 
elasticity of foreign and domestic prices to the price of Sudanese 
currency. Ali (1984c), on the other hand, using Nashashibi's own supply 
framework, showed that the actual 1978-1983 devaluations were either in 
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the wrong direction or at the wrong magnitudes. He also argued that the 
exchange rate should have been revalued effective 1981 according to the 
competitiveness criteria rather than devalued. 
Contrary to the IMF argument of an overvalued currency, Hussein 
(1984a) showed that the Sudanese pound was undervalued in the 4 years 
prior to the first devaluation of 1978. Table 2.7 calculates the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) price of the Sudanese pound (5%). While 
PPP does not generally hold under extensive import controls and 
restrictions, it is used here as a proxy to the equilibrium exchange 
rate. If E[^ is considered the equilibrium rate, it is interesting to 
note that the 1978 and 1979 devaluations were almost on target. By 
comparing columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.7 we also note that the 1982 
devaluation was very excessive and higher by about 50% than necessary. 
Since then, the nominal exchange rate has remained undervalued throughout 
the 80's rendering all subsequent devaluations irrelevant. This 
observation is in line with the results of Ali (1984c). One could 
further argue that the unnecessary devaluations were a major force 
driving the out of proportion inflation and the serious monetary 
disequilibrium in Sudan in the 80's. Thus, contrary to what they were 
intended for, the 1982-85 devaluations destabilized the economy and 
worsened the already severe internal and external imbalances. 
Column 4 of Table 2.7 indicates the strong association between the 
free market rate and the PPP rate. The appreciation of E|^ in 1976 and 
1977 was reflected in a corresponding appreciation in the black market 
rate (Eg). While there is a high positive correlation between the 
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Table 2.7. Nominal and real exchange rates (Ls/US$) and exports/ 
imports protection ratios in the Sudan (1970-1986)® 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Share of 
DINFR Production 
Eo (ir-ir*) CR ^B NPRx RNPRx RPRm NTB Imports^ 
1970 .35 0.00 .35 .983 .983 1.658 .593 .50 
71 .35 .02 .357 —  —  — —  .975 .956 1.632 .586 .47 
72 .35 .063 .373 — " — — .986 .910 1.585 .575 .49 
73 .35 .08 .402 .64 1.002 .857 1.380 .621 .53 
74 .35 .03 .414 .67 1.002 .831 1.369 .607 .55 
75 .35 .18 .489 .74 1.001 .704 1.070 .657 .57 
76 .35 -.13 .426 . 66 .994 .809 1.303 .621 .61 
77 .35 -.06 .401 .66 .949 .815 1.647 .500 .55 
78 .38 .06 .425 .72 .989 .847 1.541 .550 .56 
79 .43 .186 .504 .77 1.014 .827 1.410 .587 .51 
80 .50 .10 .554 .88 1.223 1.054 1.705 .618 .46 
81 .50 .10 .610 1.03 1.274 .995 1.697 .587 .41 
82 .90 .14 .695 1.45 1.011 1.246 1.60. .778 .42 
83 1.30 .23 .854 1.93 1.047 1.512 1.97 . .767 .41 
84 1.30 .25 1.068 2.44 1.151 1.325 2.274 .582 .42 
85 2.50 .37 1.463 3.60 1.019 1.643 2.942 .559 .43 
86 2.50 .135 1.661 4.28 1.022 1.452 2.644 .549 .44 
®The official (EQ) and black market (Eg) rates were compiled 
from Bank of Sudan, Ministry of Finance and the IMF, "International 
Financial Statistics," various issues. The differential inflation rate 
(DINFR), PPP rate (E|^), nominal and real net protection rates for 
exports (NPR^, RNPR^) and imports (RPRp,) and the net trade bias 
index (NTB) are constructed by author (see Appendix B). NTB=NEx/E^; 
NPRj^=NEj^/Eg; RNPRj^=NEj^/E[^ and RPR^^E^/E^ where E^ and Ej^ are the 
effective exchange rates for imports and exports and NEj^ is the net 
effective rate for exports adjusted for subsidies on imported input. 
^Represents the share of imported production inputs (capital and 
intermediate goods and 40% of petroleum) in total value of imports. 
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movement of the two rates, Eg maintained a substantial wedge over 
throughout the whole period. The high free market premium represents, 
besides the scarcity value of foreign exchange, a risk premium on 
speculative holdings of foreign currencies, a suppressed excess demand 
for imports and a monopolistic rent to foreign exchange dealers. An 
analysis of the forces behind the emergence and persistence of the black 
market for foreign exchange in Sudan is given in Elbadawi and Hussein 
(1988), Elbadawi (1988a), Ali and Hussein (1986), and Umbada (1986). 
Elbadawi (1988a) examined the behavior of the black market for foreign 
exchange in Sudan and the viability of devaluation policies under cur­
rency inconvertibility and collapsing exchange rates. The study argues 
that black markets emerge due to currency inconvertibility and in turn 
provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for an indirect specula­
tive attack on official reserves. The paper arrived at the conclusion 
that success of the devaluation-liberalization style of IMF policies is 
highly unlikely in presence of severe fiscal deficits, monetary 
imbalances and imperfections in the illegal market for foreign exchange. 
A low price elasticity for imports (-.04) was estimated by Elbadawi 
(1987) in support of earlier results (El Hassan, 1977). This explains 
the failure of the successive devaluations to affect the price inelastic 
import demand. The high share of production imports shown in Table 2.7 
contributes to the inelasticity of import demand. On the other hand, the 
high income elasticity (1.18) of demand for imports reported by the same 
study led to the conclusion that administrative controls and 
protectionism tend to induce further expansions in the parallel market 
activities and stimulate smuggling. 
The Structure of Economic Incentives and 
Internal Terms of Trade in the Sudan 
To examine the impact of commercial and exchange rate policies on 
the structure of economic incentives in Sudan, Elbadawi (1987) derived 
nominal protection ratios for various products. The study found that 
Sudan's foreign trade and payments regimes tend to discriminate against 
agricultural exportables. Except for wheat and sorghum, the results 
showed that producers of exportables are paid far less than the border 
price equivalents. The extent of the sectoral bias was further 
investigated using the ratios of the effective exchange rates for 
exportables to the average rate applied to imports. The bias against 
agricultural tradables was again supported and estimated to range between 
38% for wheat and 62% for livestock. 
Columns 5 to 8 of Table 2.7 calculate the aggregate net protection 
ratio indices for exports and imports and derive the net trade bias 
(NTB). The NTB provides further support to Elbadawi's results. 
According to the real protection ratio for imports index (RPRp,), high 
tariffs were imposed on importables throughout the period under study. 
The real net protection ratio for exports (RNPRx), however, indicates 
that while exportables were not paid their PPP values in the 70s, they 
enjoyed some protection in the 80s. This is attributed mainly to the 
undervalued exchange rate as a result of the previously observed 
excessive devaluations of the 80s. 
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An economy wide analysis of the indirect effects of the adverse 
trade and macro-economic policies on agriculture was performed by 
Elbadawi (1987) using the real exchange rate concept. The study showed 
that the implicit (indirect) impact of Sudan's commercial and foreign 
exchange policies further confound the direct bias against exportables 
in favor of non-tradables and import competing industries. The real 
exchange rate bias reflects the long run effects of adverse economic 
policies on agriculture. The study found that, on average, agricultural 
exportables bear an implicit tax amounting to 40% of the net import 
tariff, whereas only 60% of its intended protection effect goes to import 
substitutes. The long term effects of suppressed agricultural prices 
relative to the price of home goods (real exchange rate appreciation), 
the study observed, was the steadily increasing outflow of productive 
resources (labor and capital) from the farm sector into the urban based 
services and manufacturing sectors. 
Table 2.8 derives the structure of incentives for the three main 
economic sectors in the Sudan for the last eleven years. Due to several 
limitations of the quality of data employed to construct these indices, 
the results of Table 2.8 should be taken with reservation and need 
further qualifications. They, however, represent a substantial 
improvement on the commonly used indices. The results of Table 2.8 
generally support the findings obtained earlier. Columns 2 to 5 indicate 
that prices of agricultural tradables (PAGTRD) have grown slower than 
those of non-agricultural tradables (PNAT) and homegoods (PHG) (Figure 
2.1). Prices of agricultural tradables and urban wages have been 
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deteriorating in real terms when deflated with the consumer price index 
(Figure 2.2). Real prices of home goods and non-agricultural tradables 
on the other hand, stayed almost constant over time. Prices paid by 
farmers (PRPAID) for imported intermediate goods, capital and domestic 
resources (land and irrigation water) increased faster than prices 
received (PAGTRD). The gap becomes larger when the index of prices paid 
by farmers includes prices of consumers goods (FTPDX) as is clear from 
Figure 2.3. 
The above results provided further support to the argument that the 
internal terms of trade (relative prices and real exchange rate) were 
biased against agricultural producers and the urban poor and in favor of 
urban based manufacturing and home goods sectors over the last decade. 
While internal terms of trade are in line with the protection ratios 
findings, the subsidies realized by exporters due to the undervalued 
exchange rate in the 80s (Table 2.7) were not reflected in farm gate 
prices. This again indicates the high margin of profits accruing to 
trading in exports. 
Chapter Summary and Directives for the Present Research 
Several internal and external factors combined to bring about the 
current economic crisis in Sudan. Massive public investment outlays, 
financed primarily through extensive external borrowing, were made in the 
early seventies. Failure of these projects to pay off when foreign debt 
repayments fell due, together with a considerable deterioration in the 
country's external terms of trade led to the substantial balance of 
Table 2.8. Prices paid and received by farmers, manufacturers and 
home goods sectors, 1976 - 1986^^ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
OBS CPI PHG PNAT PAGTRD PRPAID FTPDX UWINDX 
1971 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1972 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.15 1.09 1.12 1.07 
1973 1.30 1.40 1.20 1.63 • 1.39 1.37 1.35 
1974 1.60 1.70 1.40 2.22 1.59 1.60 1.47 
1975 2.10 2.10 2.10 1.83 1.97 2.03 1.54 
1976 2.30 2.40 2.10 1.84 2.30 2.30 1.59 
1977 2.80 2.90 2.70 2.54 2.82 2.75 1.77 
1978 2.90 3.10 2.90 2.79 2.27 2.24 1.96 
1979 3.60 3.80 3.50 3.04 4.18 4.10 2.02 
1980 4.50 4.70 4.40 3.44 4.91 5.12 3.06 
1981 5.40 5.90 5.20 3.65 6.93 6.69 3.79 
1982 7.30 7.80 6.90 5.33 8.78 9.01 4.11 
1983 8.80 9.20 8.50 7.45 11.53 11.35 4.59 
1984 11.81 12.30 11.70 9.37 13.76 15.14 5.02 
1985 17.70 17.40 16.40 13.21 22.94 21.45 5.31 
1986 22.60 22.50 21.10 12.54 26.44 24.71 5.47 
^Constructed by author, see Appendix C for details. 
^Labels denote the consumer price index (CPI), price of home 
goods, (PHG), price of non-agricultural tradables (PNAT), price of agric. 
tradables (PAGTRD), prices paid by farmers (PRPAID), total paid farmers 
prices (FTPDX) and an urban wage index (UWINDX). 
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payments deficits of the late seventies. Deficit financing and external 
borrowing, on the other hand, continued to support a steadily growing 
domestic resource gap caused by expansionary fiscal policies and negative 
real interest rates. During the same period (1971-1978) the government 
maintained protective commercial policies and payments regime. Full 
exchange control was exercised under a fixed exchange rate. Multiple 
exchange rates were used to promote exports, encourage private transfers 
and provide industrial protection. 
A structural adjustment and economic stabilization program inspired 
by donor organizations was undertaken by the government. This 
characterized the liberalization period of 1978-84 in Sudan. The 
economic recovery program argued that the expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies of Sudan led to excessive domestic inflation and thus 
an overvalued nominal exchange rate which in turn, distorted relative 
prices against exportables and in favor of imports and non-tradables. 
These factors were believed to be the main forces behind the 
unsustainable balance of payments deficits facing Sudan. Protectionists 
trade policies were also criticized for imposing additional implicit tax 
on exportables and further distorting the internal structure of economic 
incentives. Devaluation of the nominal exchange rate and liberalization 
of the foreign trade and payments regimes were therefore recommended by 
the stabilization program. 
The desirability of devaluation for Sudan has been questioned on 
several grounds. Anti-devaluation views emphasized the inelasticity and 
structural rigidities arguments. Empirical evidence for inelastic supply 
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of and demand for Sudan's exports has been provided. Demand for imports 
has also been shown to be non-responsive to price shocks. The 
liberalization and devaluation measures of 1978-84 were not successful to 
bringing about the desired changes. On the contrary, Sudan continued 
to suffer from severe internal and external imbalances, a high black 
market premium for foreign exchange, persistent inflation and a negative 
rate of growth in real output. In 1985 liberalization policies were 
reversed and the country went back to a system of complete control of the 
foreign trade and payments. 
Using PPP further evidence was provided in this chapter in support 
of the first two devaluations (1978 and 1979). The results of Table 2.7 
also show that the rest of the devaluations (1981-1985) were higher than 
necessary as argued by Ali (1984c). The bias against agricultural 
exportables in favor of non-agricultural tradables and homegoods measured 
by Elbadawi (1987) was further supported by the results of Tables 2.7 and 
2.8 and Figure 2.1 of this chapter. The net effect on agricultural 
producers and the urban poor, of the various commercial and macro-
economic policies was measured by the prices paid and received indices of 
Table 2.8 (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). 
While the appropriateness of the various devaluations administered 
in Sudan has been extensively discussed in the literature, the liberali­
zation experience has not yet been adequately analyzed. It has been 
observed, by this (Tables 2.2-2.5) as well as other studies (Elbadawi, 
1988a) that liberalization was introduced in presence of expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies and distorted relative prices and interest 
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rates. The implications, however, of the simultaneous opening of the 
current and capital accounts along with successive devaluations in such 
inflationary environment and with the domestic capital market rationed at 
negative real rates of interest, were not addressed systematically. 
The debate over the soundness of liberalization in Sudan was conducted 
in a partial equilibrium framework. Several important intermarket and 
intersectoral linkages were therefore not captured. The expenditure-
absorption real exchange rate approach of Elbadawi (1987), however, was one 
step in the direction of general equilibrium analysis. While the incidence 
of policy on relative prices and incentive structures was measured, real 
responses and micro supply/demand adjustments to such shocks were not 
investigated. This is the task that the present research intends to take. 
The important elasticity question raised by the counter-devaluation 
arguments requires more rigorous empirical verifications, an objective to 
which the present work also plans to contribute. The parameter 
estimation will be conducted in a general equilibrium context. Moreover, 
the consensus on the significance of the monetary disequilibrium and 
internal imbalances to developing economies in general, and the central 
role they play in the Sudan in particular, calls for adequate modelling 
of the monetary phenomena (Taylor, 1979; Aghevli and Khan, 1978; and 
Feltenstein, 1984). Consequently, the present study aims at explicity 
incorporating the nominal sectors in the empirical model. In recognition 
of the fact that the economy of the Sudan must have been out of a full 
Walrasian equilibrium at least for the last 15 years due to extensive price 
controls and rationing regimes, the study uses the temporary equilibrium 
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approach. The model will then be used to evaluate the economy wide impacts 
of several policy regimes. Performance of the economy under fiscal, 
monetary, exchange rate and trade policies that eliminate domestic economic 
distortions will be examined. 
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CHAPTER 3. ECONOMIC POLICY MODELS: A SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
This chapter reviews several current methods of policy analysis. 
The structural features of various analytical models are outlined and 
compared. Drawbacks and advantages of each modelling approach are 
discussed and gaps identified. Specific objectives and contributions of 
the present research to modelling economic systems in developing 
countries are then defined. 
Methods of Policy Analysis 
A wide range of analytical tools have been employed to study the 
impacts of various policy measures on the behavior of economic variables. 
Available models are classified into partial and general equilibrium 
approaches to policy analysis. Important members in each group are 
discussed below. 
Partial equilibrium models 
Comparative advantage measures such as the nominal and effective 
protection ratios and domestic resource costs are often used to calculate 
the economic value of goods and primary resources for project evaluation 
and policy analysis purposes. While these concepts measure market 
distortions and generate shadow prices for optimal allocation of 
resources, they fail to evaluate the welfare costs of intervention 
policies. Protection measures have been shown to be inadequate in 
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presence of other distortions in the economy and when market interactions 
are important (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1973, 1980a). 
Welfare measures (consumer and producer surpluses), on the other 
hand, are used to evaluate the social costs of economic interventions as 
compared to the free trade position. Surplus concepts, however, are 
generally used in isolated markets and do not capture the effects of 
multiple price changes. Substitution possibilities in demand and supply 
are often ignored by these measures (Harberger, 1971 and Toi ley et al., 
1982). 
Multi-market models were thus developed to allow for substitution 
effects in interdependent markets. The multi-market framework has mainly 
been used by the World Bank staff to analyze the impacts of agricultural 
pricing and marketing policies in developing countries (Braverman, et 
al., 1985, 1986 and 1987; Singh, Squire, and Krichner, 1984). This 
approach models the supply and demand components of agricultural 
commodity markets according to the neo-classical theory of producer and 
consumer behavior. The impact of various agricultural policies on the 
level and composition of agricultural output and farmers' incomes are 
analyzed. This type of model also allows for examining the effects of 
agricultural policies on the government budget and foreign trade. This 
is, however, a unidirectional relationship, since feedback effects are 
not modelled in this approach. Therefore, the effects of policies 
directed towards other sectors of the economy (macro and non-farm 
policies) on agriculture cannot be handled with multi-market models. 
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General equilibrium methods 
These models capture the economy-wide effects of sector specific as 
well as macroeconomic policies. This group includes mainly the 
multi-sector, Walrasian, and macro-econometric models as well as various 
combinations of them. 
Linear multi-sector models (LMS) Input/output and linear 
programming models are the most important methods in this group. They 
represent a general equilibrium framework with a special focus on the 
production side of the economy. Both methods use the fixed coefficient 
structure pioneered by Leontief (1953), which implies constant returns to 
scale. 
Multi-sector input/output models contain no policy variables and no 
behavioral rules are followed. The exogenously determined final demands 
are handed to the fixed-coefficient accounting matrix of intermediate 
demands to deliver sectoral outputs. Internal consistency of the 
generated sectoral production is ensured by the material balance system 
that describes the economy wide interdependancies. The static 
input/output model has been extended to handle foreign trade (Chenery and 
Clark, 1959 and Robinson and Song, 1972), primary factor requirements 
(Leontief, 1953), dynamics (Leontief, 1970 and Gupta, 1977) and 
technological change within its general linear structure (Almon, 1967; 
Adelman, 1969; and Stone, 1970). 
While input/output models were generally used to generate compatible 
physical production plans, they were also employed to evaluate 
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consistency of concomitant value flows and as a price determination 
mechanism (Dervis et al., 1982). They provided a powerful planning tool 
for centralized economies. 
A decision rule that determines the best production plan is 
introduced by Linear Programming techniques (LP). The full capacity 
operation assumption implicit in the input/output model structure is also 
relaxed by introducing the inequality constraints of the LP formulation. 
This allows for capacity underutilization and endogenous make-or-buy 
decisions (Dervis et al., 1982). Static as well as multi-period models 
can be developed to determine optimal production and trade flows and to 
price fixed resources (the LP duals). As primal price weights are taken, 
as given in the LP formulation, the endogenously determined shadow prices 
(income) do not feed back into the model. A non-linear structure of the 
objective criterion is required to allow for a simultaneous determination 
of prices and quantities endogenously. Also, LP models solve for 
efficient resource allocation plans according to the central planners 
objective function and do not necessarily represent an equilibrium point 
in decentralized markets (Heal, 1973 and Dixon, 1975). Non-linear 
programming models, however, can be used to achieve market allocations by 
maximizing consumer and producer surpluses. Policy variables need to be 
explicitly incorporated in order for such models to experiment with 
non-command systems, where policy makers can only influence economic 
activity indirectly. 
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Walrasian general equilibrium models The Walrasian family of 
applied general equilibrium models represent an important movement 
towards full general equilibrium analysis in decentralized economies. 
Two major extension are made on the traditional input/output system to 
allow for endogenous determination of all prices and quantity flows in 
the economy simultaneously. First, final demand is endogenized by using 
an income-expenditure identity linkage (feedback mechanism) to close the 
open Leontief model. Walras Law is then used to eliminate imbalances and 
guarantee full equilibrium. Second, more flexible demand supply 
structures are used to allow for subsitution effects. Various demand 
system (e.g., the Linear, Addilog and Almost Ideal expenditure systems) 
are commonly utilized to allocate total consumption to admissible 
commodity demand functions. The supply side, on the other hand, employs 
non-linear production technologies such as the Cobb-Douglas and the 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) structures. Multi-stage 
budgeting is often used to generate weakly separable components of the 
supply/demand response structure. The production and consumption spheres 
of the economy are modeled according to the neo-classible theory of 
producer/consumer behavior (Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson, 1982). 
Given the technical, behavioral and institutional set up of the 
economy, Walras Law is invoked to obtain a fixed point solution. An 
equilibrium vector of relative prices that clear all factor and commodity 
markets (satisfy Walras Law) is derived. Accordingly, equilibrium 
quantities and trade flows consistent with the autonomous production and 
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consumption plans of the various economic agents in the economy, are 
determined simultaneously. 
Johansen (1960) was able to obtain the first numberical solution for 
a full general equilibrium model. The system was linearized by logarith­
mic differentiation and solution values gave rates of change in endogen­
ous variables. More advanced solution algorithms were then developed 
which enabled direct solutions for the levels rather than growth rates of 
all endogenous variables (Scarf and Hansen, 1973; Eaves, 1972; Shoven and 
Whalley, 1974; and Todd, 1976). A large number of empirical general 
equilibrium models were developed and solved for various analytical 
purposes as solution algorithms became available. This group is commonly 
referred to as the computable general equilibrium models (CGE). 
CGEs are employed for economic policy analysis in both 
industrialized and developing countries. Income distribution issues, 
trade policy and economic structure and growth are analyzed in a number 
of studies for developing economies (Adelman and Robinson, 1978; Lysy and 
Taylor, 1980; de Melo, 1979; Dervis and Robinson, 1978; Ahluwalia and 
Lysy, 1979; and de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1987a). Dixon et al. (1982) and 
Shoven and Whalley (1974) provide some examples from devloped economies. 
Multi-country models have also been developed to address issues of 
international trade (Spencer, 1986; Harrison, 1986; Whaley, 1985; and 
de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1987b). 
In spite of the comprehensive characterization of the ecnomic system 
and the strong theoretical basis on which they are founded, Walrasian 
equilibrium models suffer from three main weaknesses. First, 
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disequilibrium phenomena cannot be analyzed within this structure as they 
are inconsistent with Walras Law. Problems such as Keynesian 
unemployment, sticky prices and quantity adjustments in rationed markets 
can only be handled with disequilibrium models. 
The second deficiency of Walrasian multi-sector systems relates to 
modelling the macro-economy, specifically the monetary mechanism. 
Walrasian models are concerned basically with real phenomena and relative 
price movements where the nominal sectors of the economy are either 
absent or represented in such a way that money is neutral. These 
specifications correspond respectively to an exogenously specified 
general price level or endogenous absolute price, determined jointly by 
commodity and money market equilibria. Money supply is extraneously set 
in the latter, and all prices adjust fast enough such that dichotomy 
between the real and nominal sectors of the economy is preserved (Adelman 
and Robinson, 1978). This separation of the micro/macro subsystems 
coupled with the full equilibrium assumption, make Walrasian CGEs 
appropriate only for medium to long run analysis of structural change and 
economic growth. Therefore, the dynamics of short run adjustment towards 
full equilibrium, where some markets are slow to clear and where 
inflation has real effects in the short run, cannot be studied within 
this framework (Dewatripont and Robinson, 1985 and Taylor, 1983). 
Empirical estimation of the model parameters presents the third 
difficulty in working with CGE models. Calibration to benchmark year 
data, augmented by borrowing from other sources (literature search) or 
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educated guessing of key parameters such as elasticities, is generally 
followed. Due to the full simultaneity of the observed endogenous data 
in Walrasian CGE systems, proper stochastic estimation of the model faces 
several difficulties, a lengthy discussion of which is left for Chapter 
5. Calibration, however, represent a deterministic method for the 
numerical selection of parameter values, where all possible measurement 
and specification errors are assumed away. Moreover, the use of a single 
data point (e.g., the base year data set) poses serious identification 
problems for calibration techniques (Lau, 1984). More appropriate 
procedures have been recently suggested for the stochastic specification 
and estimation of CGE models (Mansur and Whalley, 1984 and Jorgenson, 
1984). 
Macro-econometric methods Economic processes are characterized 
as an integrated stochastic system of reduced form response functions in 
these macro-econometric class of models. Time-series observations on the 
set of endogenous and predetermined variables are employed in the 
econometric estimation of the systems parameters. Simulations are then 
performed on the model to experiment with economic policies and forecast 
future behavior of the economy. Issues such as the causes and 
implications of inflation, unemployment, budget deficits, monetary 
control and price rigidities are studied. Unlike Walrasian models, 
disequilibrium, non-neutrality of money and formation of expectations are 
allowed in order to examine the short run adjustment dynamics of the 
system when outside of its full equilibrium path. These models are 
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generally used to study the interactions between the nominal and rural 
spheres of the economy and evaluate the impacts of various fiscal and 
monetary policies on economic stability. 
A huge number of macro-econometric models exist in the literature. 
The Philips Curve-Business Cycle studies comprise the most important and 
the biggest member of this group. The real exchange rate models developed 
in Salter (1959), Sjaastad (1980), and Dornbusch (1972) and recently 
adopted by the International Food Policy and Research Institute (IFPRI) to 
anlyze the impacts of commercial and foreign exchange policies in several 
countries (Valdes, 1986; Garcia, 1981; Scobie, 1983; and Cavallo and 
Mundlak, 1982) provide another example. The vast majority of these models 
are generally demand driven and belong to the Keynesian-monetarists 
disequilibrium approach to macro analysis. High aggregation of sectors 
into two to three composite commodity and asset markets is common. They 
are accordingly lacking in terms of studying relative price effects and 
sectoral adjustment. 
Advanced computation techniques realized in the early sixties 
permitted extensive disaggregation of the macro-econometric models into 
many consuming, producing and financial sectors (Duesenberry et al., 1965; 
Ando, 1974; Choudhry et al., 1972; Ball, 1973; McCracken, 1973; and 
Almon et al., 1974). In spite of the significant disaggregation adopted 
in macro models, they remained demand driven. While producing sectors are 
incorporated in considerable detail in the model, supply plays no role in 
determining prices and output. Prices are determined by separate 
regression equations and fed into the demand sectors to generate total 
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output, which is then thrown into an input/output matrix to allocate 
sectoral production (Robinson and Roland-Hoist, 1987a). 
Mixed models This class represents an attempt towards 
integrating demand based macro models with the micro founded 
neo-classical supply structure. Walrasian CGE models that incorporate 
detailed macro structures have been applied to less developed countries 
(Adelman and Robinson, 1978; Ahluwalia and Lysy, 1979; Lysy and Taylor, 
1980; Taylor, 1983; and Dewatripont and Robinson, 1985), developed 
economies (Dungan, 1980; Robinson and Ronald- Hoist, 1987b; and Adelman 
and Robinson, 1987), as well as multi-country models of international 
trade (Deardorff and Stern, 1986). Supply behavior is given an 
equivalent role in deriving relative prices and output as Walras theory 
requires. On the other hand, the rudimentary structure of financial 
sectors and exogeneity of money supply renders these models inadequte to 
experiment with various fiscal and financial policies that influence 
budget deficits and monetary movements. Macro shocks, however, are 
allowed to affect relative prices and real activity through partial 
adjustment in factor markets, inflexibility of prices, money illusion and 
the saving-investment imbalances in the "macro closure" rule (Robinson, 
1989). 
The important linkage between monetary disequilibrium and public 
debt in developing countries, where financial assets markets are 
non-existent or inefficient, has been emphasized in a number of studies 
(Taylor, 1979; Aghevli and Khan, 1978; Tanzi, 1978; Feltenstein, 1984; 
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and Scobie, 1983). Specific behavioral assumptions are employed by Felt-
enstein to incorporate the portfolio balance condition into a Walrasian 
CGE model. On the other hand, a reduced form of the monetary equilibrium 
rule is econometrically estimated to establish the connection between 
domestic credit expansion and government deficits in the other studies. 
The assumption of competitive Walrasian equilibrium is relaxed in 
Harris (1986) where an increasing returns to scale production technology 
is employed. Keyzer (1986), on the other hand, violated the 
instantaneous adjustment assumption of Walras Law by using supply lags in 
agricultural production. Temporary equilibrium models have also been 
developed to capture the dynamics of disequilibrium phenomena (Grandmont, 
1977, and Neary, 1980). Economy wide adjustments to exogenous shocks are 
also examined under uncertainty with a dynamic CGE model by Adelman, 
Sarris and Roland-Hoist (1986). 
Methods and Objectives of the Present Research 
The main objective of this study is to develop an empirical general 
equilibrium model for Sudan in order to evaluate the economy wide impacts 
of various economic policies feasible for the country. The study intends 
to adapt the latest methods in applied general equilibrium analysis to 
Sudan's economic system. The following specific goals are set for this 
study to achieve: 
1. A model which recognizes the significance of the macro-economic 
structure, particularly the monetary mechanism to the Sudan economy as 
discussed in Chapter 2, will be constructed. 
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The relationship between the government sector and an endogenous 
money creation mechanism will be explicitly modelled in the present 
study. An absolute price level will be determined simultaneously with 
other nominal and real flows within the system. This together with a 
detailed tax/subsidy stru ture will enable the model to evaluate the 
economy wide impacts of alternative sector specific and macro economic 
policies. 
2. Less than perfect flexibility in some markets will be assumed to 
reflect the various rigidities introduced in the economy by government 
interventions. The fixed exchange rate and currency inconvertibility, 
import controls, inflexible interest rate, credit rationing and price and 
income supports provide a case for disequilibrium in Sudan economy. 
While the emergence of directly unproductive (DUP) rent-seeking sectors 
(Krueger, 1974, and Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1980b) will not be modelled 
explicitly as in Grais, de Melo and Urata (1986), the parallel market 
premium will be used to represent the opportunity cost of holding 
domestic money. 
3. Supply lags in some agricultural commodity markets will be 
specified. This is due to the fact that production plans, and land 
allocations in particular, on the irrigated public farms of Sudan are 
usually made ex-ante and stay unaltered over the production cycle. 
Various price expectation schemes will be employed to model the partial 
adjustment mechanism in agricultural supply and private investment 
functions. 
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4. Inflexibilities and differential adjustment rates among the 
different markets lead to non-neutrality of movements in nominal 
aggregates and macro shocks. This provides an option for the government 
to affect economic activity and allows the model to evaluate the short-
run effects of macro-economic policies. The fact that some markets are 
less quick and efficient to clear than others violates the full 
equilibrium assumption of Walras theory. Walras Law, however, is assumed 
to hold in a sequence of temporary equilibria as defined in Hicks (1946). 
5. Time-series data will be used to estimate the model's parameters 
econometrically. Estimation of the import/export supply and demand 
elasticities is necessary to verify the inelasticity arguments against 
devaluation and trade liberalization discussed in Chapter 2. The 
argument that agriculture provides the tax base for industrialization in 
developing countries due to its inelastic supply structures will also be 
examined. The elasticity structuralists' views of limited substitution 
possibilities in production and trade and thus low response elasticities 
(Robinson, 1989) can thus be evaluated for the Sudan economy. Stochastic 
simulation as well as calibration of the model to the observed history of 
the economy will be used for validation. 
Chapter four develops the general equilibrium model. Estimation of 
the model is done in Chapter five. Chapter six performs the model 
validation and policy simulations and the findings are summarized in 
Chapter seven. 
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CHAPTER 4. A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR THE SUDAN ECONOMY 
This chapter develops a general equilibrium model for Sudan (GEMS) 
and describes the market clearing mechanisms for a succession of 
temporary Walrasian equilibria. The model is built around the multi-
sector Walrasian structure of decentralized economies with the macro 
components and financial sectors explicitly integrated. Domestic supply 
is discussed first followed by the foreign sector. Income, expenditure 
and final demands are then derived. Conditions for product market 
equilibrium and the macro-economic closure and nominal spheres of the 
economy are discussed last. 
Supply Structure 
There are ten agricultural tradables in the model, produced in four 
distinct regions. A non-agricultural tradables sector, representing the 
domestic manufacturing industry and a home goods sector contribute to 
total value added. Eight of the ten agricultural products and the 
manufactured output are sold in both domestic and foreign markets. Four 
import categories are distinguished, namely intermediate and capital 
goods and two consumers imports. The supply sector, also derives demand 
for intermediate inputs and primary factors. The supply structure is 
neo-classical in nature, where production functions are used by producers 
to maximize profits. Micro-economic theory of the firm then generates 
the sectoral output supply and factor demand functions. 
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Agricultural tradables 
Sudan is predominantly an agricultural country. The economic 
significance of the farming sector to the country was discussed in 
Chapter Two. Accordingly, agricultural production represents the main 
focus of modelling supply adjustment in Sudan. The farm sector is highly 
disaggregated into ten commodity markets and four producing regions. The 
ten crops modelled here contribute to more than 80% of the foreign 
exchange earnings and provide most of the food supply in the country. On 
average, about 85% of the total value of food is contributed by the 
modelled agricultural sectors over the period covered by this study 
(1971-1986). The remaining 15% of the total value of food consumption 
came from domestic and imported manufactured goods which are also 
modelled here. 
The modelled crops are produced under different farming systems 
representing different technologies and institutional environments. 
Table (4.1) summarizes the basic features of the production and marketing 
organization for each crop. There are two main producing regions, the 
irrigated and the dry land subsectors. The public schemes, region 1 
(mainly in Central Sudan), generate most of the output in the irrigated 
sector. A sizable proportion of wheat production, however, comes from 
private irrigation farms in the northern parts of the country (region 2). 
Besides traditional agriculture (region 3), mechanized farming (region 4) 
is also an important producer of dura (sorghum) in the rainfed sector. 
Decision making is highly centralized in the public irrigation 
schemes. Allocations of land areas and chemical inputs between the 
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Table 4.1. Production and marketing systems for the major agricultural 
tradables 
Dry Land 
PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
Traditional Mechanized Public Private 
Crops® CN,GN,SS,6M, 
DR and STOZ 
OR and SS CN,6N,DR,WT OR, WT, BNS 
Modern Technology 
Chemical inputs 
Mechanical power 
Not used 
CN 
Not used 
OR and SS 
CN and WT 
CN,6N,WT 
WT 
OR, WT, BNS 
Decision Making 
Land allocations 
Modern inputs 
Decentralized 
Decentralized 
Decentrali zed 
Decentralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Decentralized 
Decentralized 
Market Organ. 
Competitive 
Non-competitive 
GN, SS and DR 
CN and GM 
DR and SS GN and DR 
CN and WT 
OR and WT 
Rotation Flexible Flexible Fixed Flexible 
Irrigated 
®Crops are cotton (CN), groundnuts (GN), sesame (SS), gum arabic 
(GM), sorghum (Dura DR), wheat (WT), beans (BNS), and livestock and other 
products (STOZ). 
different crops and the timing of the major mechanical operations are 
made by the scheme administration. A fixed cropping pattern is imposed 
on the tenancies allotted to individual farmers. Limited credit is 
provided by the production corporations for cotton production. Farmers 
are in turn required to hand over the cotton and wheat crops to the 
corporation. Cotton is then sold to the cotton marketing board which 
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sets the procurement price, while wheat is delivered to the government at 
the official price for distribution to flour mills. On the other hand, 
groundnuts and dura are sold by the individual tenants to private 
traders. 
A land rent, together with charges for water, materials 
(intermediate inputs) and services (cost of mechanical operations) 
provided by the corporation are deducted from the farmers cotton 
proceeds. The corporations perform the critical mechanical operations 
and monopolize the procurement and supply of most of the non-labor 
inputs, e.g., fertilizers, pesticides, etc. These inputs are supplied 
according to the rates recommended by research stations for cotton and 
wheat primarily. 
Farmers, on the other hand, control basically the allocation of 
family and hired labor between various crops in the fixed rotation. 
Accordingly, farmers decisions are assumed to influence yields rather 
than production, since areas are decided by the government agency. 
Individual tenants are, therefore, assumed to choose the optimal 
allocation of their labor resources that will maximize expected net 
returns per unit area, given their yield technology (production function) 
and the fixed allocations of land and intermediate inputs. Yield 
response (rather than output supply) functions and factor demands are 
then derived from the optimality conditions of this expected profit 
maximization problem. The following yield response equations are thus 
specified for the four crops grown in the public irrigation schemes 
(region 1): 
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. Yl.^ = Y(EN1.^, Wl^, GIAl^_p WHl^) 1=1, ... 4 (4.1) 
where i refers to crops, t denotes time and 1 refers to Region 1. 
Four yield equations as in (4.1) are estimated for cotton, ground­
nuts, dura and wheat. Yield at t in region 1 (Yl. .) is specified as a I , L 
function of expected real net returns (ENl^^) of the four crops, the 
real wage rate (Wl^), a weather variable (WHl^), and government 
investment in agriculture lagged one year (GIAl^). Lack of data on 
crop specific or the general stock of farm capital precluded the use of 
physical capital as a regressor in (4.1). Aggregate government 
investment in agriculture, lagged one period (GIAl^_j^) is alternatively 
used to represent changes in farm capital. Various expectations 
formation schemes and dynamic adjustment structures (lags) are employed 
to find the best representation of farmers' expected returns (ENl^). 
Expected returns from crop i at period t is a weighted average of the 
previous behavior of returns (Nlt_g) as follows: 
. ENl-t = E(Nl.^t_s, Ol^; s=l, ... T) 1=1 4 (4.2) 
where (p is the adjustment weight and T defines the length (duration) of 
the adjustment. Actual real net returns per unit area of crop i (Nl^^) 
t is defined as: 
"it = - ""it " 
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where Pl^.^ and represent real producers prices^ of crop i and 
intermediate input n (procurement or market farm gate prices) in Region 
1. is the amount of input (n) used per unit area of crop i, and 
is the land and water rate for crop i collected by the scheme adminis­
tration. The indirect tax rate on crop i is given by (t^). 
Area allocations to wheat and cotton in the irrigated schemes, on 
the other hand, are decided by the government. The main objective of the 
government in setting crop areas is to minimize wheat imports and 
generate foreign exchange from cotton, being the major export earner for 
the country. Accordingly, wheat and cotton areas are not chosen by 
optimizing economic agents and thus proper response functions can not be 
estimated. A decision rule can be specified, however, to characterize 
the objectives of the controlling government agency. The problem with 
such modelling practice is the maintained assumption of a stable 
objective criteria for all governments. Alternatively, time series 
methods can be used to fit the historical data without the need for 
behavioral specification. The same problem of structural change is again 
faced by time series methods. Wheat and cotton area can also be set 
exogenously outside the model. 
^Note that all variables in the model are real. Nominal variables 
are deflated by the consumer price index (the general price level) which 
is endogenously determined in the money market. Accordingly, all real 
prices and their effects are endogenous. This allows for the evaluation 
of the economy wide effects of macro shocks and movements in nominal and 
real variables transmitted by the general price level to real price 
movements. 
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The present study has chosen to model government policy assuming 
that'promotion of sufficient wheat supply to the politically powerful 
urban population and higher export earnings through increased cotton 
production will continue to be the main objective of decision makers in 
Sudan in the short to medium runs. These two goals have motivated 
agricultural policies in Sudan for at least the period covered by this 
study. Area response functions for wheat (AWTl^), cotton (ACNl^) and 
total land (TAl^) are therefore specified to move with world prices and 
other domestic supply factors in the irrigated sector (region 1): 
AWTl^ = Wl(AWTl^_p PWT*.p PCnJ_j, WrRiO^_p TAl^) (4.4) 
ACNlt = Cl(ACNl^_p PWT*_^, PCN*_i, STCN^, TAl^) (4.5) 
TAl^ = Al(TAl^_p GIAlt_i) (4.6) 
Equation (4.4) defines current wheat area in region 1 as a function 
of area under wheat in the previous year (AWTl^^), real international 
"fc 'ff 
wheat (PWT^_2^ and cotton (PGN^^) prices lagged one year, total area 
planned for region 1 in the current year (TAl^) and the ratio of domestic 
production to total wheat supply in the preceding year (WTRiO^,^). 
The same factors, in addition to beginning period stock of cotton 
(STCN^) are specified to determine cotton area in (4.5). Total area 
planned for region one in the current season is defined as a function of 
last years land (TAl^_j^) and real government investment in agriculture 
one year back (GIAl^_j^). 
57 
Farmers have partial control over the allocation of the remaining 
area (after cotton and wheat allocations are made) between groundnuts and 
dura. Therefore a groundnuts area response function is specified in 
(4.7) to depend on last years area (AGNl^^) and expected net returns 
from groundnuts (ENGNl^) and dura (ENDRl^) plus total land (TAl^). 
AGNl^ = Gl(AGNl^_p ENGNl^, ENDRl^, TAl^) (4.7) 
Area under dura is then derived as a residual in (4.8) below. 
ADRl = TAl^ - AWTl^ - ACNl^ - AGNl^ (4.8) 
A significant share of domestic wheat supply is produced on the 
private irrigated farms of Northern Sudan. Area and yield response 
p 
equation are specified below for wheat in the private farms (region 2). 
YWT2^ = Y2(ENPW2^, ENPB2^, WH2^) (4.9) 
AWT2^ = W2(ENPW2^, ENPB2^, G0L2^) (4.10) 
ENP2.^ = EW(NP2.^t_s, ^^i: s=l,...T) (i=l,2) (4.11) 
Expected real net prices (ENP2^^) of wheat and broad beans which 
is the competitive crop in this region, plus weather (WH2^) determine 
the yield of wheat in region 2 as in equation (4.9). Wheat area in this 
region is also a function of last years area, expected prices and 
Due to a lack of data on beans production, no supply response 
functions were specified. The equilibrium quantity of beans is, 
therefore, determined by the demand side and the nominal price is set 
exogenously (perfectly elastic supply curve). 
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quantity of gasoil^ allocated to this region (G0L2^). Price 
expectations for wheat and broad beans are defined in (4.11) as a function 
of the history of net market prices (NP2^). Net prices represent per 
unit area value added (net of intermediate costs). Here (P2^) and 
(tjt) are the real market price and indirect tax rate on crop i, 
respectively. 
NP2it = PSnd-tn' - « 
Like private irrigation schemes, decision making in dryland farming 
is decentralized and assumed to represent the optimal choices of profit 
maximizing farmers. Area and yield response functions for crop i in the 
traditional rainfed agriculture (region 3) are thus specified as follows: 
Y3.^ = Y3(ENP3.^, W3^, GIA3^_j , WH3^) (i=l 5) (4.13) 
A3,t = A3(ENP3.^, GIA3^_j, W3^, A3. ^ _^) (i=l,...,5) (4.14) 
ENP3.^ = E3(NP3.^^_g, 3.: s=l, ... T) (i=l,...,5) (4.15) 
Equations (4.13) and (4.14) define the yield and area response 
functions for 5 of the 6 crops grown in region 4^. The wage rate 
(W3^), weather (WH3^), lagged government investment in agriculture, 
^Gasoil is the name of tractor diesel in Sudan. 
^In the absence of adequate information on livestock production, 
livestock is grouped together with other minor agricultural products in 
one sector (STOZ), the supply of which is set exogenously to be 
infinitely elastic. Equilibrium quantity of STOZ is again, like beans, 
demand driven in the model. 
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last years area (A3^ and expected net prices in region 3 (ENP3^.^) 
are the regressors. Price expectations for farmers in region 3 are 
given in (4.15). Similar assumptions are used to specify the supply 
response functions for the mechanized rainfed farms (region 4). 
Y4it = Y4(ENP3.^, WHS^, GOL^) (i=l,2) (4.16) 
A4.^ = A4(ENP3.^, A4.^^_p TA4^) (i=l,2) (4.17) 
TA4^ = T4(TA4t_i, GOL^, PIN4^_^, AGBL^) (4.18) 
GOL^ represent the amount of gasoil allocated to mechanized 
farmers, and PIN4^_j^ measures real private investment in region four 
lagged one year. Availability of gas oil is assumed to affect crop 
yields and total land area cultivated in the mechanized farming sector. 
Last years' investments (PIN4) in tractors, farm equipment, land 
reclamation, etc., are also allowed to influence changes in total area. 
Short-term loans given by the Agricultural Bank of Sudan to mechanized 
farmers (AGBL^) are also used to explain total land area cultivated in 
region 4 (TA4^). Short-term loans are assumed to measure availability 
of working capital for hiring labor and other variable inputs. The same 
price expectations are assumed for regions 3 and 4 (ENP3^^). 
Although expected net returns, the wage rate and weather are the 
common supply forces in the farming sector, other factors specific to the 
different farming systems are included. Gas oil allocations or prices, 
for example, represent an important supply factor for regions two and 
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four where pumping irrigation water and mechanization are vital fuel 
using operations in those two regions, respectively. Private investment 
and short-term loans provide other important determinants of agricultural 
production in region 4. 
The above specified yield and area response functions reflect partial 
adjustment in domestic production of agricultural tradables. Production 
plans, whether exogenously set by the government (areas in region 1) or 
controlled by individual agents, are made at the beginning of the season 
according to some price expectations scheme and remain unaltered over the 
year. Except for the effects of weather (WH^), the wage rate (W^) and 
the exogenously fixed levels of intermediate inputs (Z^, GOL^, G0L2^), 
agricultural production is non-responsive to current period shocks. 
Agricultural output is accordingly predetermined with respect to current 
market forces (prices) except for the real wage effect. Disequilibrium is 
therefore allowed in agricultural tradables markets when firms' production 
plans are incompatible with observed prices, due to price forecasting 
errors, e.g., desired plans are not fulfilled. Agricultural tradables 
markets, however, are assumed to adjust in a sequence of temporary 
equilibria along which agricultural producers adjust their expectations 
and production plans to the desired levels. 
Aggregate production and value added by region and crop are given 
below: 
Qit = %j Ait " ^it (1=1,...,6) (4.19) 
VaJ = S.CNP^^ • + SR^t] (j=l 4) (4.20) 
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VAAt = SjVAj (4.21) 
(4.19) derives total production of crop i (Q^^) from all regions, and 
(4.20) calculates total value added from all crops accruing to region j 
(VA^), where GRj^ denotes total collection of indirect taxes on 
crop i from region j. Total value added in agriculture (VAA^) is given 
by (4.21). Cotton seed (QCS) is produced in fixed proportion to cotton 
lint (QCN|.) in this model. 
QGSt = ^ csfQCNt) (4.22) 
where QCN^ is given in (4.19) above. 
Non-agricultural tradables (NAT) 
This sector represents the manufacturing industry in Sudan. It 
comprises mainly the textile, sugar, and oil industries plus food 
processing. The manufacturing sector uses cotton lint, oil seeds as well 
as non-tradables (transport, etc.) as intermediate inputs. Other 
intermediate imports such as fuel are utilized in manufacturing. Labor 
is the only primary factor modelled. Investments in imported capital 
goods and physical structures from the homegoods sector are endogenously 
determined. Manufacturing output for the profit maximizing firm is 
defined as: 
NAT^ = NA(NPNAT^, UW^, PINM^_j, GINM^_^) (4.23) 
Production of non-agricultural tradables (NAT^) is a function of 
net output price (NPNAT^), urban wage rate (UW^), private and 
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government investment in manufacturing, lagged one year (PINM^ ^  and 
respectively). The unit value added (NPNAT^) and total value 
added for this sector are given by: 
NPNAT^ = PNAT^(l-tc^) - a^(P^) (4.24) 
VAM^ = NPNAT^ • NAT^ + GRM^ (4.25) 
where is the amount of intermediate input (n) per unit of output, 
•and P^ is its respective price. The indirect tax rate on NAT is given 
by tc^. While there are no capacity constraints, private and public 
investments in the previous period reflect the change of capital stock in 
this sector. GRM^ calculates total Indirect taxes collected from the 
manufacturing sector. 
Home goods sector (HG) 
All non-tradables belong to this sector. Services, transport and 
construction are the major economic activities in the home goods sector. 
Labor is used to produce HG. Private investment in HG is determined endo-
genously like in the NAT sector and represents investment demand for impor 
ted capital goods and the sectors own production of physical structures. 
Intermediate imports are represented by a fixed coefficient technology. 
Supply of non-tradables (HG^) is derived, similar to other producing 
sectors, from profit maximizing behavior. Accordingly supply is defined 
as a function of real net output price (NPHG^), the real urban wage 
(UW^), and lagged real private (PINH^_2^^) and public investment (GINH^_j^j 
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. HG^ = HG(NPHG^, UW^, PINH^_p _GINH^_^) (4.26) 
As in other sectors government investment is set exogenously whereas 
private investment is determined endogenously. Net price (NPHG^) and 
nontradables value added (VAH^) are defined as: 
NPHGt = PHG^d-th^.) - 2^ a^(P^) (4.27) 
VAH^ = NPHGt • HG^ + GRH^ 
where th^ is the indirect tax rate on home goods, and GRH^ is total 
taxes (subsidies) on the HG sector. 
Demand for inputs 
Primary factors Demand for primary factors (land and labor) is 
similarly derived as part of the dual representation of the supply 
structure specified above. Area response functions defined earlier 
represent demand for land. Demand for labor, on the other hand, is 
obtained like output supply, from the first order condition system of 
the profit maximization problem described earlier. Accordingly 
demand for labor by sector i in region j (DL^^) is specified as a 
fuction of the corresponding expected prices (EP^^) and wage rates (W^). 
= DLJ(EP^'^, wj) (4.28) 
Supply of land and labor, on the other hand, are set exogenously. 
There is only one type of labor in this model, namely, unskilled labor. 
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Labor groups, however, are distinguished by region and as urban and rural 
labor, e.g., j refers to the region and also distinguishes labor groups. 
The nominal wage rate for each group is set exogenously to define an 
infinite supply of labor for region j (SL^). 
Slj = SL^CtjJ) (4.29) 
The labor market for each category (or region j) clears by equating 
total supply to total demand for labor group j. 
, Slj = 2. (4.30) 
Land is assumed abundant in region 3 (traditional rainfed), whereas, 
upper bounds are set on areas in the other regions. 
TAJ = TAjt (4.31) 
The markets for land and labor, however, are suppressed due to data 
problems. No time series are available on labor hours supplied to or 
demanded by crop, region or sector. 
The model does not have a market for loanable funds, as the capital 
market in Sudan is controlled and institutional credit is highly 
regulated and rationed. There is, however, a money market in the model 
that clears to determine the general price level. The current account 
balance, on the other hand, provides an equilibrating mechanism in the 
saving-investment closure with fixed nominal interest and exchange rates, 
e.g., the current account balance is the endogenously determined variable 
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when neither the nominal exchange nor interest rates are allowed to 
adjust for equilibrium in the foreign exchange market. Solutions to the 
model will, therefore, be generated by clearing the goods and money 
markets simultaneously. The model can readily be extended to factor 
markets with data available on supply and utilization and can then derive 
functional distribution of income and intersectoral flows of resources. 
Investment demand The largest agricultural investment is public. 
Allocation of government investments between the three economic sectors 
(agriculture, industry and non-tradables) is exogenously determined. 
Private investment is endogenous. In agriculture, private investment is 
defined for the mechanized rainfed subsector (region 4) only, by: 
PIN4^ = N4CAGBR^, ENP3.^, ENPHG^, ENPNAT^, E(e^^-eQ^)] (4.32) 
Private demand for capital by region 4 (PIN4^) is defined in (4.32) 
to depend on the real rate of interest on the Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
long-term (investment) credit (AGBR^), expected producers prices of the 
two crops grown, expected net price of home goods (ENPHG^) and non-
agricultural tradables (ENPNAT^) and the expected black market premium 
for foreign exchange ECe^j^-e^^], where ej^^ and e^^ are the free market 
and official rates of exchange respectively. The last 3 variables repre­
sent the opportunity cost of private capital in agriculture as proxies of 
the rate of return on competitive investments. Private investment in NAT 
(PINM^) and non-tradables (PINH^) are similarly defined. 
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PINM^ = PMCBR^, ENPNAT^, ENPHG^, ENP3.^, E(e^^ - e^^)] 
PINHt = PHCBR^, ENPNAT^., ENPHG^, ENP3.^, Efe^t - e^^)] 
where BR^ is the real rate of interest on bank credit. Price 
expectations for good i (HG, NAT) are given by: 
ENP-t = E(NP, t_s; (1)^: s=0 T) (i=l,2,3) 
The endogenous private demand for capital (PIN^) plus the 
exogenous allocation of government investments to sector k (GIN^), 
generate total investment by sector of destination k (TIN^). 
TINt = PINt + GINt (k=l,2,3) (4.36) 
The main sector of origin for investment in this model is imported 
capital goods (IMl). Physical structures, however, are produced 
domestically in the home goods sector. Allocation of sectoral investment 
between sectors of origin (imported and home good) is determined as fixed 
proportions, where measures the average share of IMl in total 
investment by sector k. 
mil = TINt • a^/PMl^ (k=l,2,3) (4.37) 
Equation (4.37) derives investment demand for imported good 1 (IMl) 
by sector k, as a fraction of total investment in sector k. Investment 
demand for home good (ZHG^) by sector k is thus given by: 
ZHgJ = (1 - aj) TINV^/PHGt (k=l,2,3) (4.38) 
(4.33) 
(4.34) 
(4.35) 
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Then total investment demand for good j (IMl and HG) by all sectors 
is defined as: 
Zjt = (j=l,2) (4.39) 
Intermediate inputs A fixed coefficient technology is used to 
derive demand for intermediate inputs. The amount of intermediate input 
(n) per unit area of crop i is denoted by in the net price 
equations defined above. Total intermediate demand for input (n) by 
region k is thus given by: 
v|5t = 2. a^. * (n=l,2 N)(k=4) (4.40) 
And total demand for intermediate input (n) by NAT and HG sectors 
are: 
^nt = °nj Onjt (j=HG and NAT) (4.41) 
Total demand for intermediate input (n) is thus derived: 
(n=l,...N) (4.42) 
There are seven intermediate input categories (N=7), namely cotton 
seeds (CSD), sesame (SS), groundnuts (GN), cotton lint (QCN), home goods 
(HG), non-agricultural tradables (NAT) and intermediate imports (IM2). 
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Foreign Trade 
Imports 
Four import commodities are distinguished in the model; 
specifically, capital imports (IMl), imported intermediate goods (IM2), 
wheat (IM3) and other consumer goods (IM4). The first two are non­
competitive, whereas imported wheat is considered a perfect substitute to 
domestic wheat. Consumer imports, on the other hand, are treated as an 
imperfect substitute to locally manufactured products, e.g., non-
agricultural tradables (NAT). The small country assumption is employed 
for Sudan imports. Accordingly, Sudan faces a perfectly elastic supply 
of imports given by 4.43 for IMl, IM2, and IMS. As a significant part of 
IM4 is financed through the parallel market for foreign exchange, PM4 is 
obtained in (4.44). 
• PMjt = PMjtd - tmjt)ejt (j=l,2,3) (4.43) 
PM4t = ®bt Kt^^ - tm4t) + B4t(e4t " ®bt^Kt^^ " ^ ^t^ t*'**) 
The price of imported good j denominated in local currency (PMj) 
is defined in (4.43) to be equal to the foreign price (PMj) multi­
plied by the effective exchange rate (ey) adjusted for import tariffs 
(tmy). 3^^ in (4.44) measures the proportion of IM4 imported via 
private licensing and assumed to be financed through the free foreign 
exchange market. The effective exchange rate for import k is set in 
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(4.45) as the exchange tax/subsidy (tej) adjusted official exchange rate: 
®jt = ®ot^^ - tSjt) (j=l,...4) (4.45) 
where e^ converts U.S.$ into Sudanese pounds. The specification of 
prices and exchange rates in (4.43) to (4.44) introduces commercial 
policy in the model. There are no domestic substitutes for foreign 
capital (IMl) and foreign intermediate (IM2) goods, and thus, demand for 
these non-competitive imports is derived from the intermediate and 
investment by sector of origin demand equations. Wheat imports (IM3) on 
the other hand, are obtained as a residual from the wheat supply-demand 
balance equation. Demand for IM4 is obtained from the consumption demand 
system discussed below. 
Exports 
Manufactured products plus all agricultural tradables except wheat, 
are exported from Sudan. The small country assumption is maintained for 
non-agricultural tradables, sesame, sorghum, cotton seeds, short staple 
cotton, groundnuts, and livestock and others (STOZ). Long staple cotton 
and gum arable exports, on the other hand, are assumed to face a sloping 
demand, as Sudan delivers a large share of those products to the world 
market. Export prices for non-agricultural tradables (NAT), sesame (SS), 
sorghum (DR), cotton seeds (QS), short staple cotton (SSCN), STOZ and 
groundnuts (GN) are determined by world prices (P*), commercial and 
exchange rate policies: 
Pit = Pit (1 - tx-t) e.^ (i=l,...,7) (4.46) 
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where tx^ is the export tax/subsidy rate and e^^ is the effective rate 
of exchange for commodity i. 
®it ®ot - te^t) (i=l,...,7) (4.47) 
The specification in (4.45) and (4.46) defines a perfectly elastic 
demand for NAT, SS, DR, QCS, SSCN, STOZ, and GN exports. Domestic supply 
in excess of domestic absorption (intermediate and final demand) 
represent exports in the mentioned sectors (Ej^). Export prices 
of long staple cotton and gum arabic, on the other hand, are determined 
endogenously by the equilibrium dollar price of Sudan exports (EP^) and 
commercial policies. 
Pit = EPit (1 - tx,;) e.^ (i=l,2) (4.48) 
Supply and demand functions (SE^ and DE^ respectively) for Sudan 
exports of long staple cotton (LSCN) and gum arabic (GM) are therefore 
specified to determine EP^ endogenously. 
SE-t = SE-t (EP.^, ST.^) (i=l,2) (4.49) 
DEjt = DE-t (EP-t, P*^) (i=l,2) (4.50) 
The beginning of period stock of crop i (ST^^), and world prices 
'if (Pj^) are used together with export prices to explain supply and demand 
shifts in cotton and gum arabic exports. Over- and under-invoicing of 
exports and imports as well as smuggling activities are not modelled 
because of data problems. 
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Income and Final Demand 
Income 
Value added is divided between wages, interest and taxes. Wage 
income (YL^) is given by: 
YL^ = Zj Ylj (4.51) 
where YL;^ denotes income paid to labor j by all sectors i. 
YLJ = wj * SLJ (4.52) 
and SL:^ is the supply of labor j as defined earlier. Government income 
(T^) is defined as the sum of direct and indirect taxes. 
Tt = td^ • Zj NPjt - 3* e^ • tr^ ' RT^ + S. GR.^ (4.53) 
where GR^ calculates total indirect taxes on commodity i as follows: 
GRit : Go "m ""n Jn " ^ '"•S"' 
where: 
(i=l,...,15) 
= (te. • x^ - te^ - X.) (4.55) 
and X .  = tm^ for imports 
= tx^ for exports (4.56) 
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(Xj, te., P*, e^) = (0, 0, PHG, 1) (4.57) 
for the home goods sector. 
Interest income (RN^) is then derived as a residual 
RNt = VADt - YLt - Tt (4.58) 
where VAD^ is total value added. 
Functional distribution of value added among owners of primary 
factors is not derived due to data limitations, as discussed earlier. 
All income generated in this model is, therefore, paid to a single 
household sector. From this income the government collects tax revenues. 
Accordingly, there are only two sectors of final demand in this model: 
households and a government sector. The after tax returns to primary 
factors (labor, capital and land) plus total private remittances (TRT^) 
denominated in Sudanese pounds and net factor income (NFI^), represent 
the household sector income (HH^). 
HHt = (1 - td;) ÏJ NPjt Qjt + 8(2^; - e^t) TRTj + TRTj + NFIj (4.59) 
Here NPj is the net price and Qj is the output level of commodity j 
(j=12, e.g., 10 agricultural tradables, NAT and HG), e^^ is the 
effective exchange rate for remittances of SNWA, and 3 is the proportion 
of total remittances transferred via official channels, e.g., at e^^. 
tr. measures the exchange subsidy on SNWA remittances, and td. is the 
(4.60) 
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direct tax rate. Government taxes or subsidies are subtracted and added 
according to the corresponding tax structure (tx, te, tm, td, ti, and 
tr). 
Consumption 
The model contains seven consumption goods for final demand, namely, 
wheat, sorghum, beans and vegetables (BNS), meats and other (STOZ), 
consumer imports (IM4), home goods and agricultural non-tradables. There 
are two consuming sectors, private households and the government sector. 
The government is assumed to buy home goods, and NAT only, for final 
consumption. Government investment and consumption spending are 
exogenously set (GIN^ and GCN^ respectively). Total government 
spending is therefore defined as: 
G^ = GIN^ + GCN^ (4.61) 
where: 
GINt = \ GINt (k=l,2,3) (4.62) 
GINt is the sum of government investments in all sectors (k), and 
GCNt represents government consumption demand. The government collects 
taxes and disposes of its revenues according to (4.61) and (4.62). 
Private demand for the seven consumption goods in the model is 
derived in (4.63) using flexible demand systems: 
•"it ''i (Pit' Ef) (i=l  7) (4.63) 
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where final demand for commodity i (F^) is a function of prices (P^) 
and total consumption expenditure (5%), which is endogenously 
determined by 
Et " SR^, ejj^) (4.64) 
where SR^ is the expected real saving rate of interest, is disposable 
income (as defined in 4.59) and e ^ ^is the parallel market exchange rate. 
Equation (4.63) is consistent with demand theory and represents 
optimal choices of utility maximizing consumers, subject to an 
expenditure constraint. The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980) is used to estimate model (4.63). Properties of 
AIDS and equation (4.63) are derived in Appendix 0. 
Product market equilibrium 
As mentioned earlier, an equilibrium solution is obtained in this 
model by clearing product markets. Equilibrium in factor markets is 
maintained and is not derived explicitly due to data limitations that 
precluded adequate modelling of factor markets. Total demand for product 
j (Dj^) should match total supply (Sj^) at each time period t; such that 
Equilibrium Conditions 
(j=l 15) (4.65) 
where D^^ is the sum of intermediate (Vj^), investment (Zj^), private 
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(Fjt), and government final demands(GCN^) plus export demand (EXj^) 
for product j. 
"jt ' "jt + Zjt ^  fjt ^  GCNjt f EXjt (4.66) 
EXj^ is obtained as a residual from (4.66) for all products except 
for cotton and gum arabic where EX is an equilibrium quantity in the 
export market; such that: 
SE^t = DE-t (i=CN and GM) (4.67) 
Total supply of product j is the sum of domestic production (Qj^), 
inventory changes (ST^ - ST^_j^) and imports (IMj^J. 
Sjt ' Ojt + '"jt - ISTjt - STj.t-l' (4-68) 
Again, wheat imports (IM3^) is obtained as a residual in (4.66). 
The Macro-economic Closure 
The macro-structure of Sudan economy is specified such that excess 
aggregate demand is allowed in the model. The domestic resource gap is 
made of two components. Total private investment (TPIN^) in excess of 
private savings (PS^) represents the first structural imbalance (PD^) 
in this model: 
TPINt - PS^ = PD^ (4.69) 
where; 
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TPIN^ = PIN^ for all sectors k=l,2,3 (4.70) 
PSt = (4.71) 
The fiscal deficit (GD^), on the other hand, contributes the 
second part of the resource gap in our model. 
Gt - = 6D^ (4.72) 
Private (PD^) and public deficits (GD^) represent the domestic 
resource gap or excess aggregate demand (in local currency), which is 
balanced as follows: 
PD^ + GD^ = e^F^ (4.73) 
where represent the foreign resource gap or net foreign borrowing 
given by: 
:j PMjt ' IMjt - ^ i <t • EXit = Ft (4.74) 
With a fixed exchange regime, the specification in (4.74) allows for 
disequilibrium in foreign trade. As net capital inflow (F^) is not 
rationed, the model assumes that foreigners are willing to hold an 
unlimited size of Sudan's debts. This assumption is used in simulating 
the observed performance of the economic system for model validation. 
Different specifications will be used, however, to solve the model for 
policy analysis. A zero trade balance or fixed supply of foreign loans 
are assumed to determine the equilibrium exchange rate under a flexible 
exchange regime. 
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As there is practically no bond market in Sudan, internal imbalances 
are financed by creation of domestic credit. The limited ability of the 
central authority in monetary control through open market operations, is 
thus recognized in making money supply endogenous to the system. Change 
in money supply (M^ - M^^), according to (4.75), is a function of fiscal 
deficits (GD^), expected real saving rate (SR^), and income (VAD^): 
Mt - Mt_i = M(GD^, SR^, VAD^) (4.75) 
Similar specifications are used by various authors to allow for 
endogeneity of money supply in studying the important link between fiscal 
deficits and inflation in developing countries (Aghevli and Khan, 1978; 
Taylor, 1979; and Scobie, 1983). 
A money demand function is specified in (4.76). Demand for real 
money balances (MD/P) is explained by real gross national product (Y^), 
the expected rate of inflation (%%), and the expected black market 
premium ECe^ - e^). 
MD+ 
y— = m^CY^, ïï^, EXe^t - e^^)] (4.76) 
The' specification in (4.76) follows closely the model used by 
Domowitz and El Badawi (1987) to estimate demand for money in Sudan. The 
fact that the nominal interest rate in Sudan is an exogenously set 
constant led to its exclusion from (4.76). The same argument was 
employed by Domowitz and ElBadawi (1987) to disregard the interest rate 
as empirically irrelevant. It has also been argued by the same authors. 
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that the interest rate does not reflect the true opportunity cost of 
holding money due to the redundancy of the assets market in Sudan. 
Investment in physical assets is considered the alternative substitute 
to holding money. The inflation rate is thus used to represent the 
economic cost of holding money in the portfolio balance. Where 
The only difference between (4.76) and the Domowitz/ElBadawi study 
is in the specification of the exchange rate component. Holding of 
foreign currencies is considered a major substitute to domestic money. 
The official market exchange rate is thus used in the mentioned study, as 
the opportunity cost of holding local currency. The study did not lend 
empirical support to the statistical significance of the exchange rate 
effect. The expected wedge between the free market and official exchange 
rate is alternatively used in the present study. 
To close the model and clear the financial assets market, equality 
of demand and supply of money is required. 
The equilibrium condition in (4.79) determines the general price 
level (P^) endogenously, e.g., the price of money. In this model, 
where domestic production-absorption disequilibrium is allowed, Walras 
Law is satisfied by the trade balance (current account deficit) as shown 
(4.77) 
(4.78) 
Mt = MDt (4.79) 
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in 4.73 and redefined by 
Zj Pjt Dit " ^  = ®o''t (i=l,....12) (4.80) 
Equation 4.80 gives the budget constraint of the economy. 
Accordingly, the n+1 equations (the n commodity and money market 
equilibria plus the budget constraint) determine n+1 prices (the n prices 
and the nominal exchange rate). As the nominal exchange rate e^ is 
fixed in Sudan, the current account deficit (F^) is. determined 
endogenously. Alternatively can be set exogenously to determine the 
equilibrium exchange rate endogenously. 
While domestic money provides an additional product market in the 
economy, production of does not use real resources directly in this 
model, e.g., no production function is specified. The cost of money 
supply (cost of inflation), however, is born by all economic agents, as 
inflation imposes an indirect tax on real resources (through being 
the numeraire). The impact of excess public demand (fiscal deficit) on 
inflation and economic activity is given by the money supply linkage 
4.75. 
Short run non-neutrality of money is therefore allowed as some 
prices and quantities are slow to adjust in this model, e.g., 
agricultural supply, and the exchange and interest rates. 
Figure 4.1 gives a schematic representation of the GEMS structure. 
There are four segments of the model (supply, final demand, foreign, and 
macro sectors) plus the product and factor markets. Given relative 
prices, the supply sector delivers domestic production,.and intermediate 
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and primary factor demands to the product and factor markets. Foreign 
trade and international prices flow through the foreign sector to the 
products market. The final demand sectors (private households and the 
government) allocate total resources from value added, remittances, plus 
domestic and foreign borrowing among final demand categories (consumption 
and investment) given relative prices. 
Given total supply and demand for goods and money the general price 
level and relative prices are determined in the product market. Value 
added is thus determined and paid to the final demand sectors. The macro 
sector receives excess aggregate demand from the product market and 
adjusts money supply accordingly. Prices of goods and money and the 
corresponding equilibrium quantities are thus determined simultaneously 
within the model. 
The labor market equilibrium is maintained implicitly and the 
exogenous wage rate sets an unlimited supply of labor. The GEMS has 16 
sectors and 187 equations in 187 endogenous variables as enumerated in 
Table 4.2. 
The solution strategy and algorithms are discussed in Chapter 6 
where validation and policy simulations are performed. Chapter 5 
estimates the model parameters. 
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Supply Demand 
Demand for 
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production (Q^^) 
Final demand 
Intermediate 
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of 
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Supply 
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Figure 4.1 The General Equilibrium Model for Sudan (GEMS) 
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Table 4.2 Variables of the GEMS 
Variable Names Number of Variables and Equations 
Endogenous variables 
Yit Agricultural yield 4 agric. regions (K=4) 4+1+5+2=12 
4t Crop areas and six crops (i=6) 4+1+5+2=12 
Qit Agricultural output 5+2+7+2=16 
Nlit Net returns in region 1 = 5 
NATt Non-agricultural tradables = 1 
HGt Home goods = 1 
NPft Net prices 4+2+6+2+2(NAT&HG) =16 
Pit Product prices =12 
<t Intermediate demand =14 
PI"kt Private investment by 
sector of destination k=3 = 3 
P'jt Private investment by 
sector of origin j=2 = 2 
Fit Final demand = 7 
Dit Total demand =16 
Sit Total supply =16 
HHt Household income = 1 
Tt Government income = 1 
EPit Export price i=2 (cotton and gum arabic) = 2 
SEit Export supply i=2 (cotton and gum arabic) = 2 
OEit Demand for export i=2 (cotton and gum arabic) = 2 
EX-t Exports = 9 
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Table 4.2 Continued 
Variable Names Number of Variables and Equations 
Endogenous variables 
Imports 
Et Private consumption expend. 
PSt Private savings 
PDt. Private deficit 
GDt Government deficit S 1 
Mt Money supply 
MDt Demand for money 
Pt General price level 
STit Beginning stock = 2 
Ft Trade balance 
WTRIO^ 
VADt 
Ratio of domestic production 
to imports of wheat 
Value added (GDP) 
Yt National income (GNP) 
ENP^t Net price expectations =16 
TAJ Total land area = 4 
TOTAL =187 
Exogenous Variables 
Government investment by 
sector of destination 3 
GZjt Government investment by 
sector of origin 2 
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Table 4.2 Continued 
Variable Names Number of Variables and Equations 
Exogenous Variables 
GFjt Government consumption 1 
Water rates 4 
Wage rate 2 (rural/urban) 
WH^ Weather 1 
Indirect tax rate 9 
Exchange rate 1 
International prices 12 
PBB^ Price of broad beans 1 
Effective exchange rates 5 
®bt Parallel market exhange rate 1 
tx^t Export tax/subsidy 7 
tMjt Import tax/subsidy 4 
t Direct tax rate 1 
GOL^ Gasoil allocations 2 
AGBL^ Agricultural bank loans 1 
1/ 
TA^ Total land area 3 
AGBR+ Agricultural bank long 1 term credit rate 
TOTAL = 66 
1/ (j)., a., a^, B, s, 6, 6, d, e are vectors of parameters in the model. 
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CHAPTER 5. ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL PARAMETERS 
Two approaches to numerical specification of applied general 
equilibrium models are generally found in the literature. Calibration is 
the standard and most commonly used procedure among general equilibrium 
modelers. Econometric estimation, on the other hand, is rare and in most 
cases used to supplement calibration. This chapter describes and 
compares these two methods. Parameter values for our model obtained by 
econometric methods are then presented. We refer to the two estimation 
criteria under consideration hereafter as deterministic (calibration) and 
stochastic (econometric) approaches to numerical specification of general 
equilibrium models. 
Deterministic Specification Method 
The following representation is used to illustrate the numerical 
specification issue: 
F^(Y^, X^, e, e^) = 0 (5.1) 
Model 5.1 defines a system of M equations with a vector of M 
endogenous variables (Y^), a vector of exogenous variables (X^), a 
vector of unknown parameters (3), and a (IXM) vector of random errors 
(Sj.). The problem is to choose a numerical value for the unknown 
parameter vector 3. As defined by Lau (1984), calibration is equivalent 
to setting equal to zero in 5.1. Using a single observation on 
85 
and X|. that represents an equilibrium benchmark period t, the system in 
5.1 is then solved for the corresponding values of 3. 
Calibration is thus parsimonious as it uses only one data point to 
compute the system parameters. One other important advantage of calibra­
tion is the fact that deterministic specification of 3 guarantees an exact 
solution for the benchmark values of Y given X with all the equilibrium 
constraints holding. This is true by definition since the system 
Ft(Yt, X^, 3, 0) = 0 (5.2) 
A 
solves exactly for the same values of Y used to generate 3 given the 
corresponding values of X. This generally does not hold when 3 is 
estimated econometrically (F^ f 0). 
Calibration, however, assumes away all the legitimate reasons behind 
incorporating an error term in the model. The assumption that the 
model is perfectly specified with all influencing factors included and 
all data measured without errors, is rather strong. Moreover, with only 
one observation to use, parameter values obtained by calibration are not 
unique. While econometric methods face identification problems as well, 
they are easier to handle. It is also important to note that model 5.2 
can solve for only M independent parameters (the number of equations). 
This restriction has led to the use of less flexible functional forms. 
Often, however, other methods are used to augment calibration. Educated 
guessing or borrowing from the literature and sometimes economtric 
estimation are widely used to select numerical values for the key 
parameters of the model. Finally, the strongest criticism to calibration 
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is that it does not provide any statistical measure of reliability of the 
estimated model and its parameters (Mansur and Whalley, 1984; Lau, 1984). 
Stochastic Methods of Estimation 
With appropriate assumptions about the distribution of the 
disturbance term ^ and the function in 5.1, available time series 
on Y and X can be used to generate estimates of the parameter vector 3 
econometrically. Given enough exogenous variables and non-sample 
information to identify the model, the only limitation on the number of 
independent parameters to be estimated with this approach is the number 
of data points available. Hence, the option for using more flexible 
functional forms. In presence of non-linear restrictions imposed on the 
model parameters and equations for consistency with demand and firm 
theories as well as budget and fixed endowment constraints, full 
information maximum likelihood or other alternative system procedures 
(iterative 3 stage least squares) are required for consistent estimation 
of model 5rl. The biggest advantage of econometric procedures is the 
useful error statistics generated for evaluating reliability and 
confidence in results. Within and out of sample simulation experiments 
can also test the predictive power and stability of the econometric 
models. 
Stochastic specification of parameter values in a general 
equilibrium (GE) context, however, face some problems which has limited 
its use and led to the popularity of deterministic approaches among 
producers of GE models. The most important difficulty with econometric 
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estimation is defining the likelihood function for a large number of GE 
models where error terms are not independent (Mansur and Whalley, 1984). 
Moreover, GE models usually involve estimation of a large number of 
parameters and thus longer data series are required. The parsimony 
problem multiplies with the level of sectoral detail and disaggregation 
in the model as well as the degree of flexibility of the functional forms 
used. 
An alternative strategy for stochastic specification of GE models is 
the full information subsystem methods suggested and implemented by 
Mansur and Whalley (1984), and Jorgenson (1984). In this approach, model 
5.1 is partitioned into subsystems of N equations, where N is necessarily 
smaller than the total number of equations (M) in the complete model. 
Subsystems are chosen such that structural equations most likely to be 
interdependent are grouped together. Subgroups must also form consistent 
systems where possible theoretical cross-equation restrictions can be 
accommodated. A natural choice of partitioning used in both of the above 
studies was the supply and demand components of the GE formulation. 
One problem with subsystems estimation is the implicit assumption of 
exogeneity of some variables that are endogenous to the full 
specification of the model. Examples are income and prices in estimating 
the demand subsystem. Instrumental variables, however, can be used to 
estimate each subsystem using the consistent non-linear 3 stage least 
squares estimator (Mansur and Whalley, 1984; Jorgenson, 1984). 
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Estimation of the GEMS Parameters 
Subsystems estimation is employed to generate parameter values for 
this study. Supply-demand subdivision of the model is followed. 
Supply systems 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, supply structures are 
specified as response functions of expected net prices (or returns) plus 
other exogenous factors. Naive price expectations schemes are used such 
that expected net price (or return) of product i in region j is given by 
last year's realization: 
Kt = NPi.t-l <5.3) 
It is assumed that economic agents do not possess full information 
about the complex structure of the economy described by the GE 
representation given in chapter 4, and so do not use the rational 
expectations hypothesis. Moreover, the short series of observations 
available precluded adoption of adaptive expectations schemes with more 
lags. As mentioned earlier, current prices are not in the information 
set of agricultural producers when production plans are made. This 
specification implies lags in agricultural supply and thus current 
agricultural prices are demand determined. While the supply of 
agricultural tradables is given at period t according to 5.3, price 
expectations adjust next period's supply. 
Accordingly all repressors in the agricultural supply subsystems are 
considered predetermined except for real wages. This in addition to the 
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fact that the small country assumption is used for all agricultural 
tradables except for long staple cotton, support exogeneity of prices for 
suppliers in these sectors. Nevertheless, instrumental variable system 
estimation (3 stage least squares) as well as Zellner seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) are performed on the supply systems. Better 
statistical results, however, were obtained with the SUR estimator and in 
many cases the instrumental variable procedure generated inconsistent 
signs. Results of the SUR estimations are given in Tables 5.1 through 
5.7 below. All supply and demand response functions are estimated in the 
log linear (Cobb Douglas) form. Only 16 annual observations were 
available (1971-1986) limiting the flexibility of the used functional 
forms. The estimated equations represent response rather than proper 
supply functions and hence no theoretical restrictions were imposed on 
the system. Significance levels on the t-statistic of estimated 
coefficients are indicated by stars in all tables where one, two, and 
three stars denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Column 4 in Table 5.2 deals with the fact that not all the wheat 
produced in the irrigated public sector (region 1) is handed over to the 
government at the procurement price as required. The proportion of wheat 
delivered (PWD) by tenant farmers is found to vary inversely with the gap 
between the market price of wheat (PWHT) and the procurement price of 
wheat (PPW). As farmers in region 1 sell part of their wheat production 
(QWl) in the market, they receive the following price (PWl) on their 
wheat supply: 
PWl = PWD * PPW + (1 - PWD) * PWHT (5.4) 
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Table 5.1. Systems estimates of yield response parameters for the 
public irrigation schemes (Region 1)® 
LSCN DRA GNT WHT 
Constant -fi.449 
(-1.98)* 
1.374 
(6.66)*** 
2.814 
(132.3)*** 
1.424 
(1.89)* 
LSCNt_i .172 
(4.845)*** 
.128 
(10.165)*** 
-.045 
(-5.747)*** 
-.028 
(-1.55) 
DRAt_l .179 
(7.506)*** 
GNTt.i -.089 
(-1.192) 
.06 
(3.31)*** 
-.046 
(-1.26) 
WHTt.i -.073 
(-1.319)*** 
.26 
(5.44)*** 
WG -.11 
(-1.44) 
-.058 
(-2.465)** 
-.068 
(-3.395)*** 
-.086 
(-2.83)** 
FLDX 1.617 
(2.287)** 
.189 
(.68) 
WH .115 
(3.39)*** 
R Squared .704 .884 .93 .78 
Durbin-Watson 2.03 2.15 1.72 1.13 
^Columns denote yields of long staple cotton (LSCN), sorghum 
(DRA), groundnuts (GNT) and wheat (WHT) in Region 1. Rows refer to 
repressors : lagged real net prices (t-1), real wage rate (WG), rainfall 
(WH) and flooding index (FLDX). 
*Figures between brackets are t-statisties. 
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Table 5.2. SUR estimates of area response parameters in Region 1® 
LSCN GNT WHT PWD 
Constant 6.904 
(40.77)*** 
2.878 
(3.556)*** 
5.67 
(26.35?** 
.513 
(1.824)* 
DRAt-l -.346 
(-3.317)*** 
GNTt.i .177 
(2.348)** 
GIAGt_i .084 
(2.97)** 
BSTK -.034 
(-1.97)* 
TIME -.007 
(-4.29)*** 
AGNTt-l .484 
(3.549)*** 
DSWRt_i .626 
(6.56)*** 
WPW^.i .454 
(4.158)*** 
PWHT -2.84 
(-3.314)*** 
PPW 2.598 
(2.91)** 
R Squared .68 .48 .78 .545 
Durbin-Watson 1.83 1.5 1.35 1.25 
^Columns refer to areas of long staple cotton (LSCN), groundnuts 
(GNT), wheat (WHT), and to proportion of wheat delivered (PWD). Rows 
define the regressors: lagged real net prices of sorghum (DRA) and 
groundnut (GNT), lagged real government investment in agriculture (GIAG), 
beginning stock of cotton (BSTK), time, lagged area under groundnuts 
(AGNT), domestic supply of wheat ratio (DSWR), world price of wheat (WPW), 
market price and procurement price of wheat (PWHT and PPW, respectively). 
*Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
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Since wheat yield in Region 1 is specified to vary with PWl which in 
turn is a function of PWHT (according to 5.4), the supply of wheat in 
Region 1 (QWl) is therefore a function of the market price of wheat. 
Wheat supply in Region 2 (QW2), on the other hand, is a direct function 
of the market price (Table 5.3) as all supply is sold in the free market. 
Accordingly, domestic supply of wheat (DSW) and area planted to wheat in 
Region 1, being a function of the domestic supply ratio are responsive to 
the market price of wheat. Total supply of wheat, however, consists of 
the domestic component (DSW) plus government imports (IM3). 
Except for the treatment of producers prices in Region 1 discussed 
above, the wheat sector specification corresponds largely to the supply 
equations of Damous' wheat sector model (1986). His supply functions 
also do not contain a wage effect and are estimated by ordinary least 
squares equation by equation. While both models generate similar 
results, the systems estimators of the present study gave much better 
statistical performance than Damous'. Demand for wheat, however, is 
estimated as part of a complete demand system in this study, whereas, 
Damous (1986) estimated a demand for wheat equation in a partial 
equilibrium context and independent of other consumption goods. 
Export demand and supply functions for long staple cotton are given in 
Table 5.6. Two stage least squares is used to correct for endogeneity of 
the exort price (EXPLS). Lack of data on the world gum arabic market and 
prices led to the use of the small country assumption of perfectly 
elastic demand for its exports. 
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Table 5.3. Systems estimates of wheat supply elasticities in the 
private irrigation schemes (Region 2)^ 
Yield Area 
Constant -6.64 
(-2.597)** 
1.68 
(1.895)* 
PWHTt-l .29 
(2.29)** 
.145 
(2.5)** 
PBNS^.i -.115 
(-2.33)** 
-.082 
(-3.62)*** 
TMP2 -.713 
(-6.63)*** 
WG -.197 
(-3.46)*** 
-.087 
(-3.898)*** 
FLDX 2.72 
(5.6)** 
.367 
(1.91)* 
R-squared .91 .59 
Durbin-Watson 2.02 2.49 
®Rows refer to regressors: lagged real prices of wheat (PWHT) and 
beans (PBNS), temperature in Region 2 index (TMP2), real wages (WG) and a 
flooding index (FLDX). 
*Figures in brackets denote t-statisties. 
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No data was available on private investment by sector of destination 
and hence investment demand by sector is not estimated. Instead, reduced 
form representations of the domestic manufacturing (DMNF) and homegoods 
sectors (HMG), and Region 4 (the private dryland mechanized farming) 
supply functions are estimated directly with arguments in their 
respective private investment functions substituted in the reduced supply 
forms. Table 5.7 reports the results. 
Demand system estimation 
Private consumption and private investment functions are also given 
in Table 5.8. Estimates of the parameters of the share equations in the 
demand system are also summarized in Table 5.9. Symmetry and adding up 
(Engel aggregation) restrictions (discussed in Appendix D) are imposed on 
the almost ideal demand system (AIDS). The beans equation (the dropped 
equation) is derived using demand theory restrictions imposed on the 
structural parameters. Restrictions of the demand theory are not tested 
in this study. 
The money market 
Table 5.10 presents estimates of the supply and demand for money 
equations. The money demand equation follows closely the error 
correction model estimated by Domowitz and Elbadawi (1987), using a 
different data set. Very similar results are obtained with the present 
series (1971-1986). This indicates the stability of their model which 
covered the 1958-1977 period. The parallel market exchange rate and the 
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real savings interest rate gave poorer statistical performance than the in 
official exchange and inflation rate. We use, however, the rate of 
change in the official exchange rate rather than the exchange rate level. 
We also replace gross domestic product in their money demand equation 
with national income. Inspite of the shorter series used to fit the 
equation, the model performed better with these modifications made. 
Tables 5.1 through 5.5 reveal interesting substitution possibilities 
in the yield and area response functions in all regions. Results 
presented in these tables indicate that agricultural supply is more 
responsive to economic policy and movement in relative prices in the 
private holdings of Regions 2 to 4 than under the rigid institutional 
arrangements of public irrigation schemes (Region 1). Total area cropped 
in the mechanized rainfed sector is found to be highly responsive, 
particularly to the availability of short-term bank loans, the amount of 
gasoil allocated to the region and the expected premium on holding 
foreign assets, e.g., the lagged discrepancy between the official and 
parallel rates of foreign exchange (Table 5.5). Also, cotton area in the 
traditional rainfed sector proved to be highly sensitive to prices of 
competitive crops (Table 5.4). 
The data also indicated that the amount of rainfall is a very 
important supply factor, particularly for dry farming systems (Table 
5.4). Tables 5.1 to 5.5 contain some evidence for the inelasticity of 
agricultural supply in Sudan. This result supports the argument for 
using agriculture as the tax base for industrialization in developing 
countries. It is also important to note that the composition of 
Table 5.4. Systems estimates of area and yield response parameters for the traditional rainfed 
sector (Region 3)^ 
Constant SSCN^.i DRA^_1 GNTt-i SSMt_i GUMt-i WG WH 
ro
 
DW 
1-Yield 
SSCN -4.522 
(-3.035)** 
.077 
(.726) 
-.348 
(-1.93)* ( 
-.29 
-3.7)*** 
.658 
(2.73)** 
.55 2.3 
DRA -2.56 
(-3.2)*** 
-.054 
(-1.52) 
.11 
(.715) 
-.112 
(-2.358)* 
-.053 
(-1.38) ( 
-.06 
-3.133) 
.71 
(5.08*** 
.64 2.02 
GNT -2.528 
(-2.864) 
-.126 
(-1.15) 
.026 
(.399) ( 
-.116 
-2.873r 
.684 
(4.784)* 
.61 2.68 
SSM -1.954 
(-2.13)* 
-.334 
(-2.77)** 
-.093 
(-1.615) 
.151 
(2.26)** ( 
-.062 
-2.46)** 
.493 
(3.31)** 
.55 2.87 
GUM 4.91 
(5.82)*** 
-.236 
(-3.12r* 
.028 
(.682) 
.258 
(1.94)* 
.53 2.09 
2-Area 
SSCN 3.684 
(2.09)* 
.363 
*** 
(3.479) 
-.708 
*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.215 
*** 
(-3.13) 
.109 
(.383) 
.66 1.7 
DRA 4.02 
(2.47)** 
-.413 
(-3.43)** 
.285 
(1.138) 
-.139 
(-1.16) 
.59 
(4.26)** 
.66 
(2.504r 
.75 1.78 
GNT 7.983 
(70.56)*** 
-.175 
(-3.168)* 
-.11 
(-.57) 
.254 
(3.7ir* 
-.268 
(-5.065r 
.003 
(.32) 
.43 2.09 
SSM 3.164 
(4.1831** 
-.168 
(-1.58) 
-.112 
(-2.17)* 
.232 
(3.64r 
.639 
(5.18!** 
.65 1.76 
^Columns define regressors; lagged real prices of short staple cotton (SSCN), sorghum (DRA), 
groundnuts (GNT), sesame (SSM), gum arabic (GUM), real wages (WG) and rainfall (WH). Rows refer to 
dependent variables (yield and areas) as defined above. 
*Figures in brackets denote t-statistics. 
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Table 5.5. Systems estimates of supply parameters in the mechanized 
rainfed sector (Region 4)® 
DRA SSM PRDRA TA4 
Constant 1.814 
(4.49)*** 
-.15 
(-.423) 
-.71 
(-1.964)* 
6.2 
(4.26)*** 
DRAt-1 .032 -.039 .161 
(2.98)** 
.321 
(3.06)*** (.637) (-.858) 
-.077 
(-2.04)* 
.091 
(2.649)** 
-.046 
(-1.13) 
.175 
(.97) 
WG -.057 
(-2.72)** 
-.01 
(-.56) 
-.052 
(-2.448)** 
WH .032 .214 .096 .193 
(.471) (3.64)*** (1.614) (.88) 
PGOL -.116 
(-3.75)*** 
-.048 
(-1.93)* 
AGBLt_i .625 
(3.21)*** 
G0L4 1.296 
(4.96)*** 
DMNFt.i -.544 (-.93) 
EXDIFt.i -.199 (-1.34) 
R-squared .58 .73 .76 .97 
Durbin-Watson 1. 7 2.08 1.32 2.29 
^Columns define yield of sorghum (DRA) and sesame (SSM), proportion 
of area under sorghum (PRORA) and total area in Region 4 (TA4). Rows 
define the regressors lagged real prices of sorghum, sesame and domestic 
manufacturing (DMNF), real wages (WG), rainfall (WH), real price of gasoil 
(PGOL), lagged real total agricultural bank loans to mechanized farmers 
(AGBL), amount of gasoil allocated to Region 4 index (G0L4) and lagged 
expected parallel market exchange rate premium (EXDIF^_j), 
*Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
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Table 5.6. Two-stage least squares estimates of the long staple 
cotton export demand (EXDLS) and price (EXPLS) equations^ 
EXDLS EXPLS 
Constant 9.48 
(3.123)*** 
.838 
(.56) 
BSTK -.264 
(-1.82)* 
WPLS 2.08 
(1.26) 
1.178 
(4.68)*** 
EXPLS -2.65 
(-1.86)* 
R-squared -.10 .65 
Durbin-Watson .95 .74 
®Regressors are beginning stock of cotton (BSTK), world price of 
cotton (WPLS), and export price of cotton (EXPLS). 
*Figures in brackets denote t-statistics. 
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Table 5.7. The domestic manufacturing (DMNF) and homegoods (HMG) 
sectors supply equations* 
DMNF HMG 
Constant 5.153 5.84 
(684.4)*** (31.098)*** 
UWG -.006 -.186 
(-.55) (-2.74)** 
DMNFt.i .169 
'if 
-.346 
(2.102) (-.678) 
GINA^_1 .01 
(2.47)** 
FINT. -.046 t 
(-2.44)** 
FCAPt-l -.026 
(-1.47) 
HMG^ .643 
(.754) 
HMGt-l .713 
(1.04) 
GIHGt.i .17 
(2.09)* 
R-squared .75 .82 
Durbin-Watson 2.43 1.63 
®Rows denote the regressors: real urban wage (UWG), lagged real 
price of domestic manufacturing (DMNF^ ^ ), homegoods (6IH6^_j^), 
foreign capital (FCAP^^), current real price of HMG and foreign 
intermediate (FINT). 
*Figures in brackets represent t-ratios. 
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Table 5.8. Private consumption (PCN) and private investment (PIN) 
parameter estimates® 
PCN PIN 
Constant .27 
(1.56) 
4.32 
(9.35)*** 
RSRt.i -.0006 
(-.302) 
REBt.i .002 
(1.13) 
.061 
(3.574)*** 
DIN .946 
(40.25)*** 
RLRt_i -.014 
(-.46) 
HMGt.l 8.675 
(1.071) 
DMNF^.i 2.065 
(.314) 
R-squared .997 .70 
Durbin-Watson 2.27 1.14 
®Regressors are lagged real saving, lending and parallel market 
exchange rates (RSR, RLR and REB, respectively), disposable income (DIN), 
lagged real homegoods (HMG) and domestic manufacturing (DMNF) prices. 
*Figures in brackets denote t-ratios. 
Table 5.9. Parameter estimates of the almost ideal demand system (AIDS)^ 
DRA WHT STOZ DMNF FMNF HMG BNS 
Constant 0.135 
(1.2) 
0.119 
(2.3)** 
0.205 
(1.04) 
0.767 
(4.52)*** 
0.117 
(1.96)* 
-0.304 
(-1.64) 
-0.0683 
DRA -0.06 
(-3.06)*** 
0.011 
(1.23) 
0,0265 
(2.67)** 
0.058 
(2.69)** 
WHT 0.011 
(1.23) 
-0.042 
(-3.414)*** 
0.005 
(0.734) 
-0.02 
(-1.4) 
0.016 
(1.6) 
0.002 
(0.65) 
BNS 0.002 
(0.65) 
.003 
(.15) 
-0.027 
(-3.31)*** 
0.0254 
(2.87)*** 
-0.0192 
STOZ 0.0265 
(2.67)** 
0.005 
(0.734) 
-0.006 
(-1.7)* 
0.025 
(1.03) 
0.007 
(0.64) 
.003 
(.15) 
DMNF 0.058 
(2.69)** 
-0.02 
(-1.4) 
0.025 
(1.03) 
-0.127 
(-2.8)*** 
0.038 
(1.98)** 
-0.096 
(-2.31)** 
-0.027 
(-3.31)*** 
FMNF 0.016 
(1.6) 
0.007 
(0.64) 
0.038 
(1.98)** 
-0.043 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.026 
(-1.16) 
HMG -0.096 
(-2.31)** 
-0.026 
(-1.16) 
-0.033 
(-.71) 
0.0254 
(2.87)*** 
PCN -0.0214 -0.018 0.007 -0.08 -0.0115 0.107 0.016 
(-1.07) (-1.82)** (0.19) (-2.8)*** (-1.1) (2.57)** 
URB 0.09 
(10.64)*** 
-0.0195 
(-2.23)** 
-0.135 
(-9.58)*** 
0.052 
(2.39)** 
0.012 
R-squared .88 .66 .47 .95 .64 .81 
Columns define sectoral share equations for sorghum (DRA), wheat (WHT), beans (BNS), meats 
and vegetables (STOZ), domestic manufactured (DMNF), foreign manufactured (FMNF) and homegoods 
(HMG). Regressors are the respective real prices, consumption spending (PCN) and urbanization index 
(URB). 
*Figures in brackets denote t-ratios. 
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agricultural output is very responsive to policy changes and movements in 
relative prices as indicated by the high substitution and other elastici­
ties of crop areas, especially in the private farming systems (Regions 2 
to 4). This indicates a high potential for the appropriate policy 
measures to influence cropping mix in the desired direction. Supply of 
non-agricultural products, particularly home goods is more elastic than 
agricultural commodities (Table 5.7). Also, results of Table 5.6 did not 
support the argument of inelastic demand for Sudan exports. 
Estimates of the share equations' parameters reveal important 
characteristics of the structure of aggregate demand in Sudan (Table 
5.9). Results indicate that wheat substitutes for sorghum (DRA), 
whereas, animal protein (STOZ) substitutes for basic food staples (wheat 
and sorghum) in Sudanese diets. On the other hand, domestic manufactured 
goods (DMNF) compete with manufactured imports (FMNF) for household 
budgets. Table 5.9 also shows that the share of food except protein 
supplying items in consumption spending declines with higher 
expenditures. The fact that the shares of domestic and foreign 
manufactured goods also decline with higher consumption spending can be 
explained by their high food components. Spending on home goods 
(housing, transportation and services) increase with increased income. 
The demand system results have important policy implications. 
Linear input-output coefficients for intermediate use and allocation 
of government consumption and investment spending by sector are derived 
by simple arithmetic (data presented in appendices). Chapter six will use 
dynamic simulations to validate the model and conduct policy experiments. 
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Table 5.10. Money supply (MNYSP) and demand (MNYDM) parameters' 
estimates® 
MNYSP Change in MNYDM 
Constant -.855 (-1.25) -.4554 (-2.96)** 
MNYSPt_i .317 (1.08) 
GB .136 (2.26)** 
GDP .594 (2.09)* 
RSRt-i .0034 (1.36) • 
INFR .045 (2.741)** 
GNP 4.241 (2.475)** 
REO .052 (4.297)*** 
ERR -.163 (-3.267)*** 
INFRt.i -.036 (-1.675) 
REOt.i -.185 (-3.473)*** 
R-squared .996 .86 
Durbin-Watson 2. 06 2.23 
®Regressors are lagged money supply, government balance (GB), 
gross national product (GNP), lagged real saving rate (RSR^^)» current 
and lagged inflation rate (INFR), current and lagged rate of change in 
official exchange rate (REO), and the error correction component (ERR). 
*Figures in brackets denote t-ratios. 
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CHAPTER 6. MODEL VALIDATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS-SIMULATIONS 
This chapter tests the performance of the model with regard to 
recovering the historical records of the economy and conducts several 
policy analysis experiments. Dynamic simulation is used to implement 
these two tasks. An adapted version of the non-linear optimizer MINOS 
called GAMS/MINOS (Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus, 1988) is employed in 
solving the model. Section one describes the solution procedure and 
discusses some adjustments and decisions made before simulation on the 
basis of information revealed by the preliminary control runs. 
Validation and policy simulations are then undertaken in sections two and 
three, respectively. 
Solution Procedure and Algorithm 
A price adjustment procedure is generally used to solve for the 
equilibrium price vector which clears all product markets in the model 
allowing for small divergence (close to zero) in excess demands. The 
full model is reduced by substitution to a compact system of simultaneous 
non-linear excess demand functions. This strategy minimizes the required 
computation as a smaller number of variables and equations are handled. 
A solution algorithm is then employed to solve for equilibrium values of 
the endogenous variables iteratively. An initial guess on equilibrium 
values of prices is used to calculate sectoral excess demands. The 
solution algorithm then adjusts prices according to some rule iteratively 
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until iteration terminates (no revision of prices) when excess demands 
are close to zero. 
Two strategies, namely, the factor market and product market 
strategies, are generally used in solving CGE models. They are based on 
separating factor frcn product markets and solving for equilibrium in 
only one set of markets after substituting out the other. Adelman and 
Robinson (1978) compare the two approaches and give more detailed 
discussion of the weaknesses and advantages of each. A significant 
reduction in dimensionality is usually expected with.the factor market 
strategy. The product market arrangement of the model equations, on the 
other hand, provides a more flexible framework for incorporating various 
behavioral specifications (Dervis et al., 1982). The choice in this 
study, however, to adopt the product market strategy was based entirely 
on data limitations in modelling the factor markets in Sudan, as 
discussed earlier in chapter four. 
In addition to Johansens' (1960) strategy to reduce the model to a 
linear system of equations, Dervis et al. (1982) distinguished three 
solution algorithms used to solve CGE models: 
1. The fixed-point theorem algorithms; the major advantage of which 
is the guaranteed solution for models satisfying the fixed-point theorem 
conditions. It is, however, very expensive to use for moderate size 
models and not applicable to models violating the fixed-point theorem 
assumptions such as homogeneity of degree zero in prices. 
2. The tâtonnement process algorithms, where prices in each sector 
are adjusted up or down depending on whether excess demands are positive 
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or negative while searching for market clearing prices. While this 
technique is easy to implement, it is user tuned and hence model 
specific, although more efficient once tuned to a particular model. 
3. The Jacobian algorithms: these represent iterative search 
procedures that unlike the tâtonnement process, evaluate the derivatives 
of the model functions and use that information to determine the 
direction and step size of adjustment in their search for market clearing 
prices. Consider the solution problem for the vector of variables y 
given by: 
G(y) = 0 (6.1) 
the function vector G is usually evaluated at each k^^ iteration and 
the search continues according to some rule, like: 
yk+1 = yk + ^k (6.2) 
The direction of the search for the next iteration (d^) is simply 
given by the sign of G(y) and the size of adjustment (a^) to be taken 
in that direction is the user's choice in the tâtonnement process. 
Jacobian algorithms on the other hand, utilize information contained in 
the derivatives of the function G(y) to determine the direction vector 
d^ and step size a^. The Newton-Raphson and steepest descent methods 
are some examples of a family of Jacobian algorithms. The line search 
formula of the steepest descent algorithm is given in 6.3. 
yk*l = y"^ - 2a'^ D' G(yk) (6.3) 
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where D is the Jacobian matrix defined as: 
(6.4) 
These algorithms are thus more efficient than the tâtonnement 
process. They are, however, more expensive to solve as numerical 
computation of the derivative matrix is to be performed for every 
.solution. The Jacobian technique is chosen for the present study as it 
stands between the fixed-point algorithms and the tâtonnement process 
representing a reasonable compromise between efficiency and cost 
effectiveness. There was also a desire to avoid tuning the solution 
algorithm to a particular model specification like the GEMSE that has a 
number of deficiencies and, hence, needs further adjustments as data 
permits in the future. 
The computer program GAMS/MINOS employed in this study uses the 
projected Lagrangian algorithm of Murtagh and Saunders (1982, 1987). 
Their algorithm is developed to handle non-linearly constrained 
optimization problems. The non-linear constraint vector given by: 
where f|^ and J|^ are the constraint vector and Jacobian matrix evaluated 
at X|^. A sequence of major iterations are then executed during each 
f(x) = 0 (6.5) 
is transformed to its linear approximation 
f(x) = f^ + J|^(X - X|^) ( 6 . 6 )  
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of which an "augmented Lagrangian" objective function is optimized 
subject to the linearized version of the non-linear constraint vector as 
defined in 6.6. The reduced-gradient algorithm is used to solve the 
linearized subproblem in a sequence of minor iterations within each major 
iteration. 
GAMS/MINOS establishes feasibility of the solution before optimizing 
the objective function which is a redundant constant in the GEMSE case. 
Feasibility is attained when the linearized and non-linear constraints 
are satisfied to within a given feasibility tolerance. GAMS/MINOS then 
starts evaluating the objective function. The GEMSE model was set such 
that the objective is to maximize a constant term. This makes the search 
to be practically for a feasible solution to the non-linear system of 
equations (constraint equations) in the model which will always be 
optimal given the inactive objective function specified. 
Control runs Due to the size and non-linear structure of the 
model, control experiments were performed in order to explore behavior of 
the model and the difficulty and cost of solving the system. Another 
reason was to experiment with various settings and parameter controlling 
the execution of the algorithm operations. Very useful information was 
revealed and several decisions and adjustments were made on the basis of 
the control runs results. 
It was found that the average time required to solve the model with 
the default settings of GAMS/MINOS on the University's mainframe computer 
(a NAS 9160 which is IBM 370 compatible machine) for a single year was 
13.6 CPU seconds. This, in addition to 15 more seconds of compilation. 
I l l  
generation and execution time cost above $25.00 per one year run. 
Currently available PC versions of GAMS/MINOS, on the other hand, can 
only use 640k of memory on personal computers. The workspace required by 
GAMS/MINOS to process the present model could allow solving for only one 
year at a time on the personal computer with partial adjustment effects 
of lagged endogenous variables fed manually every year. While it is 
possible to update the current year model for the next year with the 
GAMS/MINOS save and restart file options, this however, can only be used 
once every two years. The average run time on the personal computer was 
estimated to be eight minutes per year and completes in an average of 140 
minor iterations and 15 major iterations. 
As limited funds and time were available for the completion of this 
research, the following decisions and adjustments had to be made: 
a) It is first of all decided to conduct simulations on the 1981-86 
period since liberalization and economic recovery programs were launched 
effectively in 1979/80. In addition to saving on time and resources, 
this strategy enables focusing on evaluating specific policy packages 
and proposals advocated by donor organizations. 
b) It was decided to solve the model consecutively on the personal 
computer feeding solution values of lagged endogenous variables into the 
next year to enable dynamic simulation. 
c) Several adjustments were also made on the model structure to 
reduce its size. 
(1) The small country assumption used for imports and most exports 
is extended to the long staple cotton and gum arabic sectors. 
The model is thus being made smaller by two foreign trade 
markets. 
(2) As cotton and wheat areas on the public irrigation schemes 
(region 1) are determined by the government, area response 
functions estimated to represent government decision in these 
two sectors were dropped. Land allocations to cotton and wheat 
in region 1 are thus given exogenously. 
(3) The fact that there is no data on capital stocks nor on demand 
for private investment by sector of destination led to the 
estimation of an aggregate nominal private investment spending 
function. Returns on alternative investment opportunities are 
used to explain private investment spending as discussed in 
Chapter 5. The private investment equation showed poor 
performance with substantial deviations from observed private 
investment spending. Since this was the second best alternative 
to controlling changes in capital stocks given the data 
limitations, it is decided to drop the private investment 
equation until better data is available. Total investment thus 
becomes exogenous to the model. This eliminates the spill over 
effects of the large discrepancy between the fitted and observed 
private investment on other sectors particularly equilibrium in 
the homegoods sector where investment demand is a large part of 
total demand. Another effect of this divergence works through 
the domestic product-income identity (the budget constraint) 
which transmits a hidden indirect influence to all sectors of 
the economy. Investment demand for homegoods is thus derived as 
a residual after subtracting capital imports from total 
investment demand. 
d) Two main problems were encountered while solving with the 
default settings of GAMS/MINOS. Those were namely termination due to 
infeasibilities and/or illegal operations such as undefined log 
operations, exponential overflow, etc. After experimenting with 
different values of the control parameters of the algorithm, normal 
completion of feasible solutions were obtained with the following 
alternative settings: 
(1) Illegal operations disappeared completely with the number of 
minor iterations reduced to 20 from the default of 40. 
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(2) A feasibility tolerance parameter (r) of 0.01 is used. If the 
linearized constraints are satisfied to within the tolerance r, 
the associated subproblem is declared feasible. 
(3) The row tolerance parameter which measures feasibility with 
respect to the non-linear constraints themselves is set at 
l.OE-4. This specifies a lower bound on the accuracy at which 
the non-linear constraints are to be satisfied. The row 
tolerance is actually the parameter that controls how close to 
zero excess demands should be for a solution to be considered 
feasible. 
To test the ability of the model to generate the observed history of 
the economy, in-sample forecasting was conducted using dynamic simulation 
for the period of 1981-86. The already short series (1971-1986) 
available for estimation precluded use of some data for out-of-sample 
reliability tests. Two standard statistics are computed for selected 
variables in Table 6.1 to assess the performance of the model for the 
simulated period. The Root Mean Square error (RMSE) and percent error 
(PRMSE) given in Table 6.1 are calculated using the following formulae: 
Model Validation 
-t 1 
(6.7) 
PRMSE = (i) (RMSE)(100) 
y 
( 6 . 8 )  
where y^ and y denote the solution and mean values respectively, of the 
endogenous variable y^ at t=l,2,...,n. 
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Except for government revenue.and the government balance (with RMSE 
values of 1.05 and .47, respectively) the model gave very close forecasts 
of the actual path of the economy during the 1981-86 period (Table 6.1). 
It is also clear from Table 6.1 that the divergence between the solution 
and actual values increase with time. This is, however, not unusual with 
dynamic models as dynamic simulation u;es solution values of lagged 
endogenous variables to update the model for the next period and thus 
divergence compounds as time passes. This fact renders dynamic model 
formulations to be suitable for short to medium term policy analysis 
while their long run forecasts are taken with caution. 
Policy Analysis 
The scheme for policy analysis adopted in this section is based on 
the basic components of the economic recovery and stabilization programs 
initiated by donor institutions during the late seventies. It has been 
argued in Chapter 2 that partial introduction of liberalization and other 
structural adjustment measures in presence of other distortions in the 
economy was the major reason behind its failure in Sudan. Various policy 
scenarios are designed to evaluate the impact of measures believed to 
have supported devaluations and liberalization accomplish success if 
adopted. Accordingly the following policy options are examined: 
1. Fiscal improvements and monetary control Expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies are blamed for the failure of stabilization 
programs and excessive inflation that whipped away the positive effects 
of devaluation and liberalization. To investigate the effects of fiscal 
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Table 6.1 Model validation solutions (1981-1986) and error statistics 
for selected variables 
Variables 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Mean RMSE PRMSE 
Nominal GDP 
(Ls. Billion) 
Solution Value 
4.91 
4.95 
7.09 
6.14 
9.68 
9.2 
11.49 
12.09 
15.22 
14.66 
21.56 
22.44 
11.66 
.66 5.66 
Money Supply 
(Ls. Billion) 
Solution Value 
1.53 
1.44 
2.09 
1.88 
2.33 
2.52 
2.76 
3.28 
4.37 
4.55 
5.4 
6.83 
3.08 
.14 4.55 
Pvt. Consump. 
(Ls. Billion) 
Solution Value 
4.0 
4.12 
5.15 
4.72 
7.85 
7.4 
9.15 
9.67 
12.11 
11.46 
17.7 
18.73 
9.43 
.06 .59 
Govmt. Revenue 
(Ls. Billion) 
Solution Value 
.5 
.54 
.85 
1.11 
1.19 
1.21 
1.55 
1.45 
1.05 
1.23 
1.33 
1.02 
1.08 
1.05 97.4 
Govmt. Balance 
(Ls. Billion) 
Solution Value 
.71 
.68 
.71 
.44 
.52 
.51 
.57 
.62 
1.46 
1.08 
1.76 
2.07 
.96 
.47 49.27 
Trade Balance 
(Ls. Billion) 
Solution Value 
-.72 
-.81 
-.89 
-1.41 
-1.22 
-1.27 
-1.09 
-1.01 
-.98 
-.94 
-1.37 
-1.51 
-1.05 
.25 23.92 
Gen. Price Lvl 
Index (1971=1) 
Solution Value 
5.4 
5.59 
7.3 
7.6 
8.8 
9.6 
11.8 
12.67 
17.7 
18.41 
22.6 
23.8 
12.27 
.06 .46 
Price Non-Trad. 
Index (1971=1) 
Solution Value 
5.9 
5.82 
7.8 
7.61 
9.2 
9.57 
12.3 
14.5 
17.4 
18.5 
22.5 
21.6 
12.52 
.08 .66 
Price of Wheat 
(Ls./Kantar) 
Solution Value 
9.8 
9.68 
13.8 
13.4 
18.7 
16.02 
19.1 
20.97 
19.8 
22.94 
21.3 
28.4 
17.08 
.17 .98 
Inflation Rate 
(100%) 
Solution Value 
20 
18 
35 21 
26 
34 
41 
50 
45 
28 
30 
31.3 
.18 .57 
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and monetary control the following experiments are performed: 
a) Experiment 1: Liberalization of domestic capital markets and 
positive real rates of interest represent one way of achieving 
monetary equilibrium. Therefore, the real interest rate is 
forced to be greater than %% in this experiment. 
b) Experiment 2; Reduced government is an alternative measure for 
achieving balanced budgets and consequently monetary control. 
Government consumption spending is reduced by 20% every year in 
this experiment. 
2. Price subsidies (experiment 3) To allow for the full impact 
of the government spending policy, wheat pricing and importation policies 
are changed. In this experiment Sudan is assumed to face an infinite 
supply of foreign wheat at the world price converted to Sudanese Pounds 
(small country assumption). The tax/subsidy structure in the wheat 
sector is eliminated such that all wheat is traded at its full price 
(e.g., the indirect tax levied via official procurement price on domestic 
producers as well as the subsidy to consumers are lifted). This wheat 
policy is adopted together with the reduced government spending in this 
experiment. 
3. Tax policies (experiment 4) Whereas indirect taxes distort 
relative prices, they are the main source of government revenue 
(particularly taxes on foreign trade) in developing countries. An 
experiment reducing taxes on foreign trade by 50% and increasing direct 
taxes from 5% to 10% (value added tax) is implemented. 
4. Exchange rate policy (experiment 5) Gradual devaluation and 
unification of the nominal exchange rate is adopted in this experiment. 
It is generally believed that the parallel market price of foreign 
exchange is higher than the equilibrium price by a margin paying the risk 
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premium on dealing in illegal markets under currency inconvertibilities 
plus a market power rent in an imperfect market (Elbadawi, 1988 and 
Pinto, 1988a). Accordingly a unified exchange rate defined to move as 
the average of the official and free market rates is used for all foreign 
trade in this experiment. 
5. Experiment 6 This is a combination of experiments 5 and 3. 
This experiment adopts the unified exchange rate of experiment 5 above 
together with the government spending and wheat policies of experiment 3. 
Results of the three years simulations--summarized in Tables 6.2 and 
6.3—indicate various effects in different directions. In absence of an 
objective criterion such as a welfare function, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions from this information. Evaluation, however, is left to the 
weights policy makers place on the different aspects and variables of the 
economy and their priority ordering. The analysis will, however, compare 
the direction of change and discuss the negative and positive impacts of 
the various policies in reference to the short-term objectives of 
economic recovery and stabilization programs. 
Experiment 1; The interest rate policy was not effective and is not 
reported here as the control solutions were not significantly altered. 
The impotency of interest rate is due to the institutional rigidity and 
redundancy of an almost completely rationed domestic credit market as 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 4. The very small elasticity of private 
spending (and thus saving) and money supply to real interest rate plus 
its statistical insignificance in the money demand equation in addition 
to eliminating its effect through the dropped private investment equation 
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made the model structure insensitive to real interest shocks. To improve 
the role of interest rate in allocating loanable funds, several 
institutional changes are required in order to liberalize the domestic 
credit market and allow the market system determine the scarcity value of 
capital. Among other factors, controlling domestic rates of interest at 
low to negative real levels, is an important cause of the observed 
capital flight with opening up the capital account and foreign exchange 
markets in many developing countries including Sudan (Edwards, 1984; 
Frenkel, 1982; Pinto 1988; and Elbadawi, 1988a). 
Experiment 2: Table 6.2 presents the results of the reduced 
government consumption spending simulation. The government consumes only 
homegoods and domestic manufactured goods in this model. Reduced 
spending therefore directly affects total demand for these two 
commodities. Other things equal, the endogeneously determined price and 
supply of homegoods are expected to move in response to this shock, 
whereas, reduced government demand for domestic manufactured goods leaves 
more supply of this product for exports. The indirect impact of reduced 
spending on the other hand, works through the budget deficit, money 
supply, price of money and real prices linkages. It therefore, extends 
to all sectors of the economy. Income also moves with the spending shock 
as value added change with adjustments in sectoral output in response to 
relative price movements. Private spending, tax revenues and consumption 
demand consequently adjust as well. There is a small instantaneous 
effect on agricultural supply through the real wage rate. Due to the 
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partial adjustment structure of supply response in agriculture the 
important effect of relative price changes is realized a year later. 
According to Table 6.2, the net effect of reduced government 
spending on the economy can be summarized generally in lowering of 
nominal values such as GDP, money, prices (except for wheat), and 
inflation, thus improving real variables (GDP, prices and exports). 
The government balance measuring the size of the budget deficit is 
reduced significantly and moved towards an almost balanced budget in 
1983. The positive impact of this improvement in the domestic resource 
gap was substantial on money supply, the general price level and 
inflation. Movements in the trade balance were favorable the first two 
years, whereas, it deteriorated in 1983. The positive impact of a lower 
inflation rate on real net returns and consequently on supply and exports 
is realized in the last two years. Higher real prices, however, produced 
negative effects on the demand for imported consumer goods which, 
together with the increased demand for imported intermediate goods when 
supply adjustments were larger in 1983 leading to a bigger trade deficit. 
This effect is probably due to the institutional rigidities in the 
irrigated public schemes where areas under intensive users of 
intermediate imports such as cotton and wheat are fixed by the government 
and do not respond to movements in economic incentives. No attempt was 
made on changing the fixed crop rotations in this region, an issue that 
deserves further investigation particularly for a very important foreign 
exchange earner such as cotton and import substitute as wheat. 
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Table 6.2 Results of policy simulation experiments 2, 3, and 4 
Year 
Control 
Solutions 
Reduced 
Level 
Spending 
% Change 
Reduced 
Spending 
Wheat 
Tax 
Level 
Policy* 
% Change 
Nominal GDP 
(Ls.Bill ion) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
4.95 
6.14 
9.2 
4.92 
5.69 
8.17 
-0.61 
-7.3 
-11.2 
4.9 
6.43 
7.87 
5.17 
5.93 
8.91 
+4.4 
-3.4 
-3.2 
Price Money 
(Idx,1971=1) 
1461 
1982 
1983 
5.59 
7.6 
9.6 
5.1 
6.6 
7.9 
-8.8 
-13.2 
-17.7 
5.33 
7.0 
7.7 
5.7 
6.9 
8.9 
+1.97 
-9.2 
-7.3 
Real GDP 1981 
1982 
1983 
.666 
.808 
.958 
.965 
.862 
1.034 
+6.9 
+6.7 
+7.9 
.92 
.92 
1.02 
.91 
.86 
1.00 
+2.7 
+6.4 
+4.4 
Money Supply 
(Ls. Bill.) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1.44 
1.88 
2.52 
1.40 
1.62 
2.10 
-2.8 
-13.8 
-16.7 
1.41 
1.72 
1.74 
1.43 
1.74 
2.18 
-. 69 
-7.5 
-13.5 
Inflation 
Rate 
1981 
1982 
1983 
24.3 
36 
26 
13.3 
29.4 
19.7 
-45.3 
-18.3 
-24.2 
18.4 
31.3 
10.0 
26.7 
21.1 
29.0 
+9.9 
-41.4 
+11.5 
Pri vate 
Consumption 
(Ls. Bill.) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
4.12 
4.72 
7.4 
3.99 
4.09 
6.59 
-3.2 
-13.4 
-10.9 
3.94 
4.86 
6.23 
4.12 
3.93 
7.33 
0.0 
-16.7 
-.95 
Government 
Balance 
(Ls. Bill.) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
.66 
.44 
.51 
.535 
.216 
.048 
-21.3 
-50.9 
-90.6 
.55 
.34 
.06 
.50 
.51 
.48 
-27.2 
+7.6 
-5.9 
Value of 
Exports 
(Ls. Bill.) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
.355 
.762 
.712 
.386 
.913 
1.063 
+8.4 
+19.8 
+49.3 
.37 
.64 
1.08 
.36 
.92 
.89 
-. 28 
+21.1 
+25.0 
Value of 
Imports 
(Ls. Bill.) 
19Ô1 
1982 
1983 
1.163 
2.176 
1.983 
1.047 
2.152 
2.530 
-9.97 
-1.1 
+27.6 
1.05 
1.90 
2.52 
.98 
1.75 
2.36 
-16 • 2 
-19.6 
+19.0 
Trade 
Balance 
(Ls. Bill.) 
1961 
1982 
1983 
-.61 
-1.414 
-1.27 
-.66 
-1.239 
-1.465 
-18.5 
-12.4 
+15.4 
-.68 
-1.26 
-1.44 
-.62 
-.83 
-1.47 
-23.5 
-41.3 
+15.8 
Price of 
Homegoods 
(Idx,1971=1) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
5.82 
7.61 
9.57 
4.2 
6.98 
7.7 
-27.8 
-8.3 
-19.5 
6.6 
9.2 
8.1 
6.5 
6.4 
9.5 
+ 
+ 
Wheat Price 
(Ls./Kantar) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
9.68 
13.4 
16.02 
59.4 
16.25 
45.6 
+513.6 
+21.3 
+184.6 
7.8 
7.5 
11.1 
8.6 
22.6 
9.8 
+ 
Domestic 
Supply of 
Wheat Ratio 
1961 
1982 
1983 
.37 
.42 
.228 
.364 
.443 
.241 
-1.6 
+5.5 
+5.7 
.24 
.07 
.18 
^Percentage change is measured against the control (validation) run 
solutions in column 2. 
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Deterioration in the supply of domestic manufactured goods and 
homegoods as well as the lower price of non-tradables (a sector that 
makes nearly 50% of the total value added) are considered the main 
factors behind the lower nominal GDP. Due to the partial adjustment 
structure of agricultural supply the effect of improved wheat prices on 
the proportion of domestic production in total wheat consumed improved in 
the last two years only. This is one reason for the shooting wheat price 
in 1981 as demand increased with higher real prices of competing goods 
(relative to the subsidized wheat price), whereas wheat imports are fixed 
exogenously. Domestic wheat supply, however, is not very responsive to 
movements in relative prices due to several factors including the fixed 
area allocation in public schemes, the low investment in irrigation and 
other wheat inputs, the continuously declining area suitable for 
cultivation in the private irrigation schemes due to various physical and 
technological factors. 
Experiment 3; In Sudan the government controls wheat importation 
and supports wheat production on the public irrigation schemes (region 
1). Wheat growers in the public schemes are required to deliver their 
produce at an official procurement price lower than the import price. 
Government wheat is thus rationed and distributed to local mills at a 
subsidized price. There is also a free market price for wheat which 
happens to be higher than its world price due to controlled importation. 
Wheat producers in the private irrigation schemes sell in the free 
market. Moreover, part of the wheat produced on the public scheme finds 
its way to private traders as a result of the price differential. In 
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this experiment wheat imports are endogenous and only one price for wheat 
is applied, namely the import price. As a result of this, prices paid to 
public scheme farmers rise, whereas prices received by private wheat 
producers fall as at the same time the foreign substitute (wheat imports) 
is assumed to be in unlimited supply. 
Table 6.2 gives the results of the reduced spending and wheat policy 
simulation. Results are similar to the reduced spending experiment. 
Important differences are the negative impact of lifting the wheat 
imports quota (and consequently the artificially high free market price) 
on domestic supply of wheat ratio as private wheat producers now realize 
lower returns. The long run effects of the free wheat policy on nominal 
GDP, inflation, and trade balance are better compared to the reduction 
under the wheat import control regime. 
Experiment 4; While liberalization calls for reducing indirect 
taxes and price controls which distort the structure of economic incen­
tives, some authors argue that this strategy works against stabilization 
programs since indirect taxes are the main anti-inflationary means of 
financing budget deficits in most countries (Musa, 1986 and Fischer, 
1986). The alternative of increasing direct taxation with reduced taxes 
on trade is investigated in this experiment. Taxes on foreign trade are 
reduced by 50% and the value added (direct) tax is increased 
simultaneously from 5% to 10%. Results are given in Table 6.2. 
Real GDP improved with the new tax policy. This is because the 
favorable effects on the general price level are larger than the decline 
in nominal GDP plus the positive change in nominal GDP in 1981. 
123 
Substitution of direct for indirect taxation also did not produce 
inflationary pressures on the economy as money supply and the general 
price level followed slower growth patterns. Private consumption 
declined slightly but was higher in real terms in 1983 with the new 
policy. The government balance continued to improve after showing a 
small deterioration in 1982, a fact that negates the argument against 
removal of indirect taxes for budgetary reasons. The policy also 
improved the balance of trade during the first two years until demand for 
intermediate and consumers imports rose significantly in 1983 with higher 
real incomes and net returns to domestic suppliers. The above scenario, 
however, assumes the existence of an efficient tax agency and 
institutional setup that ensures successful implementation of the policy 
given the difficulty of administering direct tax collection in LDCs. 
Experiment 5; Several devaluations have been administered on the 
nominal exchange rate in Sudan. Multiple exchange rates are also used 
for various purposes. In this experiment the exchange rate on all 
foreign trade is unified at an assumed equilibrium rate. The new rate 
moves with the evolution of the official and free market rates as an 
average of the two. Results are summarized in Table 6.3. 
According to Table 6.3 the exchange rate policy led to higher 
nominal levels in general but a deterioration in real terms due to the 
large inflationary pressures of devaluation. Significant improvements 
are realized in the government and trade balances (except for 1983). 
This is due to the positive impact of the higher nominal exchange rate on 
returns to producers, and consequently supply and exports. The increased 
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demand for intermediate imports was greater than the. negative demand 
efect of higher prices on imported manufactured goods, especially in 1983 
when the trade balance started to deteriorate. The results of Table 6.3 
indicate that while improving supply incentives and promoting exports, 
devaluation policy placed large inflationary pressures on the economy. 
Experiment 6; To mitigate the inflationary effects' of adjusting the 
nominal exchange rate, reduced government spending and the wheat 
importation and price policies of experiment 3 are simultaneously adopted 
in this experiment together with the exchange rate regime of experiment 
5. Results are given in Table 6.3. 
With reduced government spending working in an opposite direction on 
nominal variables the benefits of adjusting the nominal exchange rate are 
better realized. The inflation rate is curbed at lower levels and larger 
improvements are realized on exports, and the government and trade 
balances. The combination of controlled budgets and removal of currency 
overvaluation produced favorable demand management and supply and export 
promotion results. Lower inflation rates and thus better results can, 
however, be obtained with smaller adjustments in the nominal exchange 
rate and/or tighter fiscal and monetary policies. 
Lessons learned from the policy simulations results support the 
argument that expansionary fiscal and monetary policies and other 
distortions in the structure of economic incentives were important 
factors behind the failure of devaluation and liberalization policies in 
Sudan. Reduced spending and lower trade and exchange rate taxes showed 
large potential for improving the performance of Sudan economy. 
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Table 6.3 Results of policy simulation experiments 5 and 6 
Year 
Exchange R 
Level 
ate Policy 
% Change® 
Exchange Rat 
Spending & W 
Level 
e, Reduced 
heat Policies 
% Change® 
Nominal GDP 
(Ls. billion) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
5.4 
8.5 
8.7 
, +9.1 
+38.4 
-5.4 
5.2 
8.3 
8.95 
+5.1 
+35.2 
-2.7 
Price of Money 
(1971=1) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
6.3 
11.0 
13.8 
+12.7 
+44.7 
+43.8 
6.2 
10.3 
11.4 
+10.9 
+35.5 
+18.8 
Priv. Consumption 
(Ls. billion) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
4.5 
6.96 
7.1 
+9.2 
+47.5 
-4.1 
• 4.2 
6.8 
6.94 
+1.9 
+44.1 
-6.2 
Govmt. Balance 
(Ls. billion) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
.66 
.26 
.25 
-?.9 
-40.9 
-51.0 
.48 
.16 
.12 
-29.4 • 
-63.6 
-76.5 
Inflation Rate 1981 
1982 
1983 
42 
72 
26 
+75.0 
+100.0 
0.0 
37 
66 
11 
+52.3 
+83.3 
-57.7 
Price of 
Homegoods 
(1971=1) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
6.3 
13.8 
8.9 
+8.3 
+81.3 
-7.1 
6.1 
13.1 
10.1 
+4.8 
+72.1 
+4.3 
Value of Exports 
(Ls. billion) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
.44 
.94 
1.19 
+23.6 
+23.4 
+67.2 
. 55 
1.10 
1.34 
+54.5 
+44.4 
+88.2 
Trade Balance 
(Ls. billion) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
-.723 
-1.26 
-1.48 
-10.7 
-10.9 
+16.5 
-.60 
-1.22 
-1.06 
-25.9 
-13.7 
-16.5 
^Percentage change is measured against the control run solutions. 
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Particular features of the Sudan economy and structure of the present 
model have important implications on policy analysis. While short run 
dynamics were modelled, partial adjustment occur in the product market 
only in this model. With factor markets suppressed, important adjustment 
dynamics and their policy implications in terms of factor mobility and 
intersectoral movement of resources, distributional effects, and 
technological change were not addressed. The impact of which on sectoral 
growth and economic performance may have been significant. 
The rigid foreign exchange and domestic capital market, on the other 
hand, led to the use of macro-closure rules that allow for disequilibrium 
in the saving-investment balance (excess aggregate demand). The use of 
an important equilibrating mechanism such as the illegal foreign exchange 
market was precluded for lack of data. The role of the two asset prices 
was, however, assumed by the general price level in the model. Impulses 
of resource-imbalances on the various sectors of the economy were 
transmitted by the endogenously determined price of money. Other 
limitations of the study are discussed in Chapter seven. 
CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
After almost a decade of economic adjustments and policy reforms 
initiated mainly by donor organizations, Sudan continues to suffer from 
persistent inflation, unsustainable balance of payments deficits, and 
negative growth in real output. While Sudan's experience is yet to be 
adequately evaluated, factors usually blamed for similar failure 
experiences were suggested in chapter one for the unsuccessful attempts 
of the country to overcome its economic crisis. Presence of unfavorable 
macro-economic environments is considered one major barrier to 
devaluation and partial liberalization measures in many countries. 
Simultaneous introduction of contractionary stabilization policies along 
with expansionary structural adjustment programs as well as the 
sequencing and speed of the liberalization process are also often 
referenced as important failure reasons. Moreover, elimination of price 
controls and indirect taxes are also believed to conflict with fiscal 
improvements and stabilization efforts as they are the main anti-
inflationary measures and sources of fiscal revenues in most developing 
countries (Mussa, 1986; Fischer, 1986; Krueger, 1984; Edwards, 1984; 
McKinnon, 1982; and Taylor, 1981). The inelastic demand for imports and 
exports and the rigid supply structures in the country's export sectors 
were also used to explain the failure of and object to devaluation 
policies in Sudan (Ali, 1984b; El Hassan, 1977; and Elbadawi, 1987). 
While evidence for or against devaluation, such as the inelasticity 
and structural rigidities, the presence of severe monetary disequilibrium 
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and distorted relative prices and interest rates has been provided by a 
number of studies, the liberalization experience in Sudan has not yet 
been adequately analyzed. For one reason, the debate over the soundness 
of liberalization and devaluation policies in Sudan was conducted in a 
partial equilibrium framework where several important intermarket and 
intersectoral linkages were not captured. Although the incidence of 
policy on relative prices and incentive structure was measured in some 
studies, real responses and micro supply-demand adjustments to such 
shocks were not systematically investigated. Moreover, the implications 
of the simultaneous opening of the current and capital accounts along 
with successive devaluations in such an inflationary environment and with 
the domestic capital market rationed at negative real rates of interest, 
were not addressed. 
An integrated analytical framework that incorporates the above 
mentioned complex structural interactions essential for a proper 
evaluation of Sudan's experience was, therefore, developed and utilized 
to conduct policy analysis in this study. The general equilibrium 
representation of economic systems was considered to be the most 
appropriate approach to modelling interactions between the various 
sectors of the economy as compared to other analytical models. A 
computable general equilibrium model for Sudan was thus constructed in 
this study to perform the intended investigation. 
A preliminary tabular analysis of the nature and origins of the 
present economic crisis and the structural features and performance of 
the economy under various policies over the last two decades was given. 
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The divergent views on devaluation and liberalization in the literature 
on Sudan were then discussed in light of new empirical results on 
distorted relative prices and internal terms of trade between economic 
sectors in Chapter two of this study. A general equilibrium model that 
attempts to overcome some of the deficiencies of applied Walrasian 
equilibrium models was then developed for Sudan economy. 
The model extends the multi-sector Walrasian equilibrium structure 
to integrate Keynesian macro features that recognize short run adjustment 
dynamics and an endogenous monetary mechanism. The model is built with 
detailed supply-demand specifications for 16 sectors. There are ten 
agricultural tradables produced in four different farming systems and 
four non-agricultural tradable sectors; namely, domestic manufacturing, 
foreign intermediate goods, capital, and consumer goods. The model also 
contains a homegoods sector and money. Macro-sectors of the economy as 
well as the important structural rigidities and adjustment dynamics of 
the system are explicitly modelled. A comprehensive representation of 
the various tax structures and other fiscal, monetary and commercial 
policy instruments are also included in the model. The relationship 
between the government sector and an endogenous money creation mechanism, 
an important phenomenon in developing countries including Sudan, is also 
specified. The general price level together with other nominal and real 
flows are endogenously determined in this model. 
In addition to explicitly modelling the macro sectors of the economy 
and the endogenous money creation rule, the model allows for less than 
perfect flexibility in some markets. The fixed nominal exchange and 
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interest rates provide some examples of disequilibrium in the official 
foreign exchange and domestic capital markets. Price expectation schemes 
were employed to model partial adjustment in some agricultural markets 
where supply lags exist. Differential adjustment rates among the 
different markets lead to non-neutrality of movements in nominal 
aggregates and macro shocks. This provided an option for the government 
to affect economic activity. The fact that rigidities exist in some 
markets violates the full equilibrium assumption of Walras' theory. 
Walras Law, however, is assumed to hold in a sequence of temporary 
equilibria in the Hicksian sense and all markets clear either through 
quantity or price or both. 
Time series data were used to choose numerical values for the model 
parameters. Econometric estimation provides superior statistical basis 
for the model specifications over calibration and deterministic methods. 
Difficiencies of the model are discussed below. Parameter estimates 
supported the inelasticity of agricultural supply argument which 
justifies the use of agriculture as the tax base for industrialization. 
The econometric results, on the other hand, indicated the large room for 
policy influences on the composition of agricultural output as crop areas 
were very responsive to movements in relative prices of competing crops 
and changes in policy instruments. 
The product market strategy was employed to solve the model using 
Jacobian algorithms. Dynamic simulation with the computer program 
GAMS/MINOS was used to solve the model for validation and policy 
analysis. Equilibrium values for the endogenous variables of the model 
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were found to within a feasibility tolerance of l.OE-4. Due to time and 
resource limitations, the model was solved over six years only starting 
in 1981 for validation purposes and solutions for three consecutive years 
beginning in 1981 were obtained for each policy experiment. Root mean 
square erors (RMSE) and percent RMSE were computed to test the model's 
ability to recover the historical records of the economy. The calculated 
statistics showed a powerful performance of the model in portraying the 
history of most economic data. 
Experiments for policy analysis were designed to address the 
important issues in the liberalization-devaluation debate in Sudan, 
presented earlier, and evaluate alternative policy options for economic 
reform. Six policy experiments were conducted as follows: 
1. A lower bound of 5% on the real rate of interest was imposed for 
monetary control. 
2. Government consumption spending reduced by 20% every year to 
investigate the impact of fiscal improvements. 
3. Reduced government spending was applied along with a free wheat 
pricing and importation policy. 
4. Indirect taxes on foreign trade reduced by 50% and direct tax 
rate raised from 5% to 10% simultaneously. 
5. Gradual- devaluation and unification of the nominal exchange rate 
at the average of the ruling official and free market rates. 
6. The exchange rate policy (5) plus the reduced spending and wheat 
policy (3) were jointly applied. 
Results of the policy simulation runs indicate that the economy is 
non-responsive to movements in nominal interest rates. The institutional 
rigidities in a highly rationed and controlled domestic credit market are 
important reasons behind the impotency of interest rates. This result 
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calls for serious institutional improvements in the domestic credit 
market. Reduced government spending, on the other hand, generated 
favorable results as smaller budget deficits and slower growth in money 
supply, inflation and other nominal variables including GDP and the price 
of homegoods were realized. Real GDP, exports and the domestic supply of 
wheat ratio were higher under reduced spending. These results support 
the argument that expansionary fiscal and monetary policies worked 
against stabilization and economic recovery in Sudan. 
Lifting the wheat imports quota and administered prices in the free 
wheat policy scenario had negative impacts on domestic wheat supply. The 
long term effects of the free wheat policy on nominal GDP, inflation and 
trade balance, however, were better than under wheat import control 
regimes. The tax policy experiment led to slower growth patterns in 
money supply and inflation and improved real GDP and the budget balance 
refuting the argument against removal of indirect taxes for budgetary 
reasons. 
Higher nominal values and faster inflation, on the other hand, were 
realized with devaluation apart from its positive demand management and 
export promotion effects. Better results, however, were obtained when 
the exchange rate policy was supported with reduced government spending. 
Slower inflation and larger improvements on exports and the government 
and trade balances were realized. The results again indicate the need 
for fiscal improvements, monetary control and minimal indirect taxation 
to go along with nominal exchange rate adjustments to improve relative 
prices'to suppliers and eliminate the bias against exportables and 
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agriculture in the structure of economic incentives in Sudan. Whereas, 
no objective criteria are available in this study to conduct welfare 
evaluations of the alternative policies examined, useful information is 
generated by the policy simulations to guide policy makers to choose the 
desired direction of change. 
The major limitation of the model is posed by scarcity of data. 
Supply in an important industry such as the livestock sector in Sudan is 
given exogenously in this model for lack of data. Factor markets in the 
model are also suppressed as information on labor use and capital stocks 
by sector is not available. Accordingly, labor and capital demand 
equations could not be estimated and the product market strategy is thus 
employed in solving the model for equilibrium prices. While an 
infinitely elastic supply of labor at a fixed wage rate is assumed, data 
could only allow for the estimation of an aggregate private investment 
spending function. Endogenizing livestock supply as well as labor and 
capital demand by sector represent important agenda for future work in 
improving the general equilibrium model. With data available to allow 
estimation of factor demands, functional distribution of income and 
spending can easily be modelled and thus enhance the model's ability to 
handle distributional as well as nutritional and poverty aspects among 
the various income recipients. 
Further disaggregation of the domestic manufacturing sector is 
desirable and useful in investigating import substitution and 
industrialization issues. The same applies to the homegoods sector. 
Demand data was poorer than supply information as there is no systematic 
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collection of consumption data in Sudan except for two recent consumer 
survey reports covering three years and mainly the Khartoum area. Better 
data on consumption is needed to allow for better disaggregation of 
consumption categories. Consumption demand by income groups and thus 
distributional effects of policies can be analyzed with better data 
available on factor markets in the future. 
Once more, lack of data precluded proper modelling of the loanable 
funds and the foreign exchange markets. While holding foreign assets is 
a real alternative to holding domestic money or assets, it has been 
illegal for most of the period covered by this study. Illegal holding 
and dealing in foreign exchange outside the banking system naturally does 
not release information to enable modelling the supply and demand for 
foreign assets as part of a more complete portfolio balance framework. 
The parallel market price of foreign exchange was, nevertheless, used as 
an opportunity cost of holding domestic assets to reflect the hidden 
effects of an invisible market for foreign assets. 
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APPENDIX A 
Data used in constructing aggregate price indices for Sudan's 
exports, imports and external terms of trade are presented below. 
Sources: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, Cotton Marketing 
Corporation, Oil Seeds Company, Ministry of Agriculture, International 
Financial Statistics (IPS), Gum Arabic Corporation, Meat and Livestock 
Marketing Corporation, Ministry of Economic Planning. The IPSEXP and 
IFSIMP are respectively the IPS export and import price index of non-oil 
exporting developing countries. EXINDX and IMINDX are the calculated 
export and import price indices. The DMNF price index is constructed in 
Appendix C and converted into U.S.$ equivalent by the relevant effective 
exchange rate. 
1) Exports are grouped into long and medium staple cotton (LSCN), 
short staple cotton (SSCN), sorghum (DRA), groundnuts (GNT), cotton seed 
(CSD), sesame (SSM), gum arabic (GUM), domestic manufactured goods (DMNF) 
and livestock and other products (STOZ). 
2) Imports (IM) are measured in 000 kantars for wheat (IMWHT) and 
unit indices for imported capital (IMl), intermediate (IM2) and 
manufactured consumer (IM4) goods. 
The IPS export price index of industrialized countries is used as a 
proxy for the price of capital imports (WPMl). Unit value indices are 
for PINT (WPM2) and FMNP (WPM4). World price of wheat (WPWHT) is taken 
from the Agricultural Statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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The EXINDX and IMINDX series are constructed as follows: 
INDX = 2 y.. Pj 
where is sector i's share in total value of exports or imports and 
P.j is the respective price. 
Table A.l. World prices (FOB) for exports, U.S.$ per unit 
DRA SSM CSD GNT GUM STOZ DMNF SSCN LSC 
3.20 8.20 13.50 6.80 39.00 3.28 1.00 21.00 32.00 
3.50 9.50 15.50 6.90 44.00 3.82 1.01 24.00 33.00 
3.70 11.90 17.70 7.30 51.30 4.27 1.05 39.00 49.00 
4.40 13.60 20.60 8.10 62.30 5.27 1.23 38.00 74.00 
7.10 17.60 20.60 12.30 58.90 5.18 1.84 42.00 62.00 
6.80 16.90 26.50 11.80 56.80 5.84 1.84 39.00 66.00 
7.10 17.30 •32.40 13.80 55.70 6.42 2.36 43.00 84.00 
8.60 22.80 31.40 15.70 54.00 7.42 2.26 34.00 96.00 
9.80 28.50 32.90 16.10 47.70 9.49 2.45 41.00 92.00 
11.80 26.60 28.40 18.30 64.00 8.60 2.26 42.00 98.00 
11.90 25.30 23.50 24.10 68.30 8.27 2.28 46.00 95.00 
13.40 22.60 23.60 16.30 79.30 9.71 2.54 40.00 88.00 
10.40 26.10 21.20 20.60 95.70 8.63 2.12 38.00 82.00 
10.80 29.80 23.70 23.20 95.40 4.85 1.64 44.00 85.00 
10.00 33.70 16.30 21.20 102.30 8.54 2.30 47.00 92.00 
10.30 35.50 17.90 20.20 105.30 8.80 2.95 43.00 78.00 
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Table A.2. Volume of exports (000 kantars)® 
LSCN SSCN DRA GNT SSM CSD STOZ • GUM DMNF 
6203.00 204.92 2289.00 3326.00 2879.00 448.00 5.33 764.00 7400. 00 
5193.00 157.13 2432.00 2772.00 1986.00 406.00 21.58 738.00 4272. 73 
4160.00 141.81 2115.00 3114.00 2293.00 337.00 18.63 764.00 10250. 00 
1340.00 186.97 2007.00 2230.00 1879.00 102.70 26.47 468.00 3428. 57 
2640.00 189.11 1015.00 4613.00 1274.00 0.00 23.27 352.00 4333. 33 
3277.00 214.44 1676.00 6363.00 1998.00 0.00 24.27 589.00 3047. 62 
3430.00 154.84 2326.00 3224.00 2093.00 6.66 25.80 750.00 4333. 34 
2644.00 192.78 1123.00 2187.00 1710.00 0.00 10.83 872.00 5379. 31 
3526.00 160.78 3870.00 842.00 360.00 0.00 15.69 994.00 3485. 71 
2142.00 119.80 6441.00 497.00 1287.00 0.00 6.76 590.00 5318. 18 
1096.00 116.42 5430.00 2124.00 1321.00 0.00 16.38 741.00 6711. 54 
1540.00 96.29 9288.00 2003.00 1368.00 0.00 11.34 673.00 4695. 65 
3932.00 86.77 5765.00 407.00 1487.00 0.00 3.07 943.00 5494. 12 
3382.00 84.97 563.00 506.00 1818.00 0.00 0.96 864.00 6760. 68 
1786.00 114.24 0.00 299.00 396.00 0.00 28.99 392.00 1993. 90 
3213.00 138.99 686.00 25.00 655.00 0.00 7.88 432.00 2379. 15 
^Except for STOZ and DMNF where units represent indices obtained 
from dividing value of exports by a price index. 
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Table A.3. World prices (WP) in U.S.$ per unit and units (IM) of imports 
WPMl WPM2 WPWHT WPM4 IMl IM2 
2560.00 531.00 2.90 1474.00 10.00 86.16 
2636.80 573.48 3.20 1470.32 9.94 80.85 
3046.40 716.85 6.50 1769.54 14.90 83.59 
3814.40 743.40 9.30 2162.91 19.37 130.88 
5094.40 939.87 8.10 2891.62 25.81 140.87 
5145.60 1125.72 6.60 2921.28 25.46 97.40 
5452.80 1412.46 5.20 3415.26 24.51 85.62 
6316.80 1677.30 6.00 2765.22 22.28 101.03 
7221.76 1836.20 7.70 3583.44 16.75 99.32 
8225.28 1970.01 8.80 3537.71 34.91 124.73 
8960.00 2011.83 8.70 3427.51 36.30 228.08 
9039.65 2145.54 7.40 3521.61 42.37 288.20 
8960.00 2198.75 7.60 3514.27 50.03 391.03 
8753.23 2294.53 6.90 3785.67 42.96 451.04 
8755.71 2320.15 6.40 4700.00 32.62 484.62 
9035.27 2368.47 5.90 5955.34 28.75 533.91 
IMWHT IM4 EXINDX IMINDX IFSEXP IFSIMP 
1931.03 26.49 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
2000.00 26.55 90.52 102.10 103.16 106.67 
1087.69 22.38 123.64 130.16 142.11 131.43 
921.51 31.55 125.50 159.26 198.95 198.10 
1111.11 30.12 128.33 228.72 201.05 211.43 
1863.66 30.47 141.75 243.41 210.53 211.43 
1248.08 33.94 183.66 270.44 246.32 218.10 
1500.00 47.30 223.69 268.44 253.68 240.95 
2851.95 42.34 225.77 289.07 300.00 290.48 
4120.45 61.87 204.42 361.58 356.84 359.05 
6137.93 68.70 144.30 340.68 321.05 357.14 
7527.03 91.14 160.66 338.06 307.37 342.86 
11907.90 179.39 260.14 315.07 295.79 327.62 
11260.87 109.46 268.15 299.20 295.79 326.67 
23140.63 116.51 193.56 292.31 270.53 312.38 
20423.73 127.14 255.23 322.78 277.89 299.05 
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APPENDIX B 
Construction of Average Rates of Protection Indices 
for Sudan's Exports and Imports (1970-1986) 
Tables B.l and B.2 derive the nominal and real effective and net 
protection ratios for the exports and imports of Sudan. 
Table B.l Exchange rates in Sudan (1970-1986)® 
YEAR CPI WDPI DINFR E [R 
^B- ERi ER3 tm+tqR ^CN ^NC 
1970 100 100 0.00 .35 .35 .35 .35 .658 .08 .12 
1971 108 106 0.02 .35 .357 — —  .35 .35 .663 .09 .135 
1972 121 112 0.063 .35 .373 — — .38 .35 .627 .09 .142 
1973 142 123 0.08 .35 .402 .64 .40 .35 .530 .08 .147 
1974 169 143 0.03 .35 .414 .67 .40 .35 .564 .09 .149 
1975 222 161 0.18 .35 .489 .74 .40 .35 .443 .10 .138 
1976 225 185 -0.13 .35 .426 .66 .40 .35 .515 .11 .146 
1977 263 227 -0.06 .35 .401 .66 .40 .35 .815 .13 .244 
1978 315 259 0.06 .38 .425 .72 .45 .38 .649 .13 .169 
1979 412 291 0.186 .43 .504 .77 .50 .45 .598 .10 .178 
1980 518 337 0.100 .50 .554 .88 .80 .50 .521 .06 .150 
1981 644 384 0.100 .50 .610 1.03 .90 .65 .551 .05 .255 
1982 809 431 0.140 .90 .690 1.45 1.02 1.28 .218 .05 .287 
1983 1056 466 0.230 1.30 .854 1.93 1.61 1.30 .219 .05 .161 
1984 1417 507 0.250 1.30 1 .068 2.44 1.87 1.50 .621 .05 .192 
1985 2060 546 0.370 2.50 1 .463 3.60 2.93 2.50 .679 .05 .181 
1986 2488 587 0.135 2.50 1 .661 4.28 2.98 2.50 .698 .05 .188 
®The official (EQ) and Black Market (Eg) exchange rates, 
domestic consumer price index (CPI), effective exchange rates for non­
government imports/non-cotton exports (ERj), government imports (ER2) 
and cotton exports (ER3) are compiled from Bank of Sudan, Ministry of 
Finance, and World Bank (1983). The World price index (WOPI) is taken 
from IPS. The import tariff equivalent (t +t_o) is borrowed from Elbadawi III IJK 
(1987). The tax ratio on cotton (t^^) and non-cotton (t^^) exports 
are derived as the ratio of tax collections to total value of exports. 
The differential inflation rate (DINFR) represent the difference between 
domestic and world inflation rates. 
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The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate (5%) is calculated 
from the PPP condition: 
Ep = P/P* (B.l) 
'ff 
where P is the domestic and P the foreign price. 
Log Ep = n - n* (B.2) 
Table B.2. Nominal and real protection ratios for Sudan exports and 
imports (1970-1986)® 
YEAR EX NEX EM EPRX REPRX NPRM RPRM NPRX RNPRX NTB GTB 
1970 .33 .35 .60 .91 .90 1.66 1.66 .98 .98 0.592 0.545 
1971 .32 .35 .60 .89 .86 1.66 1.63 .98 .96 0.585 0.536 
1972 .33 .36 .62 .91 .84 1.72 1.58 .99 .91 0.574 0.529 
1973 .34 .36 .58 .93 .80 1.61 1.38 1.00 .86 0.621 0.577 
1974 .34 .36 .59 .93 .77 1.65 1.37 1.00 .83 0.607 0.564 
1975 .34 .36 .55 .93 .65 1.52 1.07 1.01 .70 0.657 0.610 
1976 .33 .36 .58 .92 .75 1.60 1.30 .99 .81 0.620 0.574 
1977 .31 .34 .69 .86 .74 1.92 1.65 .95 .82 0.495 0.446 
1978 .35 .38 .68 .91 .78 1.80 1.54 .99 .85 0.549 0.507 
1979 .41 .44 .74 .95 .77 1.73 1.41 1.01 .83 0.586 0.548 
1980 .62 .61 .99 1.25 1.07 1.98 1.71 1.22 1.05 0.618 0.630 
1981 .66 .64 1.09 1.32 1.03 2.17 1.69 1.27 1.00 0.586 0.607 
1982 .85 .91 1.17 .94 1.16 1.30 1.60 1.01 1.25 0.777 0.726 
1983 1.29 1.36 1.77 .99 1.44 1.37 1.97 1.05 1.51 0.767 0.729 
1984 1.49 1.50 2.57 1.14 1.32 1.98 2.27 1.15 1.33 0.582 0.579 
1985 2.40 2.55 4.56 .96 1.54 1.82 2.94 1.02 1.64 0.558 0.523 
1986 2.40 2.56 4.65 .96 1.36 1.86 2.64 1.02 1.45 0.549 0.515 
^Calculated as follows: 
Effective exchange rate for exports (EX) 
EX = "CN ®CN " <1 - "CN'EI'NC (B.3) 
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Where is the share of cotton in total value of exports and 
ERg^ (ER^g) represents the effective exchange rate for cotton 
(non-cotton) exports. 
ERc„ = ERjd-tj^) (B.4) 
ERwc = EI'l'l-tNc' (B.5) 
Net effective exchange rate for exports (NEX) (this is the effective 
rate for exports net of subsidies on imported production inputs.) 
NEX = GAERG + (L-B)EX (B.6) 
Where 3 is set equal to 0.3, i.e., imports contribute to 30% of total 
value added of exports (modified from World Bank, 1983, and Sudan 
Gezira Board Annual Reports). 
Net effective exchange rate for imports (EM) 
Em = ER„(1 . (B.7) 
ER^ = 0.5(ERj + ERj) (B.8) 
Nominal (EPRX) and real (RPRX) effective protection ratios for exports 
EPRX = EX/Eq (B.9) 
EPRX is not adjusted for import subsidies and compared to the nominal 
exchange rate (EQ). However, RPRX corrects for under- or over­
valuation of exchange rate but not adjusted for import subsidies. 
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RPRX = EX/E^ (B.IO) 
Nominal (NPRX) and real (RNPRX) net protection ratios for exports 
NPRX = NEX/Eq (8.11) 
RNPRX = NEX/E^ (B.12) 
NPRX is net of import subsidies but does not account for under- or 
overvaluation of EQ. RNPRX on the other hand corrects for both. 
Nominal (NPRM) and real (RPRM) protection ratios for imports 
NPRM = EM/E^ (B.13) 
RPRM = EM/ER (B.14) 
Gross and net trade biases (GTB and NTB) are obtained from 
GTB = EX/EM (B.15) 
NTB = NEX/EM (B.16) 
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APPENDIX C 
Structure of Economic Incentives and 
Relative Prices in Sudan (1971-1985) 
Table C.l calculates price indices for agricultural tradables, 
non-agricultural tradables (manufacturing) and home goods (non-tradables) 
sectors as well as prices paid and received by farmers in Sudan. 
Prices paid (PRPAID) and received (PAGTRD) by agricultural producers 
Aggregate indices for farmers terms of trade with the rest of 
the economy in Sudan are constructed as a weighted average of prices 
received and paid by agricultural producers. The shares of the 
various agricultural products in total returns or costs per feddan in 
the irrigated sector are used as the respective weights in forming 
the price index. The weights are obtained from the Gezira and Rahad 
Schemes and the Ministry of Agriculture and presented with the 
irrigated sector data appendices (Appendix E). 
Structure of incentives among economic sectors 
An aggregate price index is constructed for agricultural 
tradables (PAGTRD), non-agricultural tradables (PNAT) and home goods 
(PHG) in the table below. The indices are derived as follows: 
i. PAGTRD; discussed in section (a) above. 
ii. PNAT: for this group it is assumed that clothing and shoes 
(CLTH) make 45% of total value added. The rest is assumed to 
come from food (F0D=25%) and other manufactured goods and non-
tradable services (0TH=30%). 
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PHG; 2 5 %  is attributed to housing costs (HSHG), other non-
tradeable services, e.g. transport, component, etc., (OTH) and 
food are assumed to contribute 45% and 30%, respectively. 
FTPDX; represents an index for prices paid by farmers 
including expenditures on consumers goods. This index is 
obtained as follows: 
FTPDX = 0.6 PRPAID + .4 CNSMN (C.l) 
CNSMN = 0.85 FRMFD + .06 PNAT + .08 PHG (C.2) 
FRMFD = .57 PDR + .43 PFOD (C.3) 
Here the overall price paid index is made of 60% production 
expenditure and 40% consumption (CNSMN). Consumption 
expenditure is distributed between food (86%), manufactured 
goods (6%) and non-tradables (8%) according to C.2. Fifty-
seven percent of the food consumed (FTPOX) is produced on farm 
(mainly sorghum ~ PDR) while the rest is purchased (FOD) as 
C.3 shows. The weights for construction of FRMPIND are taken 
from Rashid M. Hassan (1982). 
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Table C.l Price indices® 
CPI PNAT PHG PAGTRD PRPAID FTPDX UWINOX PCLTH PHSNG PFOD POTH 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.10 1.10 1.10 1.15 1.09 1.12 1.07 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 
1.30 1.20 1.40 1.63 1.39 1.37 1.35 0.96 1.40 1.40 1.40 
1.60 1.40 1.70 2.22 1.59 1.60 1.47 1.03 1.70 1.70 1.70 
2.10 2.10 2.10 1.83 1.97 2.03 1.54 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 
2.30 2.10 2.40 1.84 2.30 2.30 1.59 1.73 2.40 2.40 2.40 
2.80 2.70 2.90 2.54 2.82 2.75 1.77 2.46 2.90 2.90 2.90 
2.90 2.90 3.10 2.79 2.27 2.24 1,96 2.66 3.10 3.10 3.10 
3.60 3.50 3.80 3.04 4.18 4.10 2.02 3.13 3.80 3.80 3.80 
4.50 4.40 4.70 3.44 4.91 5.12 3.06 4.03 4.70 4.70 4.70 
5.40 5.20 5.90 3.65 6.93 6.69 3.79 4.35 5.90 5.90 5.90 
7.30 6.90 7.80 5.33 8.78 9.01 4.11 5.80 7.80 7.80 7.80 
8.80 8.50 9.20 7.45 11.53 11.35 4.59 7.65 9.20 9.20 9.20 
11.81 11.70 12.30 9.37 13.76 15.14 5.02 10.97 12.30 12.30 12.30 
17.70 16.40 17.40 13.21 11.94 21.45 5.31 15.18 17.40 17.40 17.40 
22.60 21.10 22.50 12.54 26.44 24.71 5.47 19.39 22.50 22.50 22.50 
®Price indices for food (PFOD), housing (PHSNG), cloth and shoes 
(PCLTH) and other manufactured and non-tradable goods (POTH), as well as 
the weights used for construction of the consumer price index (CPI), the 
home goods (PHG) and manufacturing (PNAT) prices indices and the urban 
wage rate (UWINDX) are compiled from Ministry of Finance "Economic Survey," 
various issues. 
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APPENDIX D 
The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) is used to estimate the demand 
parameters in this study. The AIDS model is introduced by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980) to provide an arbitrary first-order approximation to 
any demand system. From the dual formulation of the decision problem of 
a consumer with price-independent, generalized logarithmic (PIGLOG) 
preferences, they specified the following cost function 
Log C(U, P) = a(P) + U b(P) (D.l) 
where a(P) and b(P) are positive, linear homogenous functions of prices 
(P) and U denotes utility. A locally flexible functional form was 
selected for a(P) with sufficient parameters to allow the desired 
flexibility of second-order Taylor series approximations: 
a(P) = a^. Log P^ + Zj Log P^ Log Pj (D.2) 
a(P) can be regarded to denote the cost of subsistence. Engel curves 
form provided a convenient choice for b(P) 
b(P) = Bq TT p.^ (D.3) 
Substituting D.2 and D.3 in D.l we obtain the following form for C 
1 Log C = + Z. a .  Log P. + j Z. Z^ a.. Log P. Log P ^  +  U  3 ^  tt p . ^  (D.4) 
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The Hicksiah demand function for commodity i in share form is 
derived by Shepherd's Lemma from D.4. 
= a^ . + Zj a^ j Log Pj + U 3^  ir (D.5) 
Where W. is the budget share of commodity i. 
P^Qi 
W. = 9 Log C/9 Log P. = (D.6) 
Since the indirect utility function U (Y, P) is unobservable, the 
cost function and share equations D.4 and D.5 cannot be estimated. From 
the duality relation that Y = C(U, P), however, the corresponding utility 
function U(Y, P) can be obtained by inverting D.4. 
1 Bi 
U(Y,P) = Log Y - (a^ + S.a. Log P. + -g-Log P. Log Pji/Go^P. 
(D.7) 
Substituting D.7 into D.5 gives the Marshallian demand for commodity i in 
the share form 
Wj = Log Pj + Log (Y/P°) (D.8) 
The price index P° is defined by 
Log P° = ag + a^- Log P. + ^  Zj Log P. Log P .  (D.9) 
with Y{j = i = Yj1 . 
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It is argued that model D.8 satisfies the axioms of choice exactly 
and successfully aggregates over consumers (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). 
The AIDS model preserves the desired generality and flexibility of both 
the Rotterdam and translog models. The theoratical restrictions of 
homogeneity, Engel aggregation and Slutsky symmetry can be imposed 
directly on D.8. Consistency of the demand system D.8 with utility 
maximization is, therefore, tested directly using the: 
a) adding up restrictions (Engel agrégation) 
Zj otj = 1, Zj oijj = 0, 2. g. = 0 (D.IO) 
b) homogeneity restrictions Zj a^j = 0 (D.ll) 
c) and symmetry a^j = 
Another important feature of the AIDS model in contrast with the 
translog system is that it posseses the ease of estimation property of 
the liner expenditure system (LES) without being directly additive. 
Ordinary least squares can generate consistent estimators for the 
parameters in each equation of the AIDS model if the price index P° is 
directly available. The AIDS system then becomes linear in parameters. 
Stone's index given in D.12, is commonly used to construct P° directly 
when prices are relatively col linear. 
Log P° = Z. W. Log P. (D.12) 
Share elasticities with respect to income are obtained directly from D.8. 
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9 Log W. 
rrôrr = 8,/", 
Equation D.13 implies that good i is a necessity if < 0 and a 
luxury for > 0. The share elasticities for prices are also derived 
from D.8 to be 
3 Log W. a.. g. 
3 Log P .  "  ^  "  WT ''k^ (D'l*) 
Own and cross price elasticities of demand are derived below 
e.^ = -1 + - 3^ (D.15) 
1 
®ij " "ST " (0.16) 
ai-
d i i = - l + - ^  +  Wi  ( D . 1 7 )  
where e refers to the Marshallian and d denotes the income compensated 
Hicksian elasticities. Expenditure elasticities are given by: 
Six ' 1 + a; (0-19) 
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APPENDIX E 
Data 
Table E.l. Sectors of the GEMS 
Sector Name 
Agricultural Tradables 
LSCN long and meium staple cotton 
SSCN short staple cotton 
DRA sorghum (dura). 
GNT groundnuts 
WHT wheat 
CSD cotton seed 
BNS beans 
SSM sesame 
GUM gum arabic 
STOZ livestock and other agricultural products 
Non-Agricultural Tradables 
DMNF domestic manufacturing 
FMNF foreign manufactured goods (IM4) 
FCAP foreign capital goods (IMl) 
FINT foreign intermediate goods (IM2) 
Non-Tradables 
HMG home goods 
Financial Sectors 
MNY money 
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Table E.2. Region 1 (Public Irrigation Schemes) data® 
HLSCN*' FLSCN^ HDRA FDRA HGNT FGNT HWHT FWHT YLSCN 
18.03 8.40 1.58 1.28 11.38 4.16 1.85 3.33 4.40 
27.95 11.78 1.52 1.00 12.18 4.08 2.84 3.28 5.10 
44.70 16.35 1.60 1.43 14.42 4.11 3.10 3.16 4.80 
55.28 26.40 2.09 4.09 17.17 6.85 3.40 5.35 4.50 
56.45 33.39 2.58 5.89 18.42 8.90 4.30 7.34 4.90 
46.01 23.48 2.87 2.88 20.62 9.77 4.66 8.40 3.20 
66.55 34.24 3.70 3.47 33.58 11.42 6.50 8.93 3.70 
77.02 38.47 4.53 5.47 51.73 17.03 6.55 10.10 3.40 
82.82 40.88 10.84 6.05 62.39 23.52 8.25 12.97 2.90 
103.54 51.36 13.24 7.53 65.11 24.13 9.85 17.18 3.10 
123.59 60.63 18.88 14.01 98.51 46.26 11.51 28.15 2.80 
168.14 96.78 16.17 12.67 107.29 44.75 12.87 29.93 3.50 
254.75 137.99 24.62 19.24 157.67 81.95 14.31 34.26 4.40 
288.39 156.57 38.34 25.42 208.76 117.71 24.99 56.18 4.10 
315.32 207.36 43.21 30.40 256.66 142.96 26.79 48.79 3.90 
334.65 242.32 41.36 28.72 288.20 174.46 36.43 63.74 4.60 
®Gezira Board, Rahad Corporation, Ministry of Agriculture, Cotton 
Marketing Board, Oil Seeds Company, Ministry of Commerce. Intermediate 
costs other than the cost of foreign inputs and wages in crop's budgets are 
grouped as the intermediate costs of home goods. Wage rate is constructed 
from data on labor costs and mandays per feddan. 
^Intermediate Use: 1) Cost of foreign intermediate goods in 
Sudanese pounds (Ls.) per feddan (FLSCN, FDRA, etc.); 2) Cost of home 
goods in Ls. per feddan (HLSCN, HDRA, etc.). 
^Yield in Kantars per feddan (YLSCN, YDRA, etc.). 
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Table E.2. Continued 
YDRA YGNT YWHT ALSCN^ ADRA AGNT AWHT WGl® WHI^ 
9.30 13.70 9.10 967.00 629.00 261.00 262.00 1.85 315.00 
9.40 14.30 9.70 895.87 511.00 252.00 267.00 2.84 328.00 
8.70 14.60 9.40 973.00 506.00 325.00 227.00 3.10 239.00 
9.80 15.10 10.20 974.00 536.00 363.00 395.00 3.40 322.00 
10.70 14.60 11.10 968.00 629.00 412.00 558.00 4.30 377.00 
9.10 17.10 9.70 771.00 628.00 478.00 660.00 4.66 329.00 
7.80 17.40 9.10 845.00 471.00 380.00 590.00 6.50 378.00 
7.40 16.80 8.90 906.00 539.00 346.00 538.00 6.55 277.00 
8.90 16.60 9.30 885.00 591.00 363.00 542.00 8.25 437.00 
7.80 17.20 8.70 909.00 443.00 299.00 418.00 9.85 336.00 
8.10 17.60 9.90 814.00 502.00 387.00 421.00 11.51 372.00 
7.20 17.90 9.50 838.00 579.00 411.00 289.00 12.87 257.00 
9.30 16.80 10.40 833.00 579.00 244.00 204.00 14.31 145.00 
8.80 16.50 10.80 874.00 719.00 272.00 315.00 24.99 261.00 
11.40 17.60 8.70 863.00 766.00 326.00 265.00 26.79 246.00 
9.38 18.30 8.40 783.00 1123.00 296.00 300.00 36.43 293.00 
^Area under crops in 000 feddans (ASSCN, ADRA, etc.). 
®Wage rate in Ls. per man day (WGl). 
fAmount of rainfall in trni. per annum (WHl). 
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Table E.2. Continued 
PPWHT^ PWD^ FLDX^ WLSCN^ WDRA WGNT WWHT BSTK^ XLSCN^ XPLSCN^ 
1.70 0.85 
1.80 0.35 
2.00 0.58 
2.80 0.59 
2.90 0.67 
2.90 0.70 
3.40 0.69 
3.40 0.45 
4.20 0.57 
5.00 0.19 
7.30 0.48 
10.20 0.59 
12.50 0.24 
13.80 0.32 
13.90 0.27 
15.70 0.30 
104.00 12.00 
112.00 12.00 
110.00 13.00 
98.70 14.00 
100.00 15.00 
99.50 21.00 
102.00 26.00 
95.60 26.00 
93.40 28.50 
98.20 28.50 
97.90 28.50 
98.70 28.50 
102.00 38.00 
98.00 50.00 
96.00 65.00 
97.00 80.00 
0.90 3.20 
1.20 4.60 
1.60 6.60 
1.80 6.60 
2.50 7.10 
2.80 7.60 
2.80 8.60 
3.10 10.00 
3.50 10.00 
3.50 11.00 
5.00 14.00 
7.00 14.00 
19.00 19.00 
25.00 25.00 
32.50 32.50 
40.00 40.00 
2.10 4233.00 
2.20 2060.00 
3.10 1662.00 
3.40 2615.00 
3.60 5194.00 
4.20 5866.00 
4.40 4593.00 
4.40 3091.00 
6.90 2584.00 
8.40 1396.00 
11.60 1842.00 
18.00 2371.00 
18.00 3761.00 
24.00 3240.00 
36.00 2990.00 
40.00 3760.00 
6203.00 32.00 
5193.00 33.00 
4160.00 49.00 
1340.00 74.00 
2640.00 62.00 
3277.00 66.00 
3430.00 84.00 
2644.00 96.00 
3526.00 92.00 
2142.00 98.00 
1096.00 95.00 
1540.00 88.00 
3932.00 82.00 
3382.00 85.00 
1786.00 92.00 
3213.00 78.00 
^Procurement price of wheat in Ls. Per kantar (PPWHT). 
^proportion of wheat delivered to mills at the government price. 
^Flooding index (FLDX). 
JLand and water charges in Ls. per feddan (WLSCN, WDRA, etc.). 
^Beginning stock of cotton in 000 kantars (BSTK). 
^Long and medium staple cotton exports in 000 kantars (XLSCN). 
""Export price of cotton (XPLSCN) in $ per kantar. 
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Table E.3. Region 2 data (Private Irrigation Schemes)®'' 
AWHT YWHT WG2 TMP2 PWHT 
29.20 14.90 0.88 107.00 2.20 
30.00 20.00 0.96 91.00 2.50 
28.00 15.90 1.21 102.00 2.60 
29.40 13.30 1.32 111.00 3.30 
29.80 14.70 1.38 100.00 3.60 
29.30 16.70 1.43 78.00 3.80 
28.60 16.90 1.51 111.00 4.70 
28.60 12.30 1.62 . 116.00 5.30 
27.50 9.80 1.74 138.00 6.00 
28.20 - 13.30 2.16 93.00 8.50 
28.80 14.20 2.70 96.00 9.80 
26.70 15.60 2.87 100.00 13.80 
29.60 22.20 3.14 73.00 18.70 
30.80 19.00 3.42 84.00 19.10 
31.90 15.10 3.87 92.00 19.80 
29.70 17.10 4.61 88.00 21.30 
^Ministry of Agriculture, Northern Agricultural Corporation, 
Ministry of Commerce. 
^Columns are: (1) area under wheat (AWHT) in 000 feddans; (2) 
yield of wheat (YWHT) in kantars per feddans; (3) wage rate in Ls per man 
days (WG2), the same wage rate constructed for Region 1 is used as a proxy 
to wage rate in this region for lack of data; (4) temperature (TMP2); and 
(5) price of wheat (PWHT). 
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Table E.4. Region 3 data (Traditional Rainfed Sector 
ASSCN ADRA AGNT ASSM YSSCN YDRA YGNT YSSM QGUM WG3 
246.00 1565.00 1288.00 1446.00 0.98 5.20 6.20 3.70 790.00 0.70 
234.00 1442.00 1146.00 1362.00 0.79 5.60 6.60 3.50 765.00 0.80 
194.00 1318.00 1085.00 1376.00 0.86 4.70 5.80 3.30 733.00 1.14 
188.00 1743.00 1298.00 1436.00 1.17 4.90 6.30 3.90 788.00 1.16 
206.00 2060.00 1174.00 1614.00 1.08 5.10 6.10 4.10 812.00 1.20 
212.00 2421.00 1207.00 1701.00 1.19 5.40 6.70 3.80 793.00 1.20 
198.00 2388.00 1384.00 1638.00 0.92 6.10 7.20 4.30 826.00 1.24 
189.00 2036.00 1395.00 1612.00 1.20 5.70 6.50 3.70 707.00 1.30 
195.00 2380.00 1323.00 1642.00 0.97 5.50 6.30 4.10 737.00 1.60 
162.00 2978.00 1249.00 1690.00 0.87 5.90 6.10 3.70 676.00 1.98 
128.00 3020.00 1430.00 1643.00 1.07 6.30 6.80 4.00 743.00 2.20 
118.00 2820.00 1658.00 1450.00 0.96 5.80 6.40 3.80 774.00 2.30 
116.00 2686.00 1623.00 1170.00 0.88 5.20 5.90 3.20 711.00 2.50 
119.00 2647.00 1205.00 1260.00 0.84 4.10 4.60 2.80 582.00 2.90 
120.00 3195.00 1312.00 1537.00 1.12 5.40 7.10 3.30 633.00 3.30 
112.00 2468.00 1466.00 1342.00 1.46 5.70 7.40 3.80 689.00 3.90 
®Nuba Mountains Agricultural Corportion, Mechanized Farming 
Corporation, Ministry of Agriculture, Gum Arabic Corporation, Livestock and 
Meat Marketing Corporation, Oil Seeds Company, Cotton Marketing Board. 
^Columns are: (1) area in 000 feddans (ASSCN, ADRA, AGNT, ASSM); 
(2) yield in kantars per feddan (YSSCN, YDRA, YGNT, YSSM), QGUM represents 
production of gum arabic; (3) wage rate in Ls per feddan (WG3); (4) 
rainfall in mm per annum (WH3); (5) intermediate use: cost of PINT in Ls 
per feddan (FSSCN, FDRA, FGNT, FSSM), cost of home goods in Ls per feddan 
(HSSCN, HDRA, HGNT, HSSM), for gum arabic HGUM and FGUM define cost in Ls 
per unit of output. 
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Table E.4. Continued 
WH3 HGUM FGUM HSSCN HDRA HGNT HSSM FSSCN FDRA FGNT FSSM 
522.00 2.11 0.68 3.68 1.26 3.89 2.14 1.92 0.44 1.70 1.14 
501.00 2.38 0.79 3.23 1.31 4.11 2.39 2.66 0.42 1.84 1.24 
463.00 2.94 0.91 4.91 1.53 4.34 3.11 2.91 0.57 1.51 1.59 
492.00 3.83 1.20 13.55 2.63 5.41 3.49 4.69 0.45 2.03 1.76 
536.00 3.87 1.27 13.46 2.45 5.49 4.61 5.62 0.56 2.24 2.44 
576.00 3.93 1.18 19.20 3.05 6.23 5.12 6.51 0.81 2.67 2.61 
562.00 3.74 1.17 11.98 3.37 10.13 6.28 6.82 0.91 4.44 3.21 
596.00 4.05 1.29 25.79 4.18 16.30 6.82 8.10 1.06 6.89 3.40 
447.00 4.10 1.18 17.50 3.96 17.80 8.16 7.10 1.11 7.96 4.29 
513.00 5.11 1.79 12.53 6.39 18.07 8.08 7.72 2.24 7.31 3.92 
586.00 7.53 3.35 23.06 8.18 24.76 10.25 14.49 3.66 17.39 7.10 
490.00 11.58 5.70 19.31 11.91 25.76 11.02 18.44 6.72 19.00 8.30 
412.00 20.69 12.46 20.57 12.61 42.35 13.43 24.77 5.70 31.54 11.40 
382.00 30.68 19.10 21.65 14.32 61.19 18.61 28.95 8.07 38.83 15.89 
524.00 33.85 19.13 47.61 17.73 90.08 43.56 34.62 7.17 51.01 29.15 
506.00 38.85 20.28 133.25 16.06 109.40 41.04 41.47 8.13 63.35 21.53 
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Table E.5. Region 4 data (Mechanized Rainfed Sector)®'' 
ADRA ASSM YDRA YSSM WG4 AGBL 
1941.42 547.58 7.30 3.60 0.70 1.26 
1899.94 417.06 7.10 3.50 0.80 1.44 
2493.42 372.58 7.00 3.40 1.14 1.78 
2212.56 421.44 7.30 3.54 1.16 1.64 
2548.07 314.93 7.40 3.76 1.20 1.89 
2468.70 274.30 7.60 3.47 1.20 2.30 
3205.02 316.98 7.80 3.65 1.24 2.56 
2686.85 474.15 7.60 3.60 1.30 2.40 
3365.16 502.84 7.80 3.63 1.60 2.70 
3316.72 452.28 7.60 3.80 1.98 3.50 
4001.08 347.92 7.70 3.70 2.20 5.30 
4263.10 526.90 7.40 3.64 2.30 8.10 
5096.68 325.32 7.60 3.37 2.50 11.40 
4069.68 306.32 6.80 3.24 2.90 11.10 
5574.60 293.40 7.30 3.80 3.30 29.80 
5718.96 365.04 7.50 3.70 3.90 39.90 
^Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Energy and Mining, Mechanized 
Farming Corporation, Agricultural Bank of Sudan. 
^Columns are: (1) area under crops in 000 feddans (ADRA, ASSM); 
(2) yield in kantars per feddan (YDRA, YSSM); (3) intermediate use in Ls 
per feddan (FDRA, HDRA, FSSM, HSSM); (4) wage rate in Ls per man day 
(WG4), same index as Region 3; (5) rainfall mm pr annum (WH4), same index 
as in Region 3; (6) price of gasoil in Region 4 index (PGOL); (7) gasoil 
allocation to Region 4 index (G0L4); and (8) agricultural bank loans to 
mechanized farmers in Ls million (AGBL). 
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Table E.5. Continued 
HDRA HSM FDRA FSSM PGOL G0L4 
1.21 1.17 0.74 0.72 1.00 1.00 
1.16 1.48 0.71 0.91 0.98 0.99 
1.26 2.44 0.77 1.50 1.05 1.10 
1.05 2.48 0.65 1.52 1.10 1.07 
1.86 3.32 1.14 2.03 1.22 1.16 
1.46 3.59 0.90 2.20 . 1.33 1.29 
2.48 3.13 1.52 1.92 2.20 1.48 
3.54 3.93 2.17 2.41 2.16 1.50 
4.02 5.12 2.47 3.14 2.45 1.60 
6.07 6.02 3.72 3.69 3.54 1.71 
4.86 3.74 8.08 6.23 7.10 1.83 
4.48 3.94 8.21 7.22 9.50 1.84 
5.61 5.15 13.27 12.18 11.56 1.76 
8.73 9.15 20.26 21.24 11.76 1.68 
8.02 12.01 12.23 18.31 18.50 1.88 
10.88 15.11 14.50 20.14 18.50 1.94 
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Table E.6. Non-agricultural tradables and home goods sectors data^^ 
VDMNF VHMG PHMG UWG VFCAP VF INT VFWHT VFMNF VIMTX 
94.20 367.73 1.00 
97.00 414.82 1.10 
116.00 436.87 1.40 
154.00 646.34 1.70 
163.00 756.53 2.10 
181.00 968.58 2.40 
213.00 1146.19 2.90 
237.00 1510.39 3.10 
283.00 1731.27 3.80 
357.00 2175.44 4.70 
415.00 2534.52 5.90 
525.00 3999.86 7.80 
671.69 5632.86 9.20 
812.99 6760.56 12.30 
1071.00 8655.57 17.40 
1456.00 11969.76 22.50 
0.98 25.60 45.75 
1.05 26.20 46.37 
1.32 45.40 59.92 
1.44 73.90 97.30 
1.51 131.50 132.40 
1.56 131.03 109.65 
1.73 133.67 120.94 
1.92 140.74 169.46 
1.98 120.93 182.38 
3.00 287.15 245.72 
3.71 325.27 458.85 
4.03 383.00 618.34 
4.50 448.30 859.77 
4.92 376.00 1034.92 
5.20 285.60 1124.38 
5.36 259.80 1264.56 
5.60 39.05 38.06 
6.40 39.03 38.49 
7.07 39.61 47.70 
8.57 68.23 78.79 
9.00 87.10 111.60 
12.30 89.02 105.19 
6.49 115.90 120.11 
9.00 130.80 144.30 
21.96 151.73 154.36 
36.26 218.87 243.41 
53.40 235.48 331.54 
55.70 320.96 433.63 
90.50 630.43 662.47 
77.70 414.38 611.37 
148.10 570.92 694.29 
120.50 757.14 809.52 
^Ministry of Planning Economic Survey, Bank of Sudan Annual 
Reports and Foreign Trade Statistics, Ministry of Industry, Oil Seeds 
Company, Cotton Marketing Board, World Bank (1983, 1987). 
^Columns are: (1) value added in Ls million (VDMNF, VHMG); (2) 
price of home goods index (PHMG); (3) urban wage rate (UWG) in Ls per 
mandays; (4) value of imports in Ls million (VFCAP, VFINT, VFMNF, VFWHT). 
(5) value of import taxes (VIMTX) in Ls million; (6) intermediate use per 
unit of DMNF of (NALSCN, NAGNT, NACSD, NASSM, NAHG, NAFINT); and (7) 
intermediate use per unit of HMG of (HDMNF, HFINT, HGHG). 
Table E.7. Demand data& 
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DMNF^ HMG DRA WHT BNS STOZ FMNF UINDXC PWHT 
145.6 149.4 17.9 11.7 10.4 170.5 39.1 1.0 1.5 
148.2 159.7 29.7 13.5 • 11.7 171.3 39.0 1.1 1.6 
168.6 177.8 33.8 15.3 14.2 184.6 39.6 1.2 1.8 
293.4 366.2 39.7 23.2 23.5 265.7 68.2 1.2 2.4 
302.7 391.7 70.7 32.9 26.2 390.2 81.3 1.3 2.5 
295.4 451.7 79.1 39.8 32.2 353.1 87.7 1.4 2.7 
388.4 635.1 89.8 35.2 38.9 502.3 120.3 1.5 3.3 
404.8 919.3 92.9 36.2 45.7 756.3 130.8 1.7 3.5 
466.0 1018.9 164.8 57.2 49.0 759.2 151.7 1.8 3.9 
575,9 1238.1 206.5 73.4 62.7 881.6 179.7 1.9 4.9 
645.9 1356.4 276.8 98.6 79.6 1219.3 246.1 2.0 5.9 
872.3 1913.5 384.8 105.8 103.8 1465.0 300.8 2.2 8.8 
1250.8 2838.8 583.4 179.4 159.8 2343.0 491.5 2.2 10.5 
1410.8 3234.7 693.0 153.9 168.0 3074.0 414.4 2.4 18.8 
2273.5 4632.0 1066.0 212.8 231.6 3149.3 541.8 2.5 20.7 
2850.8 6661.5 1437.1 185.0 330.0 5483.0 757.0 2.4 25.7 
^Consumption is derived from physical balance and disappearance, 
e.g., total supply (import and domestic) minus intermediate use, exports, 
investment demand and other uses. World Bank (1983, 1987), Bank of Sudan 
Annual Reports and Foreign Trade Statistics, Ministry of Planning Economic 
Survey, Ministry of Commerce and Supplies, Department of Statistics, and 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
^Consumption spending in Ls million on DRA, WHT, BNS, STOZ, DMNF, 
FMNF, and HMG. 
^Urbanization index (UINDX). 
^Official consumers' price of wheat in Ls. per kantar. 
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Table 5.8. Income accounts and other data (Ls million)®'' 
GNP GDP PCN GCN PIN GIAÛ GIHG GINA TIN 
765.70 761.00 544.60 162.00 32.00 9.20 7.80 2.10 55.40 
838.10 833.00 573.20 176.60 47.00 10.40 11.60 1.50 76.80 
901.60 897.00 634.00 171.20 62.00 11.10 13.83 1.90 91.60 
1248.80 1246.00 1079.94 167.00 81.00 13.00 18.36 12.70 125.06 
1519.00 1511.00 1295.60 208.50 112.00 22.00 42.50 37.00 214.40 
1882.70 1848.00 1339.00 230.00 249.00 31.00 45.70 36.00 428.00 
2382.10 1340.00 1810.00 277.80 157.00 42.00 56.00 32.00 399.00 
2942.10 2883.00 2386.00 330.70 138.00 43.00 62.30 39.00 414.00 
3313.60 3254.00 2666.86 407.44 177.00 56.00 83.70 34.00 424.00 
4053.70 3972.00 3218.00 672.70 178.00 47.00 79.00 38.00 598.00 
4981.50 4924.80 4002.00 874.80 216.00 60.00 96.50 32.00 764.00 
7137.00 7086.30 5146.00 1186.30 909.00 60.00 133.40 89.00 1649.00 
9809.02 9682.32 7846.98 1264.35 1306.00 127.00 159.60 72.00 1789.00 
11377.80 11493.70 9149.00 1638.70 1551.00 125.00 189.00 122.00 1792.00 
14823.70 14920.00 12107.00 1983.30 1527.00 118.00 274.00 105.00 2114.00 
10795.70 21357.00 17704.61 2664.79 1871.00 112.00 232.00 74.00 2556.40 
^World Bank (1983, 1987), Ministry of Planning Economic Survey, 
Bank of Sudan Annual Report. 
^Gross national and domestic products (GNP, GDP), private 
consumption (PCN), government consumption (GCN), private investment 
(PIN), government investment in agriculture (GIAG), in domestic 
manufacturing (GINA) and home goods (GIHG), total investment (TIN), 
trade balance (TB), net factor income (NFIN), government revenue (GRV), 
transfers (TRNS), export taxes (VEXTX), total tax (TOTX), money supply 
(MNY), nominal saving rate of interest (NSR), nominal lending rate 
(NLR). 
Table E.8 Continued 
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TB NFIN GRV TRNS VEXTX TOTX MNY NSR NLR 
-1.00 -3. 60 164.96 8.30 7.20 110.10 115.00 3. 50 7.50 
6.40 -4. ,30 194.61 9.40 7.80 118.80 144.00 3. 50 7.50 
0.20 -4. 60 205.41 9.20 9.70 142.80 175.00 4. 50 8.50 
-126.00 -6. 30 194.90 9.10 10.80 187.89 237.00 4. ,50 8.50 
-207.50 -15. 00 243.00 23.00 12.10 235.00 281.00 6. 00 10.00 
-149.00 -17. 80 269.37 52.50 16.00 266.37 350.00 6. 00 10.00 
-146.80 -17. 80 330.03 59.90 20.80 309.70 497.00 7. 00 11.00 
-247.70 -17. 80 367.03 76.90 22.80 358.40 634.00 8. 50 12.50 
-244.30 -24. 00 264.33 83.60 25.60 310.50 837.00 8. 50 12.50 
-516.70 -41. 10 398.56 122.80 22.90 388.80 1097.00 8. 50 12.50 
-716.00 -135. 50 502.65 192.20 41.70 502.65 1531.00 11. 00 15.00 
-895.00 -260. 70 847.33 311.40 31.20 738.10 2091.00 13. 00 17.00 
-1218.00 -383. 80 1195.11 510.50 22.00 1067.10 2334.00 15. 00 19.00 
-1086.00 -742. 90 1546.69 627.00 23.80 1232.30 2764.00 16. 00 20.00 
-1284.30 -959. 80 747.23 863.50 19.10 1047.20 4373.00 16. 00 20.00 
-1568.80 -1568. 80 1129.27 953.70 33.60 1329.20 5397.00 16. 00 20.00 
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Table E.9. Foreign trade taxes and effective exchange rates* 
TDRA^ TGNT TSSM TCSD TFCAP TFINT TGUM TFWHT TFMNF TDMNF 
0.10 0.14 0.13 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.20 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.10 0.14 0.14 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.18 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.19 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.13 0.16 0.14 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.12 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.24 0.18 0.16 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.14 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.18 0.10 0.18 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.17 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.15 0.12 0.10 0.15 -0,23 -0.33 0.16 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.15 0.10 0.12 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.15 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.15 0.15 0.10 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.21 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.22 0.19 0.15 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.18 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.28 0.12 0.19 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.17 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.13 0.11 0.15 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.14 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.10 0.10 0.14 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.10 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.17 0.10 0.14 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.10 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.15 0.10 0.13 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.10 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
0.15 0.10 0.13 0.15 -0.23 -0.33 0.10 -0.12 -0.42 0.15 
TCN ECN^ EDRA EGNT ESSM EGUM EDMNF ECSD EFCAP EFINT EFWHT EFMNF 
0.10 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
0.10 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.40 
0.10 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.40 
0.10 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.40 
0.10 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.40 
0.10 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.40 
0.10 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.40 
0.10 0.37 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.45 
0.10 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
0.10 0.50 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.68 
0.10 0.68 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
0.10 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.90 1.30 
0.10 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.60 
0.10 1.40 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.10 2.50 2.50 1.30 1.30 1.30 2.00 
0.10 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.40 
0.10 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 
^Ministry of Planning Economic Survey, World Bank (1983, 1987), 
Elbadawi (1987). 
^Tax rates on foreign trade, e.g., cotton, sorghum, etc. exports 
(TCN, TDRA, etc.) and imports (TFINT, TFCAP, etc.). 
^Effective exchange rates (ECN, EDRA, EFINT, etc.). 
